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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA
HUNTER R. CLARK & AMY BOGRAN*
Foreign direct investment ("FDI")** can be like the quality of Por-
tia's mercy: "twice-bless'd."' It can rain high profits on multinational
enterprises. And for host nations, especially developing countries, FDI
can create jobs and capital for new investments, while providing access
to know-how, technology, and lucrative export markets. For these rea-
sons receptivity to FDI has long been a cornerstone of Nelson Mandela's
vision for post-apartheid South Africa's approximately 40 million peo-
ple. As leader of his political group, the African National Congress
("ANC"), Mandela made the importance he attached to FDI clear in an
article he wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1993, the year before he assumed
the South African presidency. Mandela stated:
It is obvious to me that the primary components of our inter-
national economic relations, which must feed our development
strategy, are the strengthening of our trade performance and
our capacity to attract foreign investment. In addition, we
must examine the possibilities of obtaining technical and fi-
nancial assistance from the developed industrialized countries.
We do not expect foreign investment to solve our economic
problems, but we understand it can play a valuable role in our
economic development...
The ANC believes the most important way to attract foreign
investment is to create a stable and democratic political envi-
ronment. Also important is the development of legitimate,
transparent, and consistent economic policies. Foreign com-
panies should be treated as domestic companies, obeying our
laws and gaining access to our incentives, and the ANC is
Hunter R. Clark, Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1979; AB, cum laude, Harvard College, 1976. Amy Bogran, J.D., Drake Uni-
versity Law School, 1998, is currently an LLM candidate in international tax law at the
University of Miami School of Law.
** As used in this article, the term '"oreign direct investment," or "FDI," means
the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise which operates in a state other than that of
which the investor is a national, the investor's purpose being to acquire an effective voice
in how the enterprise is managed.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.
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committed to the principle of uniform treatment. And while
we do not plan to provide exclusive incentives for all foreign
investors, we realize it might be necessary to make special ar-
rangements to attract the kind of investment that will make a
real difference in South Africa.
2
No wonder it seemed as though the world was only waiting for
Mandela to become the official leader of a post-apartheid South Africa
to re-invest in his nation. After all, there are many reasons why South
Africa would appeal to foreign investors. Foremost, South Africa has
the "most powerful economy" on the African continent. 3 According to
the Africa Competitiveness Report 1998, published by the World Eco-
nomic Forum, "South Africa's comparatively open economy (when com-
pared to the rest of Africa) dominates the southern region and the con-
tinent, as a whole. Its $134 billion size is more than twice the size of
any other African economy .... ,,4
Among the many advantages of doing business in South Africa are
that "[i]ts transport and telecommunications infrastructure is unrivaled
on the continent, it produces more electricity than the rest of Africa put
together and it has a third of Africa's telephone lines."5 South Africa is
also rich in mineral resources, including gold, of which it is the world's
leading producer and exporter; coal; chrome; copper; diamonds; iron;
manganese; nickel; silver; and uranium. 6 Moreover, according to the
U.S. Department of State, South Africa's "value-added processing of
minerals to produce ferroalloys, stainless steel, and similar products is
a major industry and an important growth area."7 Also, South Africa's
"diverse manufacturing industry is a world leader in several specialized
sectors, including railway rolling stock, synthetic fuels, and mining
equipment and machinery."8
In addition, there are indications that currency dealers' specula-
tions may have caused the South African rand's undervaluation.9 This
2. Nelson Mandela, South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AF., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 86, 95.
3. Victor Mallet, Trade and Investment: An African Renaissance, FIN. TIMES SURV.,
Mar. 24, 1998, at IV.
4. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE AFRICA COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1998, at 148
(1998).
5. Mallet, supra note 3, at IV.
6. See generally Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, (vis-
ited March 20, 1999), Background Notes: Republic of South Africa, February 1998
<http://www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/southafrica 0298_bgn.html>, at 5 [herein-
after Background Notes] (for a profile of the South African economy); The Africa Competi-
tiveness Report 1998, supra note 4, at 146-49; NEW AFRICAN YEARBOOK 1997-1998 (1998),
at 418-36.
7. Background Notes, supra note 6, at 5.
8. Id.
9. Down with the Rand, THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 39. See also Investment in
South Africa, 13 INT'LTRADE REP. 1581, 1613 (1996).
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being the case, investing in South Africa now may be less expensive
than in the future, when the rate might correct itself. Already several
multinational corporations operating in South Africa have started to re-
tool or add the capacity to increase export production. 10 In 1996, the
annual rate of return on South African investments was an appealing
18% to 19%, compared with 14% on investments in Latin America, 12%
to 13% on investments in Asia, and 9% on European investments.11 Re-
cently, the Investor Responsibility Research Center of Washington,
D.C., surveyed the 261 U.S. companies currently doing business in
South Africa. Respondents gave South Africa high marks for its infra-
structure, legal system, supply of raw materials and macroeconomic
management.12
However, despite apartheid's demise and South Africa's re-
acceptance into the world community, it has yet to experience the high
levels of FDI it needs or expects. 13 According to South African finance
minister Trevor Manuel, 1998 saw some 955 international companies
engaged in business in South Africa, with interests in about 2,050 op-
erations. 14 These operations controlled roughly $45 billion in assets,
and employed approximately 380,000 people. 15 But according to the Fi-
nancial Times, the statistics are somewhat misleading. Most of the for-
eign interests and assets in South Africa have been there for many
years, while the "flow of foreign investment into new factories or busi-
nesses remains modest for a market of South Africa's size."' 6
This article will explore some of the reasons why FDI fled South
Africa during the apartheid era; the current status of FDI in South Af-
rica; and how South Africa is today addressing the concerns of present
and prospective foreign investors. Finally, it will analyze why FDI in
South Africa is so necessary and important to that nation, to the Afri-
can continent as a whole, and to the industrialized world.
Historically, South Africa never rejected the ideological premises of
FDI in the way that nations opposed to, or suspicious of, capitalism did.
Vietnam, for example, passed laws expropriating and nationalizing pri-
vate holdings of foreign and domestic individuals and corporations. FDI
was viewed by that nation's leaders as an extension of imperialism and
10. See Investment in South Africa, supra note 9, at 1613.
11. See Gary G. Yerkey, BIT U.S., South Africa Expect to Conclude Investment
Treaty this Year, Aide Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 10, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
5/10/96 BTD d2.
12. See id.
13. See Asian Investment in South Africa... and the Indian Ocean, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 24, 1996, at 52; Investment in Africa: Primary Problems, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9,
1996, at 95.
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hence anathema to socialism and communism. Worse, the expropria-
tions occurred during the decades when Vietnam did not necessarily
recognize a duty to pay restitution.
Today, however, Vietnam has altered its ideology, in part because
of its dire economic circumstances.1 7 Laws have been put in place to
protect and attract FDI, and 25 years after the end of the Vietnam War,
Vietnam has recognized its duty to pay, in full, reparations or restitu-
tion for the expropriated or nationalized property of U.S. citizens.s
Consequently, foreign investors are returning to Vietnam to do business
in the new ways and forms acceptable to that government. 19
In contrast, the problem for South Africa was not that it rejected
FDI. Instead, foreign investors rejected South Africa. Although osten-
sibly committed to the growth-oriented economic policies of free enter-
prise capitalism, South Africa during the apartheid era instituted poli-
cies that were not conducive to FDI. Those policies included extensive
state intervention in the economy; apartheid itself, which created eco-
nomic distortions and political unrest; and a "dual rand" monetary pol-
icy. As one analysis has expressed it:
South African economists in the 1980s described the national
economy as a free-enterprise system in which the market, not
the government, set most wages and prices. The reality was
that the government played a major role in almost every facet
of the economy, including production, consumption, and regu-
lation. In fact, Soviet economists in the late 1980s noted that
the state-owned portion of South Africa's industrial sector was
greater than in any country outside the Soviet bloc. The South
African government owned and managed almost 40 percent of
all wealth-producing assets, including iron and steel works,
weapons manufacturing facilities, and energy-producing re-
sources. Government-owned corporations and parastatals
were also vital to the services sector. Marketing boards and
tariff regulations intervened to influence consumer prices. Fi-
nally, a wide variety of laws governed economic activities at all
levels based on race.
20
In an article for the March-April 1996 edition of Foreign Affairs, R.
Stephen Brent, an officer in the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
17. See generally Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order:
Vietnam--A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994) [hereinafter Protection of Foreign
Direct Investment] (discussing the laws and policies of the Vietnamese government re-
garding foreign direct investment).
18. See George Gedda, U.S., Vietnam to Set Diplomatic Link, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 27,
1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 4360298.
19. See Protection of Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 17, at 2009-12.
20. FEDERAL RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY
STUDY 186 (Rita M. Byrnes ed., 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter LIBRARY OF CONGRESS].
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opment mission in Pretoria, South Africa, assessed South Africa's gov-
ernmental policies and performance under white rule as follows:
Despite South Africa's reputation for a well-run economy un-
der white rule, the policies of the National Party hampered
growth severely. Apartheid brought about international isola-
tion and economic sanctions, but the government's economic
management was also poor. For all its criticisms of the inepti-
tude of African states under black rule to the north, the Na-
tional Party followed policies after 1948 that resembled much
of the rest of Africa. It developed massive bureaucratic and
parastatal structures to provide public employment for Afri-
kaners, many of whom were poor in 1948. It embraced strong
protectionism and import substitution. It spent lavishly on
public investments, especially defense and supposedly strate-
gic industries. And it set up puppet regimes in the so-called
homelands it established that had all the elements of bad gov-
ernance that the National Party criticized: autocracy, patron-
age, corruption, and enormous budget deficits.
These policies did not have the same catastrophic effects as in
other countries, partly because South Africa was trying to sub-
sidize only 15 percent of the population [i.e., the whites] and
had a cushion of vast gold revenues. But the policies did limit
growth. After steady gains in per capita income from 1946 to
1974, income stagnated from 1974 to 1981 and fell by 20 per-
cent from 1981 to 1994. Today South Africa's per capita in-
come of $2,700 is practically what it was in the mid-1960s.21
The institutionalization of apartheid 1948 culminated decades of
racial discrimination and formally created dual economies and societies
within South Africa. Laws like the Group Areas Act of 1950 restricted
the free movement of blacks and "had the effect of zoning all of South
Africa's territory according to race."22 Individual blacks were only al-
lowed to live and work in the areas governed by the tribe or local gov-
ernment of which the individual was officially designated a member.
The residents of these "homeland" areas were often "barely able to sup-
port themselves, owing in part to the homelands' arid land, inferior
roads and transportation, and overcrowding; some were therefore forced
to travel great distances to work in 'white' South Africa."23 Other laws,
such as the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, gave local officials author-
ity to segregate public facilities and accommodations, including
beaches, buses, elevators, hotels, libraries, railway stations, restau-
21. R. Stephen Brent, South Africa: Tough Road to Prosperity, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 1996, at 113-14.
22. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIV., SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY STUDY
240 (Harold D. Nelson ed., 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter FOREIGN AREA STUDIES].
23. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 185.
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rants, telephone booths, theaters, train stations, and the like, thereby
forcing social separation of the races.
24
Apartheid proved expensive and unsettling. For one thing, there
was a high cost of maintaining the large security apparatus required to
enforce apartheid. Also, investors grew nervous over brewing social un-
rest. As a result, the government in 1961 found itself faced with a sud-
den deterioration in its balance of payments. The government's re-
sponse was to inhibit the flight of investment capital by imposing a
"dual rand" currency and exchange rate system. 25 The "financial rand"
was defined as "the local proceeds of South African assets owed by per-
sons resident outside of the Republic [of South Africa]."26 In other
words, the financial rand became the currency used by foreigners in-
vesting in government approved ventures.27 The "commercial rand," by
contrast, was made the domestic currency. 28 The financial rand and the
commercial rand were developed to block the easy repatriation of non-
South African owned securities and prevent a run on foreign reserves.29
By separating the currencies, the commercial rand was never affected
by the fluctuation in the discount at which the financial rand traded,
which sometimes was as high as 30%.30
One legal scholar has asserted that the Sharpeville Massacre pre-
cipitated South Africa's 1961 balance of payments crisis. On March 21,
1960 in Sharpeville, a modest township near Johannesburg, South Afri-
can authorities opened fire on anti-apartheid demonstrators gathered
outside a police station to protest apartheid restrictions. According to
Nelson Mandela, "more than seven hundred shots" were directed into a
crowd of several thousand protesters. 31 When the shooting stopped,
"sixty-nine Africans lay dead."32 More than 400 people were wounded,
"including dozens of women and children."3 3 In Mandela's view, "it was
a massacre, and the next day press photos displayed the savagery on
front pages around the world."34 Mandela recalled, "the shootings at
Sharpeville provoked national turmoil and a government crisis."35
Nevertheless, the white society and economy benefited at first from
24. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 240.
25. See Gary S. Eisenberg, The Policy and Law of Foreign Direct Investment in the
New South Africa 28 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5, 16 (Feb. 1994).
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 17.





35. MANDELA, supra note 31, at 238.
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governmental support and prospered sufficiently under the apartheid
regime for South Africa to be considered a "middle-income country" by
the World Bank.36 By contrast, the black society and economy suffered
as a consequence of having almost no governmental support. The result
for blacks was massive poverty, unemploynient, and poor education. A
report prepared by the federal research division of the U.S. Library of
Congress in 1987, entitled South Africa: A Country Study, concluded:
By the late 1980s, black poverty was so serious that the gov-
ernment began to take steps to alleviate some of the most dire
impacts of apartheid. Government statistics then indicated
that more than 16 million people were living below interna-
tionally determined minimum-subsistence levels. Using nutri-
tional standards as an alternative measure, an estimated 2.3
million people were at severe risk from hunger and malnutri-
tion. In 1988 the [South African] minister of national health
and population development characterized the crisis as 'worse
than the Great Depression,' and in response, the government
initiated food programs and other social welfare initiatives. 37
By then, the nation's economy had deteriorated badly. "Discrimi-
natory legislation based on race [had] affected the mobility of capital,
the development of enterprises, and internal trade. All of these [had]
retarded economic growth."38 Yet for ideological reasons, South African
whites for years had refused to acknowledge what one observer called
the "basic economic interrelationship of the homelands and the White
area."39 In fact, not until 1980 did the government finally concede that
South Africa's economic well-being depended on integration of the black
and white economies, if not the societies. 40 By that time, however, FDI,
which had been a "major catalyst" in the growth and development of the
South African economy since the late 1800s, had declined signifi-
cantly. 4 1 To outside observers, it began to appear that apartheid, and
the government's inability to quell growing black unrest, was having a
negative influence on foreign investors.
42
36. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 161.
37. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 186.
38. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 162.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 207.
42. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22.
Between 1973 and 1978 total foreign investment more than doubled.
[T]hrough 1976 the rate of overall growth (public and private sectors,
direct and nondirect investment) was over 20 percent and reached a
high of 29 percent in 1975. The rate dropped sharply in 1977 to 7.6
percent and to 7.3 percent in 1978. Among the factors that appeared
to have played a part in the decline were investor concerns after the
political disturbances in Soweto in 1976....
1999
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Starting in the mid-1970s, throughout the 1980s, and on into the
early 1990s, international trade sanctions and investment boycotts be-
came weapons of choice in the world's war against apartheid. The ef-
fects on South Africa's economy were devastating. As one report re-
counts:
These [trade and investment] measures included a voluntary arms em-
bargo instituted by the United Nations (UN) in 1963, which was de-
clared mandatory in 1977; the 1978 prohibition of loans from the
United States Export-Import Bank; an oil embargo first instituted by
OPEC in 1973 and strengthened in a similar move by Iran in 1979; a
1983 prohibition on IMF loans; a 1985 cutoff of most foreign loans by
private banks; the United States 1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid
Act, which limited trade and discouraged United States investors; and
the 1986 European Economic Community (EEC) ban on trade and in-
vestment. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also discouraged
trade with South Africa, although observers estimated that [economi-
cally dependent] Africa's officially unreported trade with South Africa
exceeded R10 billion [rand] per year in the late 1980s.
The most effective sanctions measure was the withdrawal of short-term
credits in 1985 by a group of international banks. Immediate loan re-
payments took a heavy toll on the economy. More than 350 foreign
corporations, at least 200 of which were United States owned, sold off
their South African investments. 43
Today, however, South Africa should be very appealing to potential
foreign investors because the country wants FDI, needs it, is amenable
to it, and a democratic government has replaced apartheid. Among
other measures, South Africa has passed new regulations promoting
FDI in public and private partnerships. 44 These include regulations
that reduce tax rates and import tariffs; allow for easier exchange and
repatriation of profits; and which address lagging productivity and the
overall socio-economic difficulties of the black population. Taken to-
gether the government hopes its policies will reduce crime, which has
risen to daunting levels, and increase overall social stability.
To manage the evolution from apartheid to pluralistic democracy, a
transitional Government of National Unity drafted a new constitution,
which became effective on February 4, 1997. 4 5 Through the establish-
ment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the government is at-
tempting to address both the black community's demand for an ac-
Id. at 208.
43. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 192-93.
44. See Mawusi Afele, Africa Cries Out for Investment, but Will the World Listen?,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 18, 1996, available in WL 7/18/96 DCHPA.
45. New South African Constitution Handed Out Free, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Mar. 17, 1997, at 1, available in WL 3/17/97 DCHPA.
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counting of the human rights violations committed by the apartheid re-
gime, and the white community's fear of retaliation. 46 Even with these
progressive policies, however, the current rate of FDI is disappointing.
47
Pinpointing the reason why is much harder than citing any one set of
statistics or figures. The problem may be more a matter of perception
on the part of prospective foreign investors than of reality. Conse-
quently, as the government is already doing, South Africa can only hope
for the best, give assurances, and continue to address the problems it
knows affect FDI.48
For example, one of the problems is that post-apartheid South Af-
rica inherited one of the most complex tariff systems in the world. 49 By
joining the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in December 1994, the
government agreed to abide by the general goal of reducing or elimi-
nating tariffs. 50 A five-year plan to reduce or eliminate tariffs on most
industrial products began in 1995, giving credibility to South Africa's
commitment to overall tariff reform. 51 There had been some skepticism
about that commitment because of the potentially detrimental effect
tariff reduction and other policies aimed at attracting FDI might have
on the alliance between the ANC and the country's labor unions. 52 For
example, lower tariffs could conceivably put inefficient domestic indus-
tries out of business, thereby increasing the black unemployment rate,
which has reached a staggering 41% overall and is even higher among
young people.5 3 The government, however, achieved a compromise posi-
tion with labor with its five-year plan announced in June 1996. 54 The
government introduced tax breaks for labor intensive industries, and
committed to developing 409,000 jobs by the year 2000.
55
The government also wants to remove all exchange controls "as
soon as circumstances are favorable."56 It has already abolished the
46. See generally Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the
Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753 (1998).
47. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I.
48. See WILLIAM M. HANNAY & LAUREN G. ROBINSON, Introduction to A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 6-7 (Vaughn C. Williams et al. eds., 1996).
49. See Tani Freedman, Southern African Trade Hobbled by Complex Tariffs, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 23, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2267308.
50. See Leora Blumberg, Trade Regulation in South Africa, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 48, at 89.
51. See id. at 90.
52. See Mark Ashurst, News: World Trade: Unity of Apartheid's Foes Under Strain,
FIN. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at 4.
53. See Brent, supra note 21, at 114.
54. See Hilfe Country Report: South Africa: July 1995, July 1, 1996, at 18, available
in 1996 WL 11753513 [hereinafter Hilfe Country Report].
55. See id. at 19.
56. Id. at 25.
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double rand system.5 7 South Africa is also expected to remove controls
on foreign investment by its citizens.58 Ensuring the free flow of funds
by eliminating currency controls would more than likely be an "essen-
tial part" of any bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") with the U.S.59 The
policy might also serve to quell the fears of South Africa's white busi-
ness community. If white South Africans know they have the right to
exchange and remove their money from the country, any sense of panic
might ease. Hence they might feel less inclined to actually do so.
South Africa is also seeking to sign tax treaties with several coun-
tries as a further means of attracting FDI. For example, the new tax
treaty with the U.S. provides relief from double taxation and reduces, or
in some cases eliminates, withholding tax on dividends, interest, and
royalties. 60 Other South African tax initiatives include accelerated de-
preciation write-offs and the possibility for up to three, two-year tax
holidays under certain conditions.61
Tax treaties encourage FDI because they allow potential investors
to plan for the consequences of their investment choices. For instance,
if a company knows it will receive a credit or deduction for taxes paid to
the foreign country in which it has a subsidiary, it is more likely to in-
vest in that country than in another nation with which there is no tax
treaty, and the treatment of foreign taxes paid is uncertain. Most of the
countries which compete with South Africa for FDI have entered into
tax treaties with many states. Executing tax treaties, like the one with
the U.S., makes South Africa more competitive with these nations.
To make investment even more attractive, the government has
taken steps to curb the low worker productivity which seems to have
always plagued South Africa. 62 "South Africa's productivity is notori-
ously poor by international standards."6 3 According to Dr. Jan Visser,
executive director of the National Productivity Institute ("NPI"), a
South African consulting firm which each year advises between 500 and
600 companies on how to improve worker output, South Africa's low
productivity "is an organisational issue rather than a national norm."64
Visser explains:
57. See Mandela Looks for Foreign Investors, THE ECONOMIST, May 13, 1995, at 39.
58. See Yerkey, supra note 11.
59. See id. (quoting Dana DuRand, counselor for trade and industry at the South Af-
rican Embassy in Washington, D.C.).
60. See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1997, at Al.
61. See generally South Africa-Mozambique-Swaziland: Lubombo Corridor to Cata-
lyze Integration, INT'L MKT. INSIGHT REP., May 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8068620.
62. See Madeleine Wackernagel, at 1, South African Productivity: A National Prior-
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One of the biggest problems in terms of raising productivity in
this country is the lack of cooperation between management
and unions. They tend to fight, not to support each other.
Strike negotiations are a case in point-a perfect example of
how not to get along. For too long, organizations have set
their sights on creating profits for shareholders, as opposed to
creating wealth that can be shared around more equitably.
65
According to Visser, South African labor and management have
made progress toward a "common goal and a common vision," and to-
ward the introduction of modern labor relations and management tech-
niques. 66 He admitted to an interviewer that South Africa "fell behind
somewhat during the period of isolation ... ."67 He insisted, however,
that South African managers "are taking greater interest in overseas
developments and applying them locally, albeit slowly."
68
In addition, the government is planning ways to make FDI easier
from a logistical standpoint. One plan calls for the creation of "one-
stop" investment facilitation centers where prospective foreign investors
could do everything necessary, such as obtaining licenses and permits,
to start doing business in South Africa immediately and avoid having to
deal with numerous government agencies.
69
Another policy is to privatize some, if not most, large state enter-
prises, which should create tremendous FDI opportunities. A prime ex-
ample of the government's resolve to commence privatization has been
the acquisition of an equity partner in Telkom, the state telecommuni-
cations enterprise. According to one report, Telkom's partial privatiza-
tion, by which the South African government relinquished a 30% inter-
est in the parastatal, was motivated by the potential for "reduced
tariffs, extra calls, and higher tax revenues that have followed such
moves in other countries."70 The government is planning more whole or
65. Id.
66. Wackernagel, supra note 62, at 1.
67. Id. at 2
68. Id.
69. See South Africa: A Trade Strategy that Dreams of Jobs, AFR. NEWS SERV., Sept.
18, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 17256788.
70. VeldCom, THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 64. The Economist reported that in
March 1998, a U.S. company, SBC Communications of San Antonio, Texas, acquired an
18% share of Telkom. See id. According to the report, SBC stands to profit handsomely
from the acquisition, if current market trends are any indication, in large part because of
growing South African consumer demand for mobile phones. The Economist report states:
The bright spot for Telkom is mobiles. Since 1993, when the devices
were first licensed, the number of users has rocketed from 12,500 to
about 1.6 m, making South Africa one of the world's largest markets
for mobile phones outside the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development]. In a country where public phones are
almost non-existent (people steal them for their value as scrap metal),
the cellphone is a must for the well-off and a status symbol for every-
1999
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partial privatization.7 1
As stated, South Africa has made itself more attractive for FDI not
only because it wants FDI, but also because it needs it. FDI is a corner-
stone of the government's approach to economic development. In the
past, during decades spent in exile or in jail ANC leaders espoused so-
cialist ideals.72 But contrary to conventional expectations, the ANC
since coming to power in 1994 has committed South Africa to conserva-
tive economic policies, such as deficit reduction.7 3 Toward that end the
government would like to create jobs for the black population, but it
cannot expand the civil service payroll as a means of reducing unem-
ployment.74 Due in part to the current lack of FDI, however, some gov-
ernment intervention has been required.75 The primary governmental
initiative designed to address the inequalities created by apartheid is
the Reconstruction and Development Program ("RDP").
76
So far, the RDP has emphasized the redirection of current govern-
ment spending rather than new expenditures. The government, since
1996, has been trying to reduce the deficit to 3% of its gross domestic
product ("GDP") by the year 2000, down from 5.2% in 1996. 77 This
commits the government to a difficult and dangerous balancing act. On
the one hand, it must hold spending to levels that will make South Af-
rica attractive to foreign investors. On the other, it must improve black
living conditions enough to avoid political unrest until such time as the
benefits of increased FDI can be realized. It is only through increased
FDI that the South African GDP can grow between 5% and 6% annu-
ally, the rate required to significantly reduce the high rate of black un-
employment.7 8 As one analyst has concluded, "[p]rivate sector growth is
one else. Nervous drivers like to know they can call for help if they
break down somewhere dangerous. A recent letter to the Sowetan
raged against immoral township girls who sleep with any man who
owns a mobile phone.
Telkom is one of two mobile providers. It is a partner of Britain's Vo-
daphone in a joint venture called Vodacom, which claims millions of
subscribers. Its estimated pre-tax profits are 500 million rand
($100m) on sales of perhaps 1.8 billion rand [$360 million]. MTN, the
other mobile firm, with fewer customers, but wealthier ones, probably
has similar revenues. The good times are likely to continue ....
Id.
71. See, e.g., Mandela Says Foundations Laid for a Better Life, but Admits Problems,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 7, 1997, at 1, available in WL 2/7/97 DCHPA.
72. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I.
73. Id.
74. Brent, supra note 21, at 116.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 114.
77. See Ashurst, supra note 52, at 4.
78. See Brent, supra note 21, at 116. The government has already demonstrated its
resolve to avoid inflating the civil service or having a fire sale of all of the parastatals.
VOL. 27:3
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
the only long-term solution for South Africa's economic straits. But to
generate the political capital necessary to pursue long-term growth, the
government will have to combine economic liberalization with effective
interventions to help the black majority."
79
Additionally the government must decide whether to focus on capi-
tal intensive, as opposed to labor intensive, FDI. The two are antitheti-
cal. Capital intensive production methods utilize the most advanced
equipment and technology to decrease labor costs, whereas labor inten-
sive methods are ordinarily used when there is insufficient capital to
invest in the latest technological advances. On the one hand, South Af-
rica needs to update its technological infrastructure. In the long run,
capital intensive production methods will make South African products
more competitive and thus expand export markets. Conversely, how-
ever, labor intensive FDI would reduce black unemployment-at least
in the short-run-which appears to be an economic and political im-
perative. For this reason the government has introduced tax breaks for
labor intensive industries.
Fortunately, opinion polls indicate that South Africa's black popu-
lation does not seek immediate payoffs, but is willing to endure incre-
mental change for small but tangible improvements now, combined
with the realistic possibility of a better life for black children.8 0 Ac-
cording to one observer, South Africa's black communities have shown
"little evidence of populist factions in revolt against the compromises of
the new government."'s However, if neighboring Zimbabwe's experi-
ence is any indication, the South African government may have no more
than a ten-year window of opportunity to make significant changes.8 2
Yet South Africa's domestic economy cannot provide the capital necessary to develop jobs
because there is a drastic shortage of savings, from which domestic capital investment
normally comes; productivity of domestic industries is weak; and the skill level of the
work force is low. See id. at 115. Therefore, it is only through FDI that South Africa can
acquire the technical and capital revitalization to improve its export production and grow
its economy to reduce the number of unemployed.
79. Id. at 114.
80. See id. at 117.
81. Id. at 113. Apparently most whites feel the same way. Brent states:
Since the [1994] election, the once-feared threat of right-wing violence
has faded. Although extremist Eugene Terre'blanche of the Afrikaner
Resistance Movement still appears on his horse from time to time,
most conservative Afrikaners accept the new government, which
President Mandela has made easier for them by bending over back-
ward to respond to white concerns.
Id.
82. See id. at 116-17. In 1980, the people of Zimbabwe were willing to accept slow
economic progress, but when by 1994 they had not experienced significant changes in
black participation in the economy through business ownership, there was a backlash
against the government. See id. Even though the government of Zimbabwe succeeded in
correcting many social welfare problems, and increased black employment by the govern-
ment, it failed to provide measures to encourage black business ownership and reduce
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As stated, the South African government cannot provide the neces-
sary type of long term improvements for blacks without significant con-
tributions from the private sector through FDI. In addition, white
South Africans must realize and accept that their expectations must
change. Whites no longer live under a regime which benefits them at
the expense of others, as did apartheid, a system which, as one writer
put it, "oppressed the majority of South Africans for the enrichment of a
few."8 3 To avoid turmoil and unrest, the government will have to keep
all sectors of the economy focused on the long term growth that will
provide jobs and allow for the development of the black community.
8 4
Aside from the economic issues that concern foreign investors, the
political question of who and what will come after Nelson Mandela lin-
gers. His ANC will clearly remain the majority political group. Going
into the 1999 elections, the ANC controls over 60% of the seats in par-
liament.8 5 The question is whether the ANC will be able to govern ef-
fectively and responsibly without Mandela.
It is possible. Mandela is not as important to the day-to-day opera-
tion of the government as would seem at first blush.8 6 His importance
derives from his moral integrity and ability to unify various factions.
8 7
His nation and the world have clung to him as a "saint-like figure," both
while he was in prison and since his release.8 8 One observer has de-
scribed him as "among the planet's foremost moral authorities."89 Man-
dela has devoted most of his life, including nearly 30 years in prison, to
the struggle against apartheid. 90 As an ANC leader, he came to under-
stand the ways in which the colored, Asian, and white communities, as
well as blacks, were denigrated by apartheid, and that therefore South
Africa itself was the victim.9 1 He has championed South Africa as a
white control of the economy. See id. Instead, the Zimbabwean government settled for
alleviating black unemployment through government jobs and benefits. See id.
83. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Facing the Truth in South Africa, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
1998, at C7.
84. See Brent, supra note 21, at 117. 'The challenge for the [South African] govern-
ment is to keep the focus on long-term growth but provide enough benefits to the majority
population along the way that political consensus can be maintained and moral commit-
ments protected." Id.
85. Lansing & King, supra note 46, at 759. Next in parliamentary representation are
the New National Party and the IFP. Other political parties in the South African parlia-
ment are the Freedom Front, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the
African Christian Democratic Party. Id.
86. After He's Gone, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at 17.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. James Bennet, The Testing of a President: The Visitor; Mandela, at White House,
Says World Backs Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at A26.
90. See generally, MANDELA, supra note 31 (describing Mandela's life and career, in-
cluding his years in prison).
91. See id.
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place of equality for all people, regardless of race, and he has promoted
reconciliation.
This ability to understand, without necessarily agreeing with or ex-
cusing the behavior of all concerned, has made Mandela a person with
whom the leaders of the different racial groups have been able to
achieve compromise. Mandela demonstrated this ability by insisting
that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezei, and the Inkatha Freedom Party
("IFP") which he leads, be included in the transitional government of
national unity that drafted the new constitution. Buthelezi and the IFP
had opposed the ANC throughout the struggle against apartheid.
92
Mandela's conciliatory attributes were also reflected in the strong sup-
port for the new constitution demonstrated by the white-dominated
New Nationalist Party, the modern incarnation of the Nationalist Party
that institutionalized apartheid in 1948.
Yet South Africa's future cannot depend solely on one man. No one
understands this better than Mandela himself, who will be 80 years old
when his term of office expires in 1999, and has made clear that he will
not run for a second term of office. 93 Besides, while his moral courage
and efforts to lead South Africa out of apartheid should be lauded, his
skills as president should not be held out as perfect or otherworldly.
His tenure was successful in the broadest possible sense: he trans-
formed his country from "a racist, pariah state to a major, regional dip-
lomatic power."94 He can also take pride in the fact that his policies
"brought clean water to 3 million people and connected more than 2
million people to the electricity grid."95 Like other politicians, though,
Mandela has made mistakes and has been involved in funding as well
as personal scandals.9 6 Thus, his departure as president of South Af-
rica should not be viewed as an apocalypse.
Mandela has already delegated most of the daily running of the
government to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and has virtually
92. See Lansing & King, supra note 46.
Currently, there are nine major tribes in South Africa. The largest is
the Zulu tribe, which dominates the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
The second largest is the Xhosa tribe, which dominates the ANC (Nel-
son Mandela is a Xhosa prince). Historically, the Zulu and the Xhosa
have not gotten along. The antagonism between the tribes was used
by the white government in the 1970s and 1980s to promote division
among blacks, particularly between the IFP and the ANC.
Id. at 758. See also Kenneth D. Kaunda, The First Shall Be the Last: The African Na-
tional Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party Dispute, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 841, 842
(1993). Mr. Kaunda is former president of Zambia.
93. After He's Gone, supra note 86, at 17.
94. Daniel J. Wakin, Mandela: "Long Walk" Is Not Over, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 5,1999,
available in 1999 WL 11925039.
95. Id.
96. After He's Gone, supra note 86, at 17.
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anointed Mbeki as his successor. 97 As long as Mandela is in the back-
ground and participating in the ANC, even if he no longer holds a gov-
ernmental office, Mbeki's transition to power should be smooth. Once
in office Mbeki must show that he, too, can be a consensus builder. He
must also be able to control the more radical elements within the ANC,
a tough job if the promised improvements in black living conditions are
not forthcoming.
Mbeki has worked with former South African president F. W. de
Klerk, Chief Buthelezei, and other leading economic ministers on the
economic council that guides the growth of South Africa's economy.
98
An economist by training, Mbeki was educated in the United Kingdom,
and spent many years in exile in the former Soviet Union during the
apartheid era. 99 To his advantage, he has impeccable credentials
within the ANC.100 In 1997 Fikile Bam, a judge who was imprisoned
with Mandela on Robben Island, described Mbeki to an interviewer as a
courteous man, "good at economic issues and foreign policy."11 Bam
went on to speculate that Mbeki might even be able to handle the
"wealth gap" better than Mandela. 10 2 Like Mandela, Mbeki focuses on
economic liberalization. 10 3 His designation as Mandela's "heir appar-
ent" should comfort the white population, the ANC, and the interna-
tional community as a whole because he will probably not seek to make
any dramatic changes in the policies followed by Mandela's govern-
ment.1
0 4
Besides, South Africa's future as a pluralistic democracy lies not in
any one man's ability to govern, but rather first and foremost in the
new South African constitution, which is the culmination of all the
goals and aspirations Mandela has for a racially tolerant South Af-
rica.1 05 When he signed the document into law on December 10, 1996,
in Sharpeville, site of the dastardly massacre that became the rallying
cry of the anti-apartheid movement, "Mandela's pen brought to life
long-dreamed-of guarantees of racial equality and cultural protection,
as well as freedom of expression, association and religion, in one of the
world's most liberal constitutions."10 6 Ultimately, it will take the suc-
cess of that constitution to alleviate the lingering concerns of current
97. See id.
98. See Brent, supra note 21, at 117-18.
99. See Anthony Lewis, Part Democrat/Part Autocrat; Mandela the Pol, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Mar. 23, 1997, at 44; Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
100. See Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
101. Lewis, supra note 99, at 44.
102. Id.
103. Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
104. Id.
105. How Wrong Is It Going?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at 23.
106. Lynne Duke, Hopes and History Mingle as Mandela Signs Charter: Ceremony
Held in Town of 1960 Massacre, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A19.
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and prospective foreign investors.
In addition to the matters already discussed, there are other fears
which inhibit current and prospective FDI. These fears will have to be
addressed by the next South African government. Among them: trepi-
dation over the strength of South Africa's labor unions and the labor
movement's alliance with the ANC;10 7 the limited availability of quali-
fied black managers and executives;1 08 the manner in which established
South African conglomerates might act to protect their home markets
from foreign "intruders;"10 9 and worries over South Africa's high crime
rate."10
In regard to South African crime, the random and violent nature of
it seems to be its most abhorrent aspect."' The government can, how-
ever, claim some success in the war against it. For instance, recent sta-
tistics show that the South African murder rate has declined steadily
since 1994.112 Nevertheless, in his final state of the nation speech to
parliament in February 1999, Mandela felt compelled to address the
crime problem. He assured his countrymen, "[t]he battle against crime
has been joined and we have no doubts at all who the victors will be."113
107. See generally Eric Taylor, The History of Foreign Investment and Labor Law in
South Africa and the Impact on Investment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 611 (1996) (for a discussion of South Africa's labor laws and the rela-
tionship between the South African labor movement and the ANC).
108. For a discussion of South Africa's efforts to include blacks in the executive and
managerial job market, see Lynne Duke, South African Blacks Lag in Job Market Despite
Gain in Political Power, WASH. POST, July 14, 1996, at A24.
109. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I. This concern over possible protectionist behavior
by existing South African conglomerates is best-addressed by the government's adherence
to the National Treatment Obligation (NTO). South Africa committed itself to NTO,
which prohibits discriminatory differentiation between foreign and domestic enterprises,
when it joined GATT and the WTO. For a discussion of South Africa's ideological com-
mitment to NTO, see Mandela, supra note 2, at 95. "Foreign companies should be treated
as domestic companies, obeying our laws and gaining access to our incentives, and the
ANC is committed to the principle of uniform treatment." Id.
110. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I. According to The Economist, a combination of fac-
tors account for the rise in South African crime. One is that South Africa's criminal jus-
tice system is a weak and relatively ineffective relic of the bygone apartheid era. See How
Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 21. Another is that organized crime has infiltrated
the country, and South Africa has become a money laundering center, as well as a trans-
shipment point for illegal drugs and stolen cars. See id. at 22.. Analysts differ as to the
crime rate's impact on FDI. Some feel that the high crime rate makes foreign executives
and their workers reluctant to relocate to South Africa. See, e.g., Mallet, supra note 14, at
I. Others say that crime, in and of itself, "probably does not deter foreign investors much:
if there is money to be made or a market to conquer, businessmen will go there." How
Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 22. Even this latter group concedes, however, that
at the very least, crime reduces tourism. See id.
111. How Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 22.
112. See Mandela: 'Long Walk'Is Not Over, supra note 94.
113. Suzanne Daley, Mandela, in Last State of the Nation Speech, Pleads for Peace,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A3.
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By far the greatest obstacle facing South Africa, however, is the
burden of its past: the political, economical, racial, and other wounds
that are apartheid's bitter legacy. South Africa is taking steps to over-
come its past. The government established the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission in 1994 to chronicle human rights abuses committed
during the apartheid era. Chaired by Nobel peace laureate Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, the Commission has been "generally regarded as a suc-
cessful instrument of national reconciliation."'114 The Commission's
guiding philosophical principle, "promoted as a model for nations
emerging from internal conflict, was that the full public exposure of po-
litical crimes was preferable to mass criminal prosecutions as a way of
putting the past to rest."'1 5 In other words, by granting amnesty in ex-
change for information, the Commission has encouraged human rights
violators to come forward and disclose their crimes in order to bring cer-
tainty and closure to the families of their victims, and to the nation as a
whole. Archbishop Tutu has described the Commission's objective and
purpose as follows:
We are saying people who have committed horrendous acts,
demonic acts, monstrous acts, are not monsters, are not de-
mons. They remain human beings. We don't say that because
you are a perpetrator, therefore you remain a perpetrator for-
ever. We say that there is a possibility of changing.. .We-we
are hoping that white people will, when they hear the stories,
say, 'Isn't that incredible?' 'Aren't we lucky that black people
are not wanting to treat us as we treated them?' I'm saying,
white people, please, can you hear the generosity that is being
offered you? Can you hear our people saying, 'Despite the-
the agony that you have caused us, we want to be friends with
you'?l
1 6
But the Commission has not restricted its investigations to human
rights abuses committed by whites. Instead, it has endeavored to strike
a balance between those on both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle.
As President Mandela has stated, "[w]e believe that a government of
national unity should be even-handed and grant amnesty, not only to
those who committed offenses in their opposition to apartheid, but also
to those who committed offenses in defense of apartheid." 117 As an un-
fortunate result of the Commission's even-handedness, neither the ANC
114. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
591, 610 (1998).
115. Lynne Duke, South African Report Draws Bitterness: Apartheid Probe's Findings
Anger ANC and Former Leaders, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al.
116. Interview with Archbishop Desmond Tutu,60 Minutes: Forgive but Not Forget
(CBS television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1997), available in 1997 WL 7899905.
117. Steven A. Holmes, South Africa Panel to Probe Political Violence, Hous. CHRON.,
June 8, 1994, at 15.
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nor the country's former white rulers were pleased by its report issued
in October, 1998. The 3,500-page document described the nation's for-
mer white leaders as "perpetrators of gross human rights viola-
tions .. ."118 But the document also "attacked the claim to the nation's
moral high ground by the ANC, which led the struggle against apart-
heid."11 9
For all its good intentions, it remains to be seen whether the Com-
mission's work will produce the longed for reconciliation of South Af-
rica's racial groups. As one legal scholar has explained:
Truth commissions do not produce full justice. They are not intended
to. Nor will a truth commission reveal the whole truth. But, then
again, it could not have been expected to. Reconciliation will stay in-
complete, and so, too, will the hope for justice. Forgiveness, not justice,
is the price deemed necessary if a truth commission is to help heal a
society of the pain and suffering brought about by internal war and
violent ethnic strife. And this poses the crux of the dilemma: Should
those who perpetrate the most terrible of crimes escape punishment, at
the price only of admitting their guilt by showing remorse? For the ex-
perience chosen by South Africa, the price of peace and reconciliation is
"the truth" with amnesty. It is neither justice nor compensation. How
well forgiveness actually works as a strategy for fostering political sta-
bility will only be seen in coming years.
120
In the meantime, Mandela has expressed the need for what in ef-
fect amounts to a reconstruction and development program for the
South African soul. 121 In his final state of the nation address, the out-
going president lamented lingering racial animosities, especially those
harbored by whites, and issued a call for all South Africans to rise in
support of their new democratic government. He complained:
We slaughter one another in the stereotypes and mistrust that
linger in our heads.., and the words of hate we spew from our
lips. We slaughter one another in the responses that some of
us give to efforts aimed at bettering the lives of the poor. We
slaughter one another and our country by the manner in
which we exaggerate our weaknesses to the wider world, he-
roes of the gab who astound their foreign associates by their
self-flagellation.122
Mandela went on to challenge South Africans to take responsibility
for themselves. He declared:
118. Duke, supra note 115, at Al.
119. Id.
120. Joyner, supra note 114, at 610.
121. Daley, supra note 113, at A3.
122. Id.
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Quite clearly there is something wrong with a society where
freedom is interpreted to mean that teachers or students get to
school drunk; warders chase away management and appoint
their own friends to lead institutions; striking workers resort
to violence and destruction of property; business people lavish
money in court cases simply to delay implementation of legis-
lation they do not like; and tax evasion turns individuals into
heroes of dinner-table talk ....
Something drastic needs to be done about this ... South Afri-
can society-in its schools and universities, in the workplace,
in the sports, in professional work and all areas of social inter-
action-needs to infuse itself with a measure of discipline, a
work ethic and responsibility for the actions we undertake.
123
The Clinton administration has expressed a desire for South Africa
to succeed in achieving the democracy and prosperity to which it as-
pires, and has pledged U.S. support. In fact, in 1998 Clinton announced
that the administration would like to make South Africa the centerpiece
of its new African trade policy. 124 The U.S. has recognized that a stable
and prosperous South Africa is crucial to continent-wide democratiza-
tion and development. South Africa has already taken the lead in es-
tablishing regional free trade arrangements from which all of southern
Africa stands to benefit. These include the South African Development
Community (SADC); the South African Customs Union (SACU); and a
bilateral trade agreement with Zambia. 125 Commentators have sum-
marized U.S. strategic interests in South Africa as follows:
If South Africa achieves the economic and political potential
within its grasp, it will be a wellspring of regional political
stability and economic growth. If it prospers, it can demon-
strate to other ethnically tortured regions a path to stability
through democratization, reconciliation, and steadily increas-
ing living standards. Alternatively, if it fails to handle its
many challenges, it will suck its neighbors into a whirlpool of
self-defeating conflict.
Although controlling the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good
Hope would be important, especially if widespread trouble
were to erupt in the Middle East, American strategic interests
are not otherwise endangered in southern Africa. Yet because
South Africa is the United States' largest trading partner in
Africa and possesses vast economic potential, its fate would af-
123. Id.
124. For a discussion of U.S. trade policy toward Africa, see Hunter R. Clark, African
"Renaissance" and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265 (1999).
125. See Lynda Loxton, South Africa Trade Agreements Are on a Roll, AFR. NEWS
SERV.; Nov. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14178461.
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fect American trading and financial interests that have in-
vested there. It would also destabilize key commodity prices,
especially in gold, diamond, and ore markets. More generally,
instability in South Africa, as in Brazil and Indonesia, would
cast a large shadow over confidence in emerging markets.
American policy toward South Africa should reflect its impor-
tance as a pivotal state. While recognizing South Africa's de-
sire to solve its problems without external interference, the
United States should promote South Africa's economic and po-
litical stability.
126
No wonder, therefore, that on March 26, 1998, while visiting Africa
to promote his African trade policy, President Clinton told the South
African parliament, "America has a profound and pragmatic stake in
your success-an economic stake because we, like you, need strong
partners to build prosperity...." 127 He concluded, "Simply put, Amer-
ica wants a strong South Africa; America needs a strong South Africa.
And we are determined to work with you to build a strong South Af-
rica."
128
For South Africa's sake, and for their own gain, foreign investors
will, hopefully, come to share President Clinton's point of view.
In conclusion, South Africa's post-apartheid government is commit-
ted to FDI as a cornerstone of its economic development policies. So far,
however, South Africa has failed to attract the level of FDI it needs and
wants. The government has therefore taken steps to allay concerns of
current and prospective foreign investors. These steps include tariff re-
duction; the privatization of state-run industries; monetary policies de-
signed to attract FDI; increased worker productivity; and lowering the
South African crime rate.
In order to avoid social unrest, the South African government has
126. Robert S. Chase et al., Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 11,
1996, at 45-46.
127. Address by the President of the United States to the Parliament of South Africa
(Mar. 27, 1998), available in 1998 WL 138738.
128. Id. See also Albright Says South Africa Is a Model for Ties with U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1997, at 6. "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright today held up the United
States' relationship with South Africa as an example of the type of ties it wants with
countries across Africa." Id. This is not to suggest that the U.S. and South Africa agree
on all matters. For example, the two nations have failed to reach accord on a bilateral
investment treaty. This is in part because South Africa insists on maintaining an inde-
pendent trade policy that includes relations with nations like Cuba, Iran, and Libya, with
which the U.S. is at odds. See R. W. Apple Jr., From Mandela, a Gentle Admonishment,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at A2. Mandela has told Clinton that "we [South Africans]
resist any attempt by any country to impose conditions on our freedom of trade." Charles
William Maynes, The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y. 36, 44
(1998).
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also instituted the Reconstruction and Development Program to im-
prove black living conditions and reduce black unemployment, without
substantially increasing government spending. For example, the gov-
ernment is providing tax incentives for labor intensive industries in or-
der to help alleviate unemployment.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the government is
moving to reduce the lingering racial animosities that are the legacy of
apartheid. The nation seems poised for a smooth transfer of power in
1999 from retiring President Nelson Mandela to his deputy, Thabo
Mbeki. Indications are that Mbeki will continue the policies Mandela
set in motion aimed at economic liberalization, democratization, and ra-
cial reconciliation.
Lastly, the U.S. has expressed its support for a strong South Africa
that will emerge as a democratic, stabilizing force regionally and conti-
nent-wide. As this in fact occurs, investor confidence should grow along
with foreign direct investment in South Africa.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of a statutory prospectus in connection with the public of-
fering of securities in the United Kingdom long preceded the adoption of
the Securities Act in the United States. The prospectus provisions of the
English Companies Act with antecedents that go back to 18441 were the
model on which the Securities Act of 1933 prospectus was based. 2 A new
prospectus regimen became effective in the United Kingdom in July of
1995, applicable to all securities being publicly offered for the first time
in the United Kingdom. 3 The new regimen completes the process of in-
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1. The Companies Act 1844, 7&8 Vict. C 110, was the first English Act to require
the production of a disclosure document to accompany an issue of shares.
2. See SELIGMAN, J., THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982) 62-63. The
unique contribution of the Securities Act of 1933 was to provide a waiting period between
the filing of a prospectus as part of the registration statement and the effective date after
which the securities could be offered. Id. The Securities Act, in contrast to the Companies
Act, also contemplated that during the waiting period the regulatory authority (now the
SEC) would review the registration statement (including the prospectus) and could issue
a stop order before or after the effective date if it were deficient. Schedule A to the Securi-
ties Act, prescribing the content of the prospectus, also drew on the prospectus require-
ments of the then much maligned New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 57.
3. Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (hereinafter "POS"). SI 1995 No.
1537. The POS Regulations were amended March 9, 1999, effective May 10, 1999. Public
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troducing the European Community's securities legislation program,
and is best understood in the context of that program. The offering of
securities, however, has two aspects: the legal and institutional frame-
work within which a distribution of securities is completed, and the
regulatory framework governing the firms engaged in the distribution
of securities.
The Financial Services Act of 1986 provides the regulatory frame-
work that governs those engaged in the investment business.4 The FSA
was the product of a compromise reached in the late 1980s between a
government committed to statutory regulation of the securities industry
and an industry determined to maximize its own influence over its own
government, whose aim was, as far as possible, to retain the concept of
self regulation within the statutory system. The result of this compro-
mise was the creation of a single statutory regulator, known as the Se-
curities and Investments Board ("SIB").5 Although the SIB is a statu-
tory body, it was given the ability to delegate many of its powers
(including those involving authorization, supervision, surveillance and
enforcement), and it did so to a group of industry self-regulators that
were, at least initially, heavily practitioner based. The cumbersome ar-
Offers of Securities (Amendment) Regulations 1999 (hereinafter "POS" 1999 Amend-
ments). SI 1999 No. 734. Corresponding amendments to the Financial Services Act of
1986 were made in Section 3 of the same Statutory Instrument. The POS amendments
and the amendments to the Financial Services Act are available on the Internet at
http://www.hm-treasurv.gov.uk/pub/html/doc,/posame02.pdf. The amendments are of
limited significance with four exceptions. First, the restriction on sales literature (invest-
ment advertisements) relating to the exemption for an offering of Euro-Securities is made
more specific, and, perhaps, liberalized somewhat in the process. See infra note 135. Sec-
ond, the liability of an offeror other than an issuer for misrepresentations in a prospectus
is limited if the prospectus is prepared primarily by the issuer. See infra note 309. This
may also have eliminated the generally unrecognized possibility that offeror liability may
extend to an underwriter acting as principal. See infra note 314. Third, the exemption for
offerings limited to offers to 50 persons was amended to clarify what or who constitutes a
single person for this purpose. See infra note 122. Fourth, a prospectus prepared in an-
other EU member state entitled to recognition under the EU Prospectus Directive no
longer requires translation into English and no longer requires disclosure of UK tax rami-
fications. See infra note 171. Although not part of the POS amendments, HM Treasury in
connection with release of the amendments provided general guidance to the effect that
an offering not within a specific exemption does not have to comply with the POS Regula-
tions if not a public offer as that term is defined by the Regulations. See infra note 98.
4. Financial Services Act 1986 (hereinafter "FSA"). The FSA received the Royal As-
sent on November 7, 1986.
5. The DTI may delegate certain powers to the Designated Agency (FSA § 114(1))
upon satisfaction that the rules and regulations of the Designated Agency afford investors
an "adequate level of protection." FSA § 114(9). Schedule 8 of the FSA sets forth principles
applicable to The Designated Agency's rules and regulations. The DTI may resume previ-
ously delegated functions at the request or consent of the Designated Agency. FSA
§ 115(1). If the Designated Agency is unable to discharge the transferred functions or its
rules do not meet the statutory standards, the DTI may resume the transferred functions
without consent. FSA § 115(3)-(5).
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rangement of multiple self-regulatory organizations (SROs) the FSA
produced is to undergo a radical revision, the initial stages of which
were underway in mid-1998, but are dependent upon the enactment of a
new statutory regime. All of the SROs are to be merged into the SIB,
which on October 28, 1997 became the Financial Services Authority (the
Authority). At the request of Chancellor of the Exchequer appointed by
the then recently elected Labor Government, the then Chairman of the
SIB on July 29, 1997 transmitted an outline of the new regulatory
structure. The precise framework, however, is the subject of much dis-
cussion and speculation and will not be known until enabling legislation
is proposed and adopted.6 This Chapter therefore focuses on the public
offering of securities, which, although it will be impacted by the new
structure, is not likely to be drastically changed.
7
The regulation of securities business in the UK is affected by the
fact that London is both the center of the UK domestic equity and bond
markets (for historical reasons there is no substantial domestic corpo-
rate bond market in the UK, so the latter is confined to UK sovereign
issues, known as "gilts") and the center of the global bond market
known as the "Euromarket [PLM1]." The Euromarket developed in the
era of exchange controls and the U.S. Interest Rate Equalization Tax,
which effectively prevented non-U.S. entities borrowing dollars in the
U.S. domestic markets and international U.S. entities from using capi-
tal raised in the United States for their multinational operations. There
therefore developed an offshore market in dollar balances held by non-
U.S. institutions (known initially as the Euro-dollar market), and this
market, through a series of historical accidents, came to be based in
London. The market remained small until the early 1970s, when, as a
result of the oil price increases of those years, the oil exporting coun-
tries found themselves holders of massive dollar balances that needed
to be reinvested. These balances were recycled through the Euromar-
ket, which became almost overnight one of the largest and most liquid
6. On June 1, 1998, Alistair Darling, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, announced
that the Treasury would be publishing draft Financial Services legislation sometime
during the summer of 1998. On June 1, the new Banking Act went into effect giving the
Financial Services Authority supervision over the Banking system. Mr. Darling made
clear that there was broad consensus on the need for a single regulator, referring to "a
new regulator for the new millenium." See HM Treasury News Release 84-98, June 1,
1998, available on the Internet at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
7. This is true notwithstanding speculation that the power to review disclosure
documents will be vested in the Authority. In that event, however, the Authority is likely
to delegate its responsibilities at least for a period of time to the Stock Exchange. Alistair
Darling, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, let it be known that the London Stock Exchange
will continue to be responsible as the listing authority. He also noted, however, that the
contemplated Financial Services Bill "will allow the Government to transfer all or part of
the London Stock Exchange's function to the Financial Services Authority should that
prove necessary in the future." See HM Treasury News Release 16-98, Feb. 6, 1998, avail-
able on the Internet at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
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debt markets in the world. This boost seems to have given the Euro-
market "critical mass," and it subsequently developed into a capital
market that for size, depth, flexibility and product innovation compares
favorably in a number of respects with the U.S. domestic market. The
classical Euromarket instrument is still a fixed-term, fixed-interest
US$-denominated debenture, but the market has expanded to embrace
a variety of different currencies (notably Euro-Yen, although there are
now Euro- markets in most major currencies) and products, extending
to convertible bonds and, to an increasing extent, to equities.
The Euromarket is in principle offshore everywhere. It has no cen-
tral organization, trading floor or even rules. The fact that most of the
major players in the market are located in London is the result of a
congeries of accidents. Indeed, during the negotiation of the implemen-
tation of the Financial Services Act 1986, the threat that the Euromar-
kets might emigrate from London to Zurich was taken sufficiently seri-
ously by the UK government that several concessions to the
Euromarkets themselves were added to the Act. UK regulation is,
therefore, to some extent bifurcated. To some degree, it must address
both the ordinary issues that arise out of domestic securities issuance
and the very different issues that arise out of the regulation, or absence
thereof, of the Euromarkets.
II. DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. Offers of Sale, Placings, and Other Offerings
The distribution of securities in the United Kingdom has its own
distinctive characteristics. The institutional framework for distributing
securities in the United Kingdom is similar in some respects to that in
the United States. The major distinction between the two systems is to
be found in the use of the word "underwriter." In the U.S., an "under-
writer" is an investment bank that agrees to purchase an issue at a dis-
count from the price it offers the securities through an underwriting
syndicate to the public. The objective of the underwriting syndicate is to
distribute the securities to public investors, not to purchase the unsold
portion of a public offering, although in rare instances it may be re-
quired to do so. In the UK, by contrast, an "underwriter" is an investing
institution that agrees to purchase the offered shares at a discount
price if placees cannot be found at the full price. In exchange for taking
on this obligation, the underwriter receives a "commission" (classically
equal to 2.5 percent of the amount of securities that he has undertaken
to accept). Distributions in the UK therefore differ in many respects
from the underwriting syndicates that have been an indispensable part
of the arrangement for the distribution of most publicly offered securi-
ties in the United States for over a century.
The rules of the London Stock Exchange (the "Stock Exchange")
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largely dictate in broad outline the manner of distributing securities in
the United Kingdom. This in part is a reflection of the fact that most
initial offerings by companies are undertaken concurrently with (and
subject to) either a listing on the Stock Exchange or admission to deal-
ings on the Alternative Investment Market ("AIM"). AIM is a second
tier trading system that is under the supervision of the Stock Exchange.
The principal types of offerings contemplated by the Stock Exchange
Rules are as follows:8
An offer for sale. This is an offer to the public by an issuing house
or broker of securities that has agreed to purchase the issue from the
issuing company. This is the most common form of offer. The primary
distinction between a UK-style offer for sale and a U.S.-style underwrit-
ten offer is that in an offer for sale the issuing house does not depend
upon other dealers to sell to the public. The issuing house will make the
offer directly to the general public, having arranged sub-underwriting
(in the English sense) from institutions for its own benefit. There are
prescribed procedures for such offers, as described below. The Stock Ex-
change Listing Rules describe such offers as follows: "An offer for sale is
an invitation to the public by, or on behalf, a third party to purchase se-
curities of the issuer already in issue or allotted."9 The third party re-
fers to the issuing house. The reference to "already in issue" is not as
one might conclude to securities that have entered the trading market,
but to the fact that at the time of the offer (or before completion of the
offer) the securities will have been issued to the third party under-
writer.
An offer for subscription is a variation of the offer of sale that dif-
fers in that the issuer is offering the securities directly to the public.10
In an offer for subscription, the issuer arranges underwriting (in the
English sense) directly for its own benefit. The underwriter agrees to
purchase any securities not purchased by the public.
An intermediaries offer is an offer by an issuer to intermediaries
(brokers or underwriters) who in turn offer the shares to their clients."
This type of offering permits a public offering to be made without af-
fording the general public an opportunity to subscribe to or purchase
the shares. Such an offering, accordingly, is somewhat comparable to
the manner in which securities are publicly offered in the United
States.
A placing, which is an offering of securities by a single issuing
house (or a small group of them acting together) primarily to their own
8. Listing Rules, Ch. 4.
9. Listing Rules 1 4.4.
10. See Listing Rules 4.5.
11. See Listing Rules 1 4.10.
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clients that does not involve an offer to the public. 12 A placing of already
listed securities cannot be made at a price that is more than ten percent
below the market price absent exceptional circumstances. 
1
An invitation to tender is an offer for sale or subscription that is
not made at a fixed price, but rather where prospective subscribers in-
dicate the number of shares they want to subscribe to and the price
range they are willing to pay for the shares. Based on the subscriptions,
the offeror determines the striking price that will result in the highest
price at which all of the shares are subscribed for. The Listing Rules
provide that an invitation for tender must provide for a stated mini-
mum price.
1 4
A placing tends to place an issue primarily with a few long-term in-
vestors. An offer for sale opens the offer to the general public and is
more conducive to an active market. The Stock Exchange Listing Rules
are designed to assure a public distribution prior to the listing of a se-
curity, although they provide considerable latitude with respect to
placings. The Stock Exchange at one time required that offerings of a
certain size be made by an offer for sale. This was because the use of
the placing mechanism tended to result in the sponsoring broker-dealer
and the co-sponsors placing "hot" issues with their favored clientele,
thereby preventing members of the public from subscribing. The mar-
ket-making system has now been abolished, and the only requirement
now is that there be a sufficient number of shares in the hands of the
public in order for the security to be listed. 15 Trading on the exchange
rather than relying on market-makers is now an order driven system
referred to as SETS (Stock Exchange Trading System).
An offer for sale or an offer for subscription typically involves
opening the subscription books to all would-be subscribers during a
limited time frame and, in the event of an over-subscription, allocating
(allotting) the shares to subscribers on a fair basis. The basis of allot-
ment has to be disclosed in the Listing Particulars as a material matter
relating to the offer, and the Stock Exchange would not accept a docu-
ment that contained an unfair basis of allotment.' 6 This does not pre-
12. Listing Rules 4.7.
13. Listing Rules J 4.8.
14. Listing Rules 11 4.4-4.5.
15. Listing Rules 1 3.18.
16. This does not necessarily mean pari passu. In some of the 1980s privatisations
the government's policy objective of securing wider retail holdings of shares was met by
adopting a "bottom-up" allocation, in which small applications were filled in full and large
applications were reduced according to their size. This resulted in institutional investors
being left short of stock and obliged to buy in the retail allocations at a substantial profit
to the retail investors. Retail application for privatisation issues became so popular that
one member of Parliament was obliged to resign his seat when it was demonstrated that
he had made multiple applications for small numbers of shares in the names of a number
of other people, including his dog.
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clude the underwriters, who purchased the shares (offer of sale) or
agreed to purchase the unsubscribed shares (offer for subscription),
from allocating a part of the offering to institutional investors who act
as sub-underwriters (sub-underwriters, although unusual, are not un-
known).
The contrasting philosophies between the U.S. and the UK is an in-
teresting one. In the United States, a public offering is not made to the
public at large, but to the customers of the members of the underwrit-
ing and selling groups. The underwriters and members of the selling
group by and large are free to sell the securities to whomever they
please. The National Association of Securities Dealers' (NASD) "free-
riding" rules preclude allocating shares in a "hot issue" (one in which
the market opens at a premium) to certain categories of restricted per-
sons, 17 but otherwise does not preclude a firm allocating shares to its
own customers on whatever basis it chooses. The Commission and
NASD have expressed some concern about the practice of allocating
shares of a hot issue to executive officers of other companies whose cor-
porate finance business the underwriter is seeking. i
B. Pre-Emption and the Distribution of Securities in the United
Kingdom
The right of a company's existing shareholders to have the first op-
portunity to subscribe to any further equity that is issued for cash is
enshrined in UK company law.' 9 As a matter of company law, pre-
emptive rights can be disapplied, but the power to do so is limited. 20
The rules of the London Stock Exchange, therefore, provide that com-
panies listed thereon must in principle offer new securities to the ex-
isting holders. 21 Overseas companies, however, are exempt from this re-
quirement.2 2 The Pre-Exemption Group, a committee composed of
representatives from the Stock Exchange, industry, corporate treasur-
ers, pension funds, and insurance companies, has proclaimed the sanc-
tity of pre-emptive rights:23 "The retention of this pre-emptive right is a
major point of principle to investors and without shareholders' approval
17. See IM-2110-1, NASD Manual (CCH) 4111.51. The Listing Rules 4.3 preclude
allocating shares to a securities firm participating in the offering unless placed with a
market maker or fund manager.
18. See Michale Siconolfi, Spin Desk Underwriters Allocate IPOs. For Potential Cus-
tomers, WALL ST. J. (Interactive Ed.), Nov. 12, 1997.
19. See CA 1985 §§ 89-96 for the present position.
20. CA 1985 § 95. Pre-emption rights cannot be abolished once for all in a UK com-
pany, but the power to allot without regard to existing holders must be renewed every five
years.
21. Rule 6.18 and 6.19.
22. Rule 17.8.
23. Pre-Exemption Group, "Shareholders' Pre-Emptive Rights" (Oct. 20, 1987) (here-
inafter "PE Group Guidelines").
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in general meeting, the right cannot be varied." Academic economists
have regularly demonstrated that the existing holders do not benefit in
any way from a new issue made on a "rights" basis, but this view has
made little headway amongst London-based investing institutions. The
LSE and the new London capital market, however, increasingly take
into account the need of issuers and underwriters for an efficient distri-
bution process. Pre-emptive rights are foreign to the experience of many
of the new players (including U.S. securities firms) in the flotation of
securities. The American experience is that a rights offering is the ex-
ception rather than the rule because it is inefficient and the existence of
rights is routinely, denied in the articles of incorporation of U.S. public
corporations. The Stock Exchange, recognizing the need to accommo-
date diverse interests within the existing legal framework, formed the
Pre-Emption Group, which has published a number of guidelines that
will have the support of the IPCs (the investment committees of the As-
sociation of British Insurers ("ABI") and the National Association of
Pension Funds ("NAPF').24 Under the guidelines, the IPCs will recom-
mend that their members support shareholder approval of resolutions
for an annual disapplication of pre-emptive rights if restricted to shares
not exceeding five percent of the outstanding ordinary shares and pro-
vided that such disapplication over a three-year rolling period does not
exceed 7.5 percent of outstanding ordinary shares. The discount (price
at which shares are purchased by the underwriter) at which shares are
issued for cash other than to shareholders should not exceed five per-
cent of the market price immediately prior to the announcement of the
issue. The issuer is to file with the Stock Exchange reports reflecting
the amount of the discount.2
5
Subject to applicable company law, and to obtaining the consent of
its own shareholders, a listed company is free to act outside of the
guidelines; however such companies are encouraged to consult with the
IPCs before doing so.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROSPECTUS REGIMEN
A. The Companies Act and Unlisted Securities
A new prospectus regimen became effective in the United Kingdom
in July of 1995, applicable to all securities to be offered to the public for
the first time in the United Kingdom. The adoption of the new regimen,
although it took several years to implement, was prompted by the adop-
tion by the European Union of the Public Offer Prospectus Directive in
24. PE Group Guidelines.
25. PE Group Guidelines.
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1989.26 Relatively little was required in this regard vis-a-vis listed secu-
rities, other than to deal with the terminological confusion as between
"listing particulars" and "prospectus," which in certain contexts are one
and the same. The problem in adapting to the Prospectus Directive re-
lated largely to unlisted securities. The European Union (then the
European Community) in 1980 adopted the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive, 27 which, among other things, prescribed the minimum content for
a prospectus (referred to, however, as listing particulars) of securities
officially listed on a stock exchange in a member state. The standards of
the Listing Particulars Directive already had been built into the Rules
of the London Stock Exchange. The Financial Services Act of 1986 in-
troduced a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of the investment
business (securities business) in the UK adopting a largely new regula-
tory framework for securities professionals. The Act, however, built on
what was in place in terms of disclosure in connection with public of-
ferings. Schedule 3 of the Companies Act of 1985,28 which set forth the
prescribed content of a statutory prospectus, 29 was replaced in 1987 by
the provisions of Part IV of the Financial Services Act in respect of of-
fers the subject of an application for listing on the Stock Exchange. The
Companies Act provisions, however continued to govern offers of securi-
ties not the subject of an application for listing. It was not until 1995
and enactment of the Public Offers of Securities Regulation ("POS") and
related amendments to the Financial Services Act that the scheme of
the 1989 Prospectus Directive was brought fully into force in English
law. See Section V.
Prospectuses in respect of unlisted securities were not subject to
any form of scrutiny under the Companies Act. Delivering a document
meeting the statutory prospectus requirements to the Registrar of
Companies satisfied the prospectus requirements of the Companies
Act.30 The Registrar is a ministerial official who is authorized to refuse
registration of the prospectus only if (1) it is not dated, or (2) not signed
in accordance with the requirements of the Act, or (3) it does not have
attached documents required by the Act. 31
B. The Stock Exchange and Listed Securities
In order to go public and to be listed on the Stock Exchange, a com-
pany must meet the listing requirements of the Exchange, one of which
26. Directive 89/298, 1989 OJL 124 (May 5, 1989) (hereinafter the "Prospectus Direc-
tive").
27. Directive 80/390, Mar. 17, 1980, O.J. 1990 L100/1 (hereinafter "Listing Particu-
lars Directive").
28. CA 1985, Pt. III, consisting of §§ 56-79.
29. CA 1985 § 56(1).
30. CA 1985 § 64(1).
31. CA 1985 § 64(5).
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is that it have an acceptable sponsor. 32 One of the principal responsibili-
ties of a sponsor is to make an appropriate investigation of the company
and advise the Stock Exchange that in its opinion the company "is an
appropriate entity to be admitted to listing."33 Some issuers, including
issuers of Eurobonds, covered warrants and other asset-backed securi-
ties, may dispense with the requirement for a sponsor and appoint a
listing agent instead. The role of a listing agent is similar to that of a
sponsor, but, unlike a sponsor, the listing agent is not required to make
a declaration to the Stock Exchange that it is satisfied that the com-
pany for whom it acts is a suitable candidate for listing.34 Sponsors or-
dinarily are investment banks and are not precluded from acting 'as an
underwriter or otherwise participating in the offering. If a company is
able to meet the admission requirements of The Stock Exchange and an
appropriately qualified person is prepared to act as a sponsor, the proc-
ess of going public (or going to market) in the United Kingdom and the
process of listing on the Exchange are intertwined and basically the
same. For many years Appendix 34 to the Yellow Book prescribed in de-
tail the information to be included in a prospectus that overlapped the
information required in the Listing Particulars. The Adoption by the
European Community or EC (now the European Union or EU, although
also still known for some purposes by its former name of the European
Community) of the Listing Particulars Directive, 35 specifying in Sched-
ules A and B the minimum content standards for listing particulars, re-
sulted in a revision to the content of the listing particulars. The provi-
sions of the Yellow Book relating to the content of the listing particulars
were moved from Appendix 34 to the body of the Listing Rules where,
after amendments and revisions, they reside today. 36 Although referred
to as listing particulars, the listing particulars did double duty pre-
scribing the disclosure required in order to be listed and the disclosure
document used in connection with the public offering. The listing par-
ticulars and the prospectus in effect became one and the same docu-
ment for an issuer going public and concurrently applying for admission
of the securities being offered to the Official List of the Stock Exchange.
C. The Financial Services Act and Listed Securities
Part IV of the FSA essentially left this process undisturbed with
respect to securities publicly offered subject to admission to listing. The
32. Listing Rules 2.3(a). A sponsor must be an authorized person under the Finan-
cial Services Act and satisfy the Exchange that it is competent to discharge its responsi-
bilities as such. Listing Rules 1 2.1.
33. Listing Particulars 2.7[b].
34. Listing Particulars 1 2.19.
35. Directive 80/390, Mar. 17, 1980, O.J. 1990 L100/1 (hereinafter "Listing Particu-
lars Directive').
36. Listing Rules, Chapter 6.
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Act, following the Listing Particulars Directive, prohibits the admission
of any security to the Official List of the Stock Exchange unless it com-
plies with the listing rules of the "Competent Authority."3 7 The Council
of The Stock Exchange is designated by the FSA as the Competent
Authority. 38 In addition, the FSA imposes a separate statutory duty
upon those responsible for the prospectus that it "[s]hall contain all
such information as investors and their professional advisors would
reasonably require." Compliance with the disclosure prescribed by the
Yellow Book may not discharge this responsibility. 39 The FSA also re-
quires that before the Listing Particulars are published as required by
the listing rules of The Stock Exchange that a copy of the Particulars be
delivered to the Registrar of Companies and a statement to that effect
must be included in the particulars. 40 The Prospectus Directive, which,
in effect, incorporates the Listing Particulars Directive under these cir-
cumstances, adds little, if anything, to this basic process other than re-
quiring that the Particulars be referred to as a Prospectus when being
used to satisfy the requirements of the Prospectus Directive. The Pro-
spectus Directive merely requires for securities offered subject to being
listed that "the contents of the prospectus and the procedures for scru-
tinizing and distributing it shall, subject to adaptations appropriate to
the circumstances of a public offer," conform to the standards of the
Listing Particulars Directive.4 1 If securities that are the subject of an
application for listing comply with the requirements described above in
the UK and the notice42 and publication requirements 43 of the Prospec-
tus Directive in the other member states in which the securities are to
be offered, the prospectus is entitled to the benefit of the mutual recog-
nition provisions of the Prospectus Directive.44
D. Unlisted Securities - The Road to the POS Regulations
When the FSA was originally enacted, in addition to Part IV it in-
cluded Part V, consisting of Sections 157-171, which dealt with offers of
securities that were not to be listed. The FSA contemplated that Parts
IV and V together would completely replace the prospectus provisions of
37. FSA § 142.
38. FSA § 142(6).
39. FSA § 146. ("[Misting Particulars ... shall contain all such information as inves-
tors and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect
there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of - (a) the assets and liabili-
ties, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities; and
(b) the rights attaching to the securities.")
40. FSA § 149.
41. Prospectus Directive, Art. 7.
42. Id., Arts. 14 and 17.
43. Id., Arts. 15-16.
44. See § 1.09.
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Part III of the Companies Act 1985. 45 Part IV was implemented in 1987,
and Part III of the Companies Act was thereby repealed as to securities
offered subject to listing on The Stock Exchange. 46 Part V was never
brought into force and the prospectus provisions of the Companies Act
continued to govern the offering of unlisted securities until 1995.
The implementation of Part V as to unlisted securities is a study in
administrative delay. After the adoption of the European Union Pro-
spectus Directive in 1989, 4 7 the implementation of Part V as to unlisted
securities became not only a matter of implementing the FSA, but also
of harmonizing it with the Prospectus Directive. On July 12, 1990, the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published a Consultative
Document outlining and discussing in broad terms the implementation
of Part V of the Financial Services Act and harmonization of the Part V
prospectus with the requirements of the Prospectus Directive.48 The ex-
pectation was that the DTI would propose draft regulations by the end
of 1990 implementing Part V and permitting compliance with the Pro-
spectus Directive by April 17, 1991, the date by which Member States
were to have adopted measures necessary to comply with the Prospec-
tus Directive.49 The draft regulations contemplated by the Consultative
Document were not published 50 and the prospectus requirements re-
lating to an offering of securities not to be admitted to the official list
continued to be governed by Schedule 3 to the Companies Act of 1985.
In June of 1992, the authority to implement those provisions of the FSA
that interface with European Union listing and disclosure directives
was transferred to HM Treasury. 51 The Treasury in July of 1994 issued
a consultation document seeking views on draft regulations that would
implement Part V and belatedly satisfy the requirements of the EC Di-
rective. 52 In July of 1994, the Treasury proposed "The Public Offers of
Securities Regulations 1994," which with some revisions were adopted
effective June 19, 1995 as "The Public Offers of Securities Regulations
1995 (POS).53 Concurrently with the adoption of the POS, Part V of the
45. FSA § 212(3), Sch. 17, pt. I.
46. SI 1986 No. 2246.
47. Directive 89/298, 1989 OJL 124 (May 5, 1989) (hereinafter the "Prospectus Direc-
tive").
48. DTI, Consultative Document on Listing Particulars and Public Offer Prospec-
tuses: Implementation of Part V of the Financial Services Act 1986 and Related EC Direc-
tives.
49. Prospectus Directive, Art. 26.
50. Cook, Likelihood of a Simplified Route to Public Listing Remains Elusive, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at Section I, p.31.
51. See Transfer of Functions (Financial Services) Order 1992, SI 1992, No. 1315,
June 4, 1992.
52. UK: HM Treasury - Revised Implementation of the Prospectus Directive, Her-
mes - UK Government Press Releases, July 20, 1994.
53. SI 1995 No 1537 (June 14, 1995), adopted pursuant to the European Communi-
ties Act 1972, § 2(2).
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FSA and Schedule 3 to the Companies Act were repealed. The POS be-
latedly brings the UK into compliance with the Public Offers Prospectus
Directive.
IV. THE EU PROSPECTUS DIRECTIVE
The UK prospectus regimen is understood best in the context of the
EU Prospectus Directive. The European Community adopted the Pro-
spectus Directive on April 17, 1989 to coordinate the requirements for
the "drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution" of a prospectus to be used
when securities are offered to the public.54 The Directive contemplated
that each of the member states would adopt implementing legislation
by April 17, 1991. The purpose of the Directive is to encourage "the
creation of a genuine European capital market."5 5 The Directive applies
to securities offered to the public for the first time in a member state if
such securities are not already listed on a stock exchange in that
state. 56 Member states must ensure, absent an exemption, that any of-
fer of securities to the public "within their territories" is subject to the
publication of a prospectus by the offeror.57 The prospectus must be
published or made available no later than the time when an offer is
made to the public.58
The Directive is expressly inapplicable to certain types of offers, in-
cluding, without limitation, offers of securities to a "restricted circle of
persons."59 Various types of securities also are excluded, such as certain
government securities; securities offered in connection with a takeover
bid or merger; certain debt securities; 60 and "Eurosecurities which are
not the subject of a generalized campaign of advertising or canvass-
ing."6 1 The provision for Eurosecurities, which includes both Euro eq-
uity and Eurobonds, excludes from regulation in the EU large amounts
of securities issued annually in the Euromarket.62 "Eurosecurities" are
54. Prospectus Directive, supra N. 47.
55. Id., Preamble.
56. Id., Art. 1.
57. Id., Art 4.
58. Id., Art. 9; Art. 16.
59. Id., Art. 2, no. 2.
60. Id., Art. 5(a) (debt securities issued by certain financial institutions); id., Art. 5(b)
(certain debt securities guaranteed by a member state or subdivision thereof); id., Art.
5(c) (certain other debt securities considered by national law as debt securities issued or
guaranteed by the state).
61. Id., Art. 2, no. 2. "Eurosecurities" are transferable securities which are to be un-
derwritten and distributed by a syndicate at least two of the members of which have their
registered offices in different states; are offered on a significant scale in one or more
states other than that of the issuer's registered office; and may be subscribed for or ini-
tially acquired only through a bank or other financial institution. Id., Art. 3.
62. See Warren, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The Common
Market Prospectus, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 46, n. 167 (1990).
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not, however, exempted from the Prospectus Directive if they are the
subject of "a generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing." The
exemption for Eurosecurities appears to have been born of competitive
considerations.6 3 The definition of Eurosecurities has raised some con-
cerns among participants in the Eurobond market that are discussed at
§ 1.07. Securities already listed in a member state are not subject to the
Directive even if publicly offered in the state for the first time.64
The Prospectus Directive approaches public offerings on the basis
of whether the securities in question will be listed in a member state. If
securities are not to be listed in the state in which offered or another
member state, the content of the prospectus must conform with the
minimum standards established by Article 11.65 If a public offer of
transferable securities is made in a member state and at the time of the
offer the securities are the subject of a listing application in the same
state66 or another member state, 67 prospectus requirements must be de-
termined in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive. The
Listing Particulars Directive requires considerably more disclosure
than Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive. In the case of securities be-
ing listed concurrently with the offering, the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive is applicable to both the prospectus content requirements and the
procedures for reviewing and distributing the prospectus, subject to
"adaptations appropriate to the circumstances of a public offer." 68
In the case of the first public offerings of other securities (i.e., secu-
rities not subject of a listing application and not already listed in that
state) in a member state, the prospectus must contain information nec-
essary in order to enable investors69 to make an informed investment
63. Id. at 38-41. "From the beginning, an all-pervasive fear of the Eurobond market
taking flight to Zurich or elsewhere outside the EC dictated opposition to the [Prospectus]
Directive." Id. at 39. "The United Kingdom and Luxembourg were concerned 'that the
[Euromarket] would be driven offshore to Zurich rather than submit to the prospectus
obligation."' Id., n. 132, quoting See Rules Requiring Detailed Prospectuses Adopted by EC;
Will be Effective 1991, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1975 (Dec. 23, 1988). "Once it be-
came clear.. . that a Eurobond exemption could be secured, the goal was expanded to in-
clude Euroequities as well." Harmony, id. at 41.
64. Prospectus Directive, supra N. 47, Art. 1. This can occur, for example, when an
issuer became a public company in one member state and listed its securities because of
trading interest in another member state. The issuer, of course, would have had to comply
with the rules of the exchange relating to listing particulars in that member state, which
would be based upon the Listing Particulars Directive.
65. Prospectus Directive, Art. 11.
66. Prospectus Directive, Art. 7.
67. Prospectus Directive, Arts. 7 and 8.
68. Id.
69. This appears to be a lesser requirement than that which applies in the case of
listing particulars, where the requirement is that the document contain sufficient infor-
mation to enable investors and their investment advisors to make an informed assessment
of the prospects of the issuer. The omission of the italicized words from the prospectus
directive may be significant, but the point has never been considered by any judicial
VOL. 27:3
1999 THE PUBLIC OFFER OF SECURITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 373
decision.70 Without limiting the foregoing, Article 11 of the Prospectus
Directive sets forth the minimum prospectus disclosure requirements
member states must apply to prospectuses for a public offer of securities
not to be officially listed on an exchange in a member state.71 Prospec-
tuses for unlisted securities must be published or made publicly avail-
able pursuant to procedures established by each member state.7 2 The
member states may provide, however, that the person making the of-
fering may prepare the prospectus, in terms of its content, and subject
to appropriate adaptation, in accordance with the Listing Particulars
Directive, even though the securities in question are not subject of a
listing application.7 3 In such event, authorities designated by the ap-
propriate Member State make prior scrutiny of the prospectus. 74 A pro-
spectus so prepared and approved by a Member State in the three
months preceding application for listing must be recognized, subject to
translation, as listing particulars in the member states in which appli-
cation for listing is made. 75 Such a prospectus must also be deemed to
satisfy the prospectus requirements of other member states in which
the same securities are, simultaneously or within a short time period,
offered to the public.
7 6
A member state is not compelled to give issuers not proposing to
list the alternative of complying with the more stringent disclosure
standards of the Listing Particulars Directive, but may limit those
standards and procedures to securities for which an application for
listing is to be made. This, of course, would require that the issuer be
able to satisfy the conditions to listing. Under the Prospectus Directive,
a member state has no obligation to recognize a prospectus meeting the
requirements of another member state that satisfies only the Article 11
requirements. Thus, if an issuer wishes to make an offer to the public in
more than one member state without obtaining a listing in any of them,
authority.
70. Id., Art. 11(1).
71. Id., Art. 11(2). Member states may allow the omission from the prospectus of oth-
erwise required information under certain circumstances, such as if the disclosure of the
information would be "contrary to the public interest." Id., Art. 13(1)(b). The member
state also may permit omission of information if the disclosure thereof would be "seriously
detrimental" to the issuer, if omission would not be likely to mislead the public. Id. Simi-
lar accommodation may be made in the case of sellers other than the issuer or an agent
thereof, in respect of information not normally in the possession of the seller. Id., Art.
13(2).
72. Id., Art. 15.
73. Id., Art. 12(1).
74. Id., Art. 12(2).
75. Listing Particulars Directive, Art. 24b. This is one of the world's more obscure
provisions, as why an entity incorporated in one country would wish to submit a prospec-
tus to its own authority and then demand mutual recognition of another exchange when it
could simply submit the prospectus directly to that other exchange is not clear.
76. Prospective Directive, Art. 21(1).
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he may either (a) comply with the disclosure requirements of the List-
ing Particulars Directive and have the document approved by his se-
lected Competent Authority, or (b) comply with the local implementa-
tion of the Article 11 requirements in each country in which it is
intended to make a public offer. Presumably, issuers contemplating a
multi-member state offering will be motivated to comply with the more
stringent disclosure standards relating to securities to be listed, if that
alternative is available to an unlisted security in an appropriate mem-
ber state, in order to have the benefit of the multi-prospectus recogni-
tion provision. Some may conclude, however, that the cost of meeting
the more stringent disclosure standards outweighs the mutual recogni-
tion benefit. The UK as discussed below authorized the Stock Exchange
to adopt rules to implement Article 12 and permit unlisted securities to
conform with the disclosure requirements and procedures applicable to
listed securities. See Section IX(B).
The Prospectus Directive requires a member state to recognize,
subject to translation if necessary, a prospectus prepared in accordance
with the content requirements of the Listing Particulars Directive ap-
proved in another member state in accordance with the Directive. If
public offers are made within short intervals of one another in two or
more member states, a public offer prospectus prepared and approved
in accordance with the content requirements of the Listing Particulars
Directive must be recognized as a public offer prospectus in such mem-
ber states.77 The member states may not impose any approval require-
ment or require additional information to be included in such prospec-
tus, other than certain country-specific information and translation.7 8
Article 21 of the Prospectus Directive permits EU companies prepared
to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive to sell securities, simultaneously or within a short time period, in
several EU countries on the basis of one prospectus. The Directive per-
mits member states to limit this reciprocity requirement to issuers
having their registered offices in a member state.7 9 See Section IX for
the mutual recognition provisions adopted by the UK.
The EU may negotiate agreements with non-EU countries pursu-
ant to which it would recognize, for purposes of the Prospectus Direc-
tive, prospectuses prepared and reviewed in accordance with the foreign
law of non-member countries, provided such foreign law gives equiva-
lent protection, even if it differs from the Directive.8 0 This possibility,
however, is subject to "reciprocity,"8 1 meaning subject to acceptance by
the particular foreign country of prospectuses prepared in accordance
77. Id., Art. 21.
78. Id.
79. Id., Art. 21, no. 4.
80. Id., Art. 24.
81. Id.
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with EU law. Although no negotiations of this nature between the SEC
and the EU have been publicly reported,8 2 it is possible that at some fu-
ture date this provision may serve as a basis for negotiating a multiju-
risdictional disclosure system between the United States and the EU.
V. THE PUBLIC OFFERS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1995
The Treasury proposed and on June 14, 1995 adopted (effective
June 19, 1995) the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 ("POS").
The objective was to prescribe the content of the prospectus for unlisted
securities contemplated by Part V of the Financial Services Act and to
implement the provisions of the European Union Public Offers Prospec-
tus Directive. The POS is not applicable to securities that are officially
listed or securities that are the subject of a listing application.8 3 Securi-
ties in these categories continue to be regulated by the Stock Exchange
in accordance with Part IV of the FSA. See Sections XII-XIII. The
Regulations follow the Prospectus Directive in that the prospectus re-
quirements are applicable only to the first offer to the public of the se-
curities in the United Kingdom. The first public offering of the securi-
ties may be by the issuer (which would be the usual situation) or by
someone other than the issuer (a secondary distribution).8 4 The POS is
applicable to stock, corporate debt securities, warrants to purchase such
securities or certificates representing them.85 POS does not apply to
government securities (issued by any government) or to "Units in Col-
lective Investment Schemes" (mutual funds and the like).
86
The POS provides two alternatives for satisfying the prospectus re-
quirements in connection with the first offering of unlisted securities,
tracking respectively Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive, establishing
minimum prospectus requirements, and Article 12, applying the Listing
Particular requirements and Stock Exchange scrutiny to the prospec-
tus. The prospectus requirements are satisfied either by complying with
the specific disclosure requirements set forth in Schedule 1 of POS87 or
by complying with the requirements applicable under Part IV of the
82. It is believed that bilateral negotiations took place in the late 1980s between the
SEC and the London Stock Exchange. However, the reciprocity provisions of the various
EC Directives would (probably) have prevented the Stock Exchange from entering into
such an agreement on anything other than a Europe-wide basis, and the discussions were
discontinued.
83. POS § 3(1)(a).
84. POS § 4(1).
85. POS § 3(1)(b). The securities included are by reference to "investments" as defined
by Schedule 1 to the FSA, paragraphs 1, 2. 4, and 5. Debentures with a maturity of less
than one year from date of issue are specifically excluded. POS § 3(2)(a).
86. POS § 3(1)(b) in describing the securities to which the POS is applicable omits
those described in 1 3 (government and public securities) and 6 (units in collective in-
vestment accounts) of Schedule 1 to the Financial Services Act.
87. POS § 8(1).
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FSA for securities officially listed and submission of the document to
the Stock Exchange for approval.88 Under the latter provision, the secu-
rities, although unlisted, are required to comply with a selective list of
the disclosure requirements applicable to applicants for admission to
listing that omits for the most part those that go beyond the minimum
disclosure required by Schedule A (for equity securities and Schedule B
(for debt securities) to the Listing Particulars Directive as incorporated
into the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange. See Section
XIII(B). Such securities do not thereby become officially listed securi-
ties, but the prospectus is subject to pre-vetting review by the appropri-
ate Stock Exchange Committee. This alternative is designed to permit
an offeror of unlisted securities to take advantage of the mutual recog-
nition provisions of the Prospectus and Mutual Recognition Directives.
The Stock Exchange rules and procedures to accommodate this type of
offering are discussed at § 1.13[2].
Schedule 1 to the POS sets forth the content of disclosure for is-
suer's electing to comply with the POS prospectus disclosure require-
ments. The financial statements required are divided according to the
jurisdiction of incorporation of the offeror. For a UK company, the re-
quirements are those of the Companies Act 1985 relating to annual ac-
counts and reports of public companies.8 9 For companies incorporated
outside the UK, the requirement is for accounts prepared in accordance
with the applicable local law, and either audited in accordance with
such law or accompanied by a statement that such law does not require
an audit.90 The prospectus must be delivered to the Registrar of Com-
panies before the securities are offered.91 Those complying with the POS
requirements are not entitled to the mutual recognition provisions of
the EU Prospectus Directive, whereas those complying with the pro-
spectus requirements of Schedule A/B of the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive have the benefit of the mutual recognition provisions of the EU
Prospectus Directive. See Section IX.. The POS also introduces a new
regime of liability and responsibility for misrepresentations in a pro-
spectus relating to unlisted securities.
92
VI. LISTED SECURITIES - CONFORMING TO THE PROSPECTUS DIRECTIVE
As noted above (see Section III(C)), the contents requirements for
disclosure documents relating to securities being listed in conjunction
with a public offering of securities have been governed prior to and
since the adoption of the Financial Services Act by the rules and proce-
88. POS § 4(3), FSA § 156A.
89. POS Sch. 1, pt. 7. See § 1.13[3].
90. POS Sch. 1 1 45.
91. POS § 4(2).
92. POS §§ 13-15.
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dures of the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange is the designated
competent authority under Part IV of the FSA to determine the content
of the listing particulars/prospectus, the minimum standards for which
are set forth in the Listing Particulars Directive. 93 Since the Prospectus
Directive in effect defers to the Listing Particular Directive as to securi-
ties being listed in conjunction with the first public offer of the securi-
ties, only a modest number of amendments to the FSA were required to
prescribe the prospectus to be used in connection with such offerings.
Those amendments were made at the same time as the effective date of
the POS in order to coordinate the Act with the POS and fully imple-
ment the EU Prospective Directive. Section 142 of the FSA was
amended by adding a new paragraph 7A that defines what constitutes
an offer of securities for purposes of the Act and incorporates a Sched-
ule 1 1A that determines "whether a person offers securities to the pub-
lic in the United Kingdom." Schedule 11A then creates a number of ex-
emptions from the prospectus provisions. Schedule 11A provides that
any offer made to any person in the United Kingdom is made to the
public unless to the extent made in the United Kingdom it falls within
one of the safe harbors provided by the Schedule. This list corresponds
with the exemptions from the POS.94 Thus, under this scheme of things,
substantially identical exemptions from the use of a prospectus are in-
cluded in Section 7 of the POS for unlisted securities and in Schedule
11A to the FSA for securities to be listed. Section 144(2) of the FSA was
amended to provide that securities "which are to be offered to the public
in the United Kingdom for the first time before admission" shall be
subject to the condition that a prospectus meeting the requirements of
the rules of the Stock Exchange as to form and content be submitted,
approved, and published in accordance with the rules of the Exchange.
A new Section 156B was added to the FSA making it unlawful to offer
listed securities subject to Section 144(2) in the UK before the publica-
tion of the prospectus. Thus, the FSA obligation to publish a prospectus
in connection with securities to be listed (as under the POS in connec-
tion with unlisted securities) is limited to the first public offering of the
securities in the UK. A new Section 156A also was added authorizing
the Stock Exchange to prescribe the content of a prospectus for issuers
not seeking to list their securities, but attempting to obtain Stock Ex-
change approval of an offer document in order to utilize that document
in another EC member state through the mutual recognition proce-
dure. 95 The same section incorporates substantial portions of Part IV of
93. Directive No. 80/390, Mar. 17, 1980, O.J. 1990 L100/1 (hereinafter "Listing Par-
ticulars Directive").
94. See respectively, supra Ns. 59, 85 and related text. The differences between
Schedule 11A and reg. 7(2) of POS are entirely drafting matters, and the substance of the
two exemptions is identical. The exemptions for the most part correspond to those allowed
by the Prospectus Directive.
95. See supra N. 88 and related text.
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the FSA with appropriate modification in terminology to make them
applicable to a prospectus issued pursuant to this Section. Documents
that are submitted to the Stock Exchange for approval under this mu-
tual recognition regime are sometimes hereinafter referred to as Section
156A documents and the specific listing disclosure rules applicable as
Schedule A/B of the Listing Particulars. The Stock Exchange has
amended its Listing Rules to accommodate the changes described
above. See Section XIII(A)-(B).
From the perspective of a UK issuer, therefore, the potential con-
tent requirements may be set out in tabular form as follows:
Document Disclosure Requirements
Application for listing Listing Rules of the London
on the London Stock Ex- Stock Exchange ('Yellow Book").
change and concurrent
public offering. Can also
be used as listing par-
ticulars to be listed and/or
as a prospectus for offer-
ing in another member
state.
Prospectus to be used § 156A regime - LSE Rules
for UK offering of unlisted for Approval of Prospectuses Where
security and to be used for No Application for Listing is Made
more or less concurrent (equivalent to Schedule A/B of the
offering and/or listing in Listing Particulars Directive 96 plus
another EU member approval from the Stock Exchange).
state.
Prospectus to be used Schedule 1 of the POS Regula-
for an unlisted public offer tions (loosely equivalent to Sched-
in the UK. ules A/B of the Listing Particulars
Directive).
VII. EXEMPT OFFERINGS
The POS only requires that a prospectus be prepared in the event
of an offer "to the public" in the UK Reg. 7(2) of the POS sets out a se-
ries of safe harbor provisions in respect of offers that are "deemed not to
be an offer to the public in the United Kingdom."97 Paragraph 3 of
Schedule 1 lA to the Financial Services Act, applicable to securities to
be listed, contains a number of the same exemptions phrased in pre-
cisely the same manner. The exemptions follow generally those allowed
96. See Art 2 of the Second Mutual Recognition Directive 90/211/EEC.
97. POS § 7(2).
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under the EU Prospectus Directive. See Section IV. There are, however,
some potentially significant differences, suggesting that UK regulators
and practitioners had some concern about the phraseology and, in some
instances, scope of those set forth in the Prospectus Directive. There is
a basic difference in how the UK regulatory framework and the Pro-
spective Directive address the exemptions/exclusions from the prospec-
tus requirements. The Prospectus Directive in Article 1 provides that
the Directive applies "to transferable securities which are offered to the
public for the first time in a Member State" if not already listed on a
stock exchange in that member state. It then in Article 2 lists in para-
graph 1 the type of offers to which the Directive does not apply and in
paragraph 2 the types of securities to which the Directive does not ap-
ply. Presumably, the lists were intended to establish by implication "se-
curities which are offered to the public" by setting forth those that are
not deemed "offered to the public." It does not, however, define when se-
curities are deemed to be offered to the public or specifically purport to
have set forth an exclusive list of what are not deemed offered to the
public. The POS in Section 4, very much like the Prospectus Directive,
limits the application of the POS to "[w]hen securities are offered to the
public in the United Kingdom for the first time." In Section 5, the POS
defines what constitutes an offer and in Section 6 it defines in very gen-
eral terms when a person offers securities to the public in the United
Kingdom. In Section 7 it then sets forth the circumstances under which
"an offer of securities shall be deemed not be an offer to the public in
the United Kingdom."9 8 In the process some of the Prospectus Directive
exemptions/exclusions are modified and a number of additional specific
situations are deemed not to involve an offer to the public. The follow-
ing table compares the language of a number of relevant UK exemp-
tions with the language of the Prospectus Directive and sets forth some
of the UK exemptions that have no precise Prospectus Directive coun-
terpart.
POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
Box 1:
(a) the securities are of- (a) where transferable se-
98. HM Treasury in publishing the POS Amendments in March of 1999 set forth
"Guidance" making clear (1) that whether an offer is to the public under the general lan-
guage of Section 6 is a question of fact in each instance, (2) the specific exemptions of Sec-
tion 7 are not necessarily exclusive, and (3) offerors may rely on Section 6 if the offering in
fact is not to the public. See HM Treasury, Guidance Note -Public Offers of Securities
Amendment Regulations (March 1999), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/docs/1999/78.htm. Offerors, presumably, ordinarily will rely on the safe-
harbor of the specific exemptions.
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
fered to persons- curities are offered to persons
(i) whose ordinary activi- in the context of their trades,
ties involve them in acquiring, professions or occupations,
holding, managing or disposing
of investments (as principal or
agent) for the purposes of their
businesses; or
(ii) who it is reasonable to
expect will acquire, hold, man-
age or dispose of investments
(as principal or agent) for the
purposes of their businesses;
or are otherwise offered to
persons in the context of their
trades, professions or occupa-
tions 99
Box 2:
(d) the securities are of-
fered to a restricted circle of
persons whom the offeror rea-
sonably believes to be suffi-
ciently knowledgeable to un-
derstand the risks involved in
accepting the offer; 100
(7) In determining for the
purposes of paragraph (2)(d)
whether a person is sufficiently
knowledgeable to understand
the risks involved in accepting
an offer of securities, any in-
formation supplied by the of-
feror shall be disregarded,
apart from information about
(a) the issuer of the securi-
ties, or
(b) if the securities confer
(b) where transferable se-
curities are offered to a re-
stricted circle of persons,
99. Reg. 7(2)(a).
100. POS § 7(2)(d); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(d).
101. POS § 7(7); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. llA, 4.
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
the right to acquire other secu-
rities, the issuer of those other
securities.' 0 '
Box 3
(b) the securities are of- No counterpart




(c) the securities are of- No counterpart
fered to the members of a club
or association (whether or not
incorporated) and the members
can reasonably be regarded as
having a common interest with
each other and with the club or
association in the affairs of the
club or association and in what
is to be done with the proceeds
of the offer.
(e) the securities are of- No counterpart
fered in connection with a bona




(g) the securities are of- No counterpart
fered to a government, local
authority or public authority,
as defined in paragraph 3 of
Schedule 1 to the Act;'
04
(h) the total consideration (c) where the selling price
payable for the securities can- of all the transferable securi-
not exceed ECU 40,000 (or an ties offered does not exceed
equivalent amount);10 5  ECU 40,000, and/or
(i) the minimum considera- (d) where the transferable
tion which may be paid for se- securities offered can be ac-
curities acquired pursuant to quired only for a consideration
102. POS § 7(2)(b); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. llA, 3(1)(b).
103. POS § 7(2)(e); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. llA, I 3(1)(e).
104. POS § 7(2)(g); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(f).
105. POS § 7(2)(h); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(g).
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
the offer is at least ECU 40,000 of at least ECU 40,000 per in-
(or an equivalent amount); 106  vestor;
(j) the securities are de-
nominated in amounts of at
least ECU 40,000 (or an
equivalent amount)
10 7
(k) the securities are of- (2)(d) to transferable secu-
fered in connection with a rities offered in connection with
takeover offer;, 8  a take-over bid;
(1) the securities are of- (2)(e) to transferable secu-
fered in connection with a rities offered in connection with
merger within the meaning of a merger;
Council Directive No.
78/855/EEC;10 9
(n) the securities are (2)(g) to shares or trans-
shares, or investments falling ferable securities equivalent to
within paragraph 4 or 5 of shares offered in exchange for
Schedule 1 to the Act relating shares in the same company if
to shares, in a body corporate the offer of such new securities
and are offered in exchange for does not involve any overall in-
shares in the same body corpo- crease in the company's issued
rate, and the offer cannot re- shares capital;
sult in any increase in the is-
sued share capital of the body
corporate;" 0
(s) the securities offered (2)(1) to Euro-securities
are Euro-securities and are not which are not the subject of a
the subject of advertising likely generalized campaign of adver-
to come to the attention of per- tising or canvassing.
sons who are not professionally (3)(f) Euro-securities shall
experienced in matters relating mean transferable securities
to investment;"' which:
"Euro-securities" means _- are to be underwritten
investments which - and distributed by a syndicate
106. POS § 7(2)(i); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(h).
107. POS § 7(2)0); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, I 3(1)(i).
108. POS § 7(2)(k); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)6).
109. POS § 7(2)(1); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(k).
110. POS § 7(2)(n); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, I 3(1)(m).
111. POS § 7(2)(s); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, I 3(1)(r).
112. POS § 2(1), incorporating 1 3 of FSA, Sch. I1A; FSA § 142(7A), Sch. llA, 1 3(2).
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated I Art. 2(1)
(a) are to be underwritten
and distributed by a syndicate
at least two of the members of
which have their registered of-
fices in different countries or
territories;
(b) are to be offered on a
significant scale in one or more
countries or territories other
than the country or territory in
which the issuer has its regis-
tered office; and
(c) may be acquired pursuant
to the offer only through a
credit institution or other fi-
nancial institution;
"financial institution"
means a financial institution as
defined in Article 1 of Council
Directive No 89/646/EEC;112
at least two of the members of
which have their registered of-
fices in different States, and
- are offered on a signifi-
cant scale in one or more
States other than that of the
issuer's registered office, and
- may be subscribed for or
initially acquired only through
a credit institution or other fi-
nancial institution.
Section 3(2)(a) debentures No counterpart
having a maturity of less than
one year from their date of is-
sue shall be deemed to be ex-
cluded from paragraph 2.113
Excluded from coverage of (2)(b) to units issued by
the POS regulation.1 14  collective investment under-
takings other than of the
closed-end type.
(o) the securities are issued (h) to transferable securi-
by a body corporate and offered ties offered by their employer
- (i) by the issuer; or by an affiliated undertaking
(ii) only to qualifying per- to or for the benefit of serving
sons; and or former employees;
113. POS § 3(2)(a); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, 3(1)(t).
114. Section 3 of the POS regulations provides that it is applicable to securities de-
scribed in specific paragraphs of Schedule 1 of the FSA and excludes units in a collective
investment scheme by not referencing paragraph 6 of such schedule that in turn refer-
ences such securities.
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
(iii) on terms that a contract
to acquire any such securities
may be entered into only by the
qualifying person to whom they
were offered or, if the terms of
the offer so permit, any quali-
fying person.'
15
(12) For the purposes of
paragraph (2)(o), a person is a
"qualifying person," in relation
to an issuer, if he is a bona fide
employee or former employee of
the issuer or of another body
corporate in the same group or
the wife, husband, widow, wid-
ower or child or stepchild un-
der the age of 18 of such an
employee or former em-
ployee. 11
6
Excluded by Section 3 of
the POS regulations. 117
An offering of securities is-
sued pursuant to conversion
rights where a prospectus re-
lating to the convertible securi-
ties was published previously
pursuant to Part IV of the FSA
(listed securities), the POS
(unlisted securities post-POS),
.3.
(c) to transferable securi-
ties issued by a State or by one
of a State's regional or local
authorities or by public inter-
national bodies of which one or
more Member States are mem-
bers;
(i) to transferable securi-
ties resulting from the conver-
sion of convertible debt securi-
ties or from the exercise of the
rights conferred by warrants or
to shares offered in exchange
for exchangeable debt securi-
ties, provided that a public of-
115. POS § 7(2)(o); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, I 3(1)(n).
116. POS § 7(12); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A, I 8(a).
117. Section 3 of the POS regulations provides that it is applicable to securities de-
scribed in specific paragraphs of Schedule 1 of the FSA and excludes government and
public securities by not referencing paragraph 3 of such schedule that in turn references
such securities.
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POS Section 7 except as Prospectus Directive
otherwise indicated Art. 2(1)
or the Companies Act of 1985 fer prospectus or listing par-
(listed securities pre-POS).11 8  ticulars relating to those con-
vertible or exchangeable debt
securities or those warrants
were published in the same
Member State.
The exemption in Box 1 expands on without otherwise restricting
the in the context of their trades, professions, or occupations exemption
of the Directive to make it clear that it encompasses institutional inves-
tors, money managers, and other professional investors. This as dis-
cussed below in part may have been to assuage concerns of investment
banking firms marketing eurobonds and other Eurosecurities. On the
other hand, the exemption in Box 2 relating to an offering to a re-
stricted circle of investors limits the Directive counterpart to persons
who are "sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the risks" of the in-
vestment. This appears to be out of concern that a restricted circle
might be a limited identifiable group that knew little about the issuer
and/or investments. For purposes of the exemption for an offering to a
restricted circle of persons sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the
risks, it is specifically provided that any information provided by the
"offeror" shall be disregarded except "information about the issuer of
the securities."' 1 9 A similar proviso is not tacked on to the counterpart
Prospectus Directive exemption for an offering to a restricted circle of
persons. 20 The reason for this restriction apparently is that otherwise it
would be possible to argue that any person who had been provided with
sufficient preliminary material by the offeror would be sufficiently
knowledgeable to understand the risks. The exemption would widen to
include all offers in respect of which full disclosure is made, whereas
the exemption is intended to be a narrow one. What is intended in this
context is that the offering be limited to a restricted group who because
of their relationship to the company or their involvement in the indus-
try or otherwise have sufficient knowledge of the risk without more to
evaluate the company. This does, however, require reading the phrase
"information about the issuer" in the narrow sense of identifying the
company making the offer. 1
21
118. POS § 7(2)(p); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. llA-3(l)(o).
119. POS § 7(7), FSA, § 142(7A), Sch. 11A-3(4).
120. See Prospectus Directive, Art. 2, 1(b).
121. It is also mindful of the position taken by the Fifth Circuit prior to adoption of
Rule 506 in construing the Section 4(2) exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 for
transactions not involving a public offering. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d
137, 160 (2d Cir. 1972) (private placement memorandum cannot furnish the knowledge
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Box 3 and Box 4 set forth two exemptions not specifically included
in the Prospectus Directive. The Box 3 exemption to offers to not more
than 50 persons, presumably, is to provide a reliable criterion that, if
followed, provides assurance the exemption is available.122 The exemp-
tion for offers to members of a club having a common interest in the
club and what is to be done with the proceeds appears to be a narrow
one. It should be noted that the 50-person exemption is based on offers
and not purchases. A person is deemed to make an offer if "it would give
rise to a contract" if accepted or if he "invites a person to make such an
offer." 123 There is an interesting provision as to what is deemed to con-
stitute the offering for the purpose of the exemption for offerings to not
more than 50 persons. 124 For this purpose, securities of the same class
offered by the same person in reliance on that exemptions within any
12-month period are deemed to be a single offering.1
25
It is interesting that the POS restricts the restricted circle exemp-
tion and at the same time adds a 50-person exemption. The POS, unlike
the Prospectus Directive, which is silent in this regard, provides with
limited exceptions part of the offering may be within one of the exemp-
tions and the other part within another exemption. 126 Thus one could
offer an unlimited amount of securities to a restricted circle of knowl-
edgeable persons and also offer securities to 50 other persons without
being involved in an offer "to the public." The exceptions for exemptions
that must pertain to the entire offering include the exemption for Euro-
securities, the total offering cannot exceed 40,000 ECU, and the mini-
mum investment is at least 40,000 ECU. This, presumably, does not
preclude reliance on more than one exemption for the entire offering if
otherwise applicable.
The definition of Eurosecurities warrants extensive discussion as
much of the Eurobond market is centered in the UK.127 The Prospectus
required to make one a knowledgeable investor for purpose of private offering exemption).
122. The POS amendments provide that for purposes of determining the number of
persons to whom offers are made offers to a trust, to a partnership, to a joint venture, or
to two or more persons jointly are to be deemed an offer to one person. POS 1999 Amend-
ments, § 2(g).
123. POS § 5; FSA § 142(7A)(a).
124. What constitutes a single offering is determined in the same manner in relation
to the exemption for offerings not aggregating more than 40,000 ECU equivalents.
125. POS § 7(6); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A-3(3).
126. POS § 7(3)-(4); FSA § 142(7A), Sch. 11A-4.
127. The UK fortuitously had an exemption going back to the Companies Act of 1948
that made London an attractive market for Eurobonds and played an important role in
London becoming the centre of the Eurobond market. Section 423(2) of the Companies Act
1948 provided that "an offer of shares or debentures for subscription or sale to any person
whose ordinary business is to buy or sell shares or debentures, whether as principal or
agent, shall not be deemed an offer to the public" [and therefore shall not require a pro-
spectus] as long as the offer pertained to securities of a company incorporated outside of
the UK Thus, when the Euromarket emerged the UK provided a friendly unregulated
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Directive exemption reads as follows:128 "[I]nvestments which - (a) are
to be underwritten and distributed by a syndicate at least two of the
members of which have their registered offices in different countries or
territories; (b) are to be offered on a significant scale in one or more
countries or territories other than the country or territory in which the
issuer has its registered office; and (c) may be acquired pursuant to the
offer only through a credit institution or other financial institution."
Beyond that, for the exemption to be available the offering must not be
"the subject of a generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing."'
' 29
On the positive side, it embraces both bonds and equity securities, al-
though the so-called Euromarket is largely a market for debt securities.
It conforms with the definition used by the OECD for statistical pur-
poses to identify Eurobonds, except the OECD uses as a reference point
the currency in which denominated rather than the registered office of
the issuer and makes no reference to being purchased only through
credit or other financial institutions. The OECD classifies as Eurobonds
offerings by an international syndicate with significant portions of the
offering sold in two or more countries other than the country of the cur-
rency in which the bond is denominated. 130 Thus bonds of a U.S. issuer
denominated in dollars and sold by an international underwriting syn-
dicate in the United Kingdom and on the continent are Eurobonds un-
der this definition. Similarly, securities of a Japanese issuer denomi-
nated in dollars or yen and sold by an international underwriting
syndicate in the UK and Switzerland are Eurobonds. The how acquired
part of the definition aside, they are also Eurosecurities under the Pro-
spectus Directive definition. The Prospectus Directive definition is also
market as Eurobonds could be sold unrestricted by prospectus regulations in the UK.
Ironically, for many years it had the effect of locking out UK companies from raising capi-
tal in the Euromarkets, although it promoted the development of London as the center of
the European capital market. This provision became Section 79 of the Companies Act
1985. This may explain in part the concern of the City that the Prospectus Directive defi-
nition of Euro-securities might be construed more restrictively.
128. Prospectus Directive, Art. 3(f).
129. Prospectus Directive, Art. 2, par. 2(1).
130. The Institutional Investor was the keeper of the statistics for many years on in-
ternational bond offerings, which it divided into two categories - foreign bonds and euro-
bonds. Foreign bonds were defined as bonds of foreign issuers "sold primarily within one
country in that country's currency and by a syndicate of that nationality." Eurobonds con-
sisted of "deals done by international syndicates with a significant portion sold in two or
more countries other than the country of the currency in which the issue is denominated."
See, for example, Sweepstakes, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l ed.), Mar. 1996, at 119. The
Directorate for Financial Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs of the OECD took over the task of
maintaining the statistics and in 1996 published International Capital Markets Statistics,
1950-1995 and thereafter periodically published detailed statistics relating to interna-
tional offerings in Financial Market Trends. Unfortunately, for a period of time it referred
to eurobonds as international bonds and eurobonds together with foreign bonds as exter-
nal bonds. In February of 1996 it returned to the Institutional Investor terminology, refer-
ring to eurobonds and foreign bonds as the two categories that together constitute inter-
national bonds. See OECD, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, Feb. 1996.
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broad enough in some instances to cover a relatively new phenomenon,
the global offering, since the exemption is not limited to offerings made
exclusively in member states. U.S. issuers often looked to the Eurobond
market not only because of more favorable interest rates, but also be-
cause of perceived savings in offering costs by avoiding registration
with the SEC. During the decade of the 1990s, global offerings made in
the U.S. and registered with the SEC or made pursuant to Rule 144A,
but with significant tranches sold in countries all over the world, were
not uncommon. Literally, even a global offering by a U.S. issuer meets
at least the first part of the definition of the Eurosecurities test al-
though it may not meet the restriction against a generalized campaign
of advertising and canvassing. The possibility of meeting this test is
more likely if the offering is made in the U.S. pursuant to Rule 144A,
which is often the case particularly in a global offering by a non-U.S. is-
suer.
Some concern existed among UK practitioners about, among other
things, the requirement that Euro-securities be acquired only through a
credit institution or other financial institution. A credit institution by
the Prospectus Directive is defined in effect as a bank. Financial insti-
tution is not defined in the Prospectus Directive and is variously de-
fined in other EU Directives. "Financial institution" can have a very
narrow meaning.131 It is broadly defined in the Second Banking Direc-
tive and the POS132 and the related amendment to the FSA setting
forth exemptions 133 both incorporate as part of the definition of Euro-
Securities the Second Banking Directive definition of financial institu-
tions. That definition includes the following: (1) portfolio management
and advice; (2) providing services relating to and participation in share
issues; (3) advising and services relating to on mergers and acquisi-
tions; (4) advising companies on capital structure and industrial strat-
egy; and (5) trading for one's own account and for customers in trans-
ferable securities. 3 4 In addition, the UK exemption differs in one other
significant respect from the Prospectus Directive. The UK exemption
substitutes for the Directive language, "are not the subject of a gener-
alized campaign of advertising or canvassing," the words, "are not the
subject of advertising likely to come to the attention of persons who are
not professionally experienced in matters relating to investment."'
' 35
131. For example, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(46), it is limited
to domestic banks, foreign banks, and saving associations.
132. POS Regulation § 2(1), incorporating FSA, Schedule 11A 3 (sic). Although the
cross-reference is to 1 3 of Schedule 11A, the definition of a financial institution appears
in 2 of Schedule 11A.
133. FSA, Schedule 11A I 2(c).
134. Directive 89/646, Art. 1, 1 6 incorporating Annex 1 2-12, 1989 OJL 386 (Dec. 15,
1989).
135. The 1999 amendments in lieu of this generalized language incorporate by refer-
ence provisions of two statutory instruments specifying persons to whom investment ad-
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The variations between the UK exemption and the Prospectus Directive
exemption should allay most concerns. The POS and related amend-
ment to the FSA also expands the Prospectus Directive exclusion for of-
ferings "to persons in the context of their trades, professions or occupa-
tions"1 36 to exclude all offers made to "persons whose ordinary activities
[in the context of their trade, profession, or occupation] involve them in
acquiring, holding, managing or disposing of investments (as principal
or agent) for the purposes of their businesses." 137 This latter exemption
as noted above goes beyond the offering of Euro-market securities, but
also provides a fall back exemption for an offering of Euro-securities.
Investment banking firms involved in Euro-market offerings generally
use a prospectus meeting relatively high disclosure standards.' 38 The
prospectus, however, generally does not conform to any specific regula-
tory regimen and the Euromarket would like to keep it that way.
VIII. PUBLICATION AND REGISTRATION OF THE PROSPECTUS
The POS requires as to unlisted securities that a copy of the pro-
spectus be delivered to and registered with the Registrar of Companies
prior to publication of the prospectus. 13 9 The POS requires that a pro-
spectus prepared thereunder be made available free of charge at an ad-
dress in the UK from the time of the first offer and so long as the offer
remains open. 140 An advertisement or other notice of an offering for
vertisements can be sent without violating general restrictions on the use of investment
advertisements under Section 57 of the Financial Services Act. These provisions take a
fairly liberal view of persons who are deemed professional investors for this purpose, in-
cluding the following: (1) persons authorised to engage in the investment business in the
UK; (2) European investment firms authorised by another Member State operating in the
UK under the EU passport for investment sevice companies; (3) corporations with 20 or
more shareholders and a paid in share capital or net assets of not less than £500,000; (4)
any other corporation or an unincorporated association that has share capital or net as-
sets of not less than £5 million; (5) the trustee of a trust with net assets of £10 million or
more; (6) persons whose ordinary business involves them in acquiring investments for
purposes of the business, (7) persons whose ordinary business involves managing invest-
ments for others. The amendment also permits the offering, which pursuant to the terms
of the exemption has to be made through credit or financial institutions, to be made to
customers of such credit or financial institutions who effected a transaction through such
institution within the 12 months preceding the commencement of the offering. See POS
1999 Amendments, § 2(e) amending POS § 7(2)(s) and incorporating Article 8 of the (In-
vestment Advertisements)(Exemption Order) (2) (1995), SI 1995 No. 1536 and Article 11
of the (Investment Advertisements)(Exemption Order) (1996), SI 1996 No. 1586.
136. Prospectus Directive, Art.2, 1(a).
137. POS Reg. § 7(2)(a).
138. Because of the possibility that the fraud provisions of the federal securities laws
may follow them offshore, U.S. investment bankers participating in such syndicates often
require from counsel a so-called Rule 10b-5 opinion relating to the prospectus.
139. POS § 4(2). The Financial Services Act § 149 is a similar provision with respect to
a Part IV prospectus.
140. Id. at § 4(1).
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which a prospectus is required by the POS must state that a prospectus
is available and the address at which available. 141 The publication re-
quirements of the POS also are applicable to a 156A document. 142 The
POS requirement relating to delivery of the prospectus to the Registrar
is not applicable to a 156A prospectus, 143 but Section 156A of the FSA,
adopted contemporaneously with the POS,14 4 specifically incorporates
those provisions of the FSA requiring the prospectus/listing particulars
be delivered for registration to the Registrar of Companies.
145
The EU Public Offer Prospectus Directive requires as to securities
being listed in conjunction with the first public offer that the prospectus
be made available either by publication in a newspaper or in the form of
a brochure available at the registered office of the person making the
offering and at the offices of the company's paying agent. 146 A notice
must be published in a designated newspaper stating where the pro-
spectus has been published and where a copy may be obtained. 147 The
Listing Rules include similar requirements with respect to the public
offering of securities in conjunction with an application for listing.
48
IX. MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF PROSPECTUS/LISTING PARTICULARS
APPROVED IN OTHER EU MEMBER STATES
A. The EU Directives
The POS amends the FSA in a number of respects so as to allow
listing particulars and/or a prospectus approved in a Member State to
be recognized, subject to translation, without further review and ap-
proval. The operation of the mutual recognition provisions requires an
understanding of the mutual recognition provisions of the applicable di-
rectives. Assuming the first public offer of the securities in a Member
State, the Prospectus Directive establishes four category of offerings.
First, securities that are not to be listed in any Member State that are
to be offered in accordance with legislation embodying the minimum
standards set forth in Article 11.149 Second, securities being offered in
the Member State for which an application has been filed for listing on
a stock exchange in that state (Article 7 offering).150 Third, securities
141. Id. at § 12.
142. POS § 4.
143. POS § 4(3).
144. See supra N. 95 and related text.
145. FSA § 156A(3) incorporating §§ 146-152 and 154 of the FSA. Section 149 of the
FSA provides for registration of the listing particulars/prospectus.
146. Prospectus Directive, Art. 10(3).
147. Id. at Art. 10(4).
148. See Listing Rules, ch. 8.
149. Prospectus Directive, Art. 11.
150. Id. at Art. 7.
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being offered in a Member State that are not being listed in that state
but for which an application has been filed for listing in another Mem-
ber State (Article 8 offering).151 Fourth, the securities being offered that
are not to be listed in a Member State, but as to which, as permitted by
Article 12, the prospectus conforms with all the prospectus require-
ments and procedures applicable to a listed security.1 52 Securities com-
plying with legislation of a Member State implementing Articles 7, 8, or
12 of the Prospectus Directive are entitled to the mutual recognition
provided for by Article 21 of the Prospectus Directive.1 53 Securities of-
fered under legislation embodying the Article 11 standards are not. 154
The EU scheme of things, in addition to providing for mutual rec-
ognition of prospectuses, provides under appropriate circumstances for
mutual recognition of listing particulars in connection with the listing
of securities. The Listing Particulars Directive established the mini-
mum standards as to the content of the listing particulars and proce-
dures for processing the listing particulars.155 Those standards and pro-
cedures, with appropriate modifications for a public offering, are
incorporated into the Prospectus Directive for securities being concur-
rently listed with the public offering either in the Member State in
which the offering is being made or another Member State.' 56 The
Listing Particulars Directive also has its own mutual recognition provi-
sions requiring under the circumstances set forth that the listing par-
ticulars of a company listed in one Member State be accepted as the
listing particulars when the company applies for listing in another
Member State.'5 7 Article 24 provides that if application for listing is
made simultaneously or within a short interval in two or more Member
States, the listing application shall be prepared in accordance with the
legislation of and approved by the competent authority of the state in
which it has its registered office. If it does not have its registered office
in any of the states in which application for listing is made, the listing
particulars must be drawn and approved in accordance with the legisla-
tion of the Member State in which it is applying for listing that it se-
lects. Under Article 24a, if the listing particulars have been drawn and
approved as provided in Article 24, the listing particulars subject to
translation must be accepted without further approval by any other
Member State in which application for listing is made simultaneously
or within a short interval. After the adoption of the Prospectus Direc-
151. Id. at Art. 8.
152. Prospectus Directive, Art. 12.
153. Prospectus Directive, Art. 21.
154. Id. at Art. 20.
155. Directive No. 80/390, Mar. 17, 1980, O.J. 1990 L100/1 (hereinafter "Listing Par-
ticulars Directive").
156. See Prospectus Directive, Arts. 7 and 8, respectively. See also supra Ns. 66, 67
and related text.
157. Listing Particulars Directive, Arts. 24, 24a, 24b.
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tive, the Listing Particulars Directive was amended to require a Mem-
ber State on application for listing to recognize as the listing particulars
a public-offer prospectus under the circumstances set forth. If such ap-
plication is made within three months of the approval of the prospectus
in another Member State under Article 7, 8 or 12 of the Prospectus Di-
rective, the prospectus must be recognized as listing particulars in the
state in which application for listing is made without further ap-
proval.158 There is no similar obligation with respect to a prospectus ap-
proved pursuant to legislation conforming with Article 11.159
Article 21 of the Prospectus Directive (incorporating Article 20)
provides in substance that subject to translation if securities are offered
to the public simultaneously or within a short interval of one another in
more than one Member States, all Member States in which the offering
is made must recognize a prospectus drawn up in accordance with Arti-
cle 7, Article 8, or Article 12. All three of these articles as noted above
require compliance with the disclosure requirements of and review by
the competent authority passing upon applications for the listing of se-
curities under the Listing Particulars Directive. 160 Under Article 20, as-
suming concurrent offerings in more than one Member State, if the of-
fering is being made or an application for listing is being made in the
Member State in which the issuer has its registered office, the compe-
tent authority of that state is the competent authority for approval of
the prospectus. If neither the offering nor the application for listing are
being made in the Member State in which the issuer has its registered
office, then the person making the offering is to choose from among the
competent authorities of the states in which the offering is being made
the competent authority that is to scrutinize the prospectus.
The Member States generally have elected to make the grant of
mutual recognition subject to a requirement for translation into the lo-
cal language. As a result, in practice the mutual recognition procedure
is seldom used. for a small offering as the cost of translation of an entire
prospectus can be prohibitive. In the case of a large offering, if retail
distribution is considered desirable in multiple jurisdictions then it is
usual to seek listings on the appropriate stock exchange of each Mem-
ber State in which the offering is being made. Although the mutual rec-
ognition provisions as discussed above extend to listing particulars, the
applicant for listing must still satisfy the admission conditions of the
stock exchange in each country in which listing is sought. A number of
offerors apparently have concluded that there is no substantial down-
side to having the listing particulars/prospectus also reviewed by the
local stock exchange authority as part of the process. Companies are not
precluded from listing in their home country (the UK, for example) and
158. Listing Particulars Directive, Art. 24b.
159. See supra note 149 and related text.
160. See supra notes 66-67 and related text.
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offering the securities in other Member States without listing in those
states. In that event, the mutual recognition provisions subject to
translation and other limited localized disclosure requirements would
come into play without the necessity of review by the regulatory body in
which the offering is being made. See Section IX(B) immediately below
for the manner in which the UK implements this requirement. The
predilection for listing in the EU countries in which the offering is being
made may be influenced by the fact that the European "passport" for
carrying on the investment business under the Investment Services Di-
rective can be restricted to securities dealt in on a regulated market in
that country. 161
B. UK Implementing Provisions
The UK gives effect to the above as to securities for which applica-
tion for listing is to be made by defining a European Document to in-
clude (1) listing particulars it is required to recognize under Article 24a
of the Listing Particulars Directive in connection with an application for
admission to listing, (2) a prospectus it is required to recognize under
Article 24(b) of the Listing Particulars Directive in connection with an
application for admission to listing, and, subject to the qualification
noted immediately below, (3) a prospectus it is required to recognize
under Article 21 of the Prospectus Directive in connection with the
public offer of securities. 162 The prospectus referred to in (3) above,
however, is within the definition of a European Document only if it re-
lates to securities that are subject to an application for listing the
United Kingdom. 163 In connection with an application for listing with-
out a concurrent offering of the securities in the UK, a European Docu-
ment is in effect deemed to constitute the listing particulars for pur-
poses of Part IV of the FSA without further approval. 164 If securities are
to be offered for the first time in the UK in conjunction with the appli-
cation for listing, a European document that is a prospectus is deemed
to constitute the prospectus and listing particulars for purposes of Part
IV of the FSA without further approval. 16 5
The foregoing provisions of Schedule 4 with respect to the recogni-
tion of a prospectus are applicable only to the situation in which a list-
ing application is being made in the UK. Separately provision is made
for the recognition of a prospectus approved in another Member State
without regard to listing in the UK if recognition is required under Ar-
161. See Directive 93/22 on Investment Services. 1993 OJL 141 (May 10, 1993), Art.
14(3).
162. See POS (SI 1995 No. 1537), § 20, Schedule 4, 1(c).
163. Id. at 1(c)(3).
164. Id. at 3(a) and 4.
165. Id. at I 3(a) and 1 4.
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ticle 20 of the Prospectus Directive.' 66 Article 20 references a prospectus
conforming with Article 7,167 8,168 or 12169 of the Prospectus Directive. 70
With respect to securities approved under the appropriate Article but
not to be listed with the Stock Exchange, however, the translation of
the prospectus into English must be certified in a prescribed manner
and additional disclosures, including the following, are required: (a) tax
information relevant to a UK resident, (b) name and address of paying
agent, if any, in the United Kingdom, (c) a statement of how notice of
meetings and other notices will be given to UK residents.1 71 Further,
the offer in the UK must be made simultaneously or within three
months of the offer in the Member State in which the prospectus was
approved.
172
The mutual recognition provisions of the Prospectus Directive' 73
and of the Listing Particulars Directive1 74 provide that a Member State
does not have to afford recognition to a company that does not have its
registered office (i.e., not incorporated under the laws of) a Member
State. If the securities being offered are to be listed in the UK, a Euro-
pean Document in each instance is defined by the UK mutual recogni-
tion legislation not only to include listing particulars or prospectus, as
appropriate, that it is required to recognize, but those that it is permit-
ted to recognize.' 75 The latter appears to be an awkward way of saying
that the UK foregoes its right under the relevant EU Directives to not
recognize European documents as defined above involving an issuer
that has its registered office in a non-Member State. A U.S. issuer, for
example, could list securities and/or offer securities for the first time in
a Member State other than the UK in compliance with the applicable
legislation of that state. If the securities are then listed and offered for
the first time in the UK, the UK would recognize the listing particulars
and/or the prospectus to the same extent it is required to recognize
similar documents of issuers that have their registered offices in a
Member State.
If the securities are to be offered in the UK, but are not to be listed,
there is no reference to a prospectus that the UK is permitted to recog-
166. POS, Schedule IV, Pt. 2.
167. See supra note 150 and related text.
168. See supra note 151 and related text.
169. See supra note 152 and related text.
170. See supra note 154 and related text.
171.POS, Schedule 4, 8. NOTE: The 1999 amendments, revoked those provisions of
Schedule 4 requiring the transalation of a prospectus into English and disclosure relating
to tax information relevant to a UK resident. See POS 1999 Amendments, § 2(q) revoking
POS Schedule IV, I 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(c)(i).
172. POS, Schedule IV, I 8(1)(b).
173. Prospectus Directive, Art. 21, 1 4.
174. Listing Particulars Directive, Art. 24a, 5; Art. 24b, 1 2.
175. POS Schedule 4, 1 1(c).
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nize.' 76 This may be accounted for by a drafting quirk. Schedule 4, in
referring to the effect to be given to a prospectus scrutinized and ap-
proved by the appropriate regulatory authority in another member
state if a listing application is made in the UK in connection with a
public offering in the UK, refers to Article 21 of the Prospectus Direc-
tive as the relevant provision. 77 In referring to the effect to be given to
a prospectus scrutinized and approved by the appropriate regulatory
authority in another member state if a public offering is to made in the
UK, but there is no application for listing in the UK, reference is made
to as approved by Article 20 of the Prospectus Directive.178 This is two
ways of saying the same thing except paragraph 1 of Article 21 provides
that such a prospectus must be recognized and paragraph 4 of Article
21 says, however, a Member State "may restrict the application of Arti-
cle 21" to issuers whose registered office is located in a Member State.
This may explain why in referring to Article 21 in the first instance, the
draft person in addition to the reference what the UK is required to rec-
ognize added "or which paragraph 4 of that Article permits to be recog-
nised." The reference in the other instance to Article 20 is a reference to
the manner in which the prospectus was approved not to what is re-
quired to be recognized, which, perhaps, accounts for the lack of any
reference to paragraph 4 of Article 21.
X. ADMISSION TO LISTING ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
Chapter 3 of the Listing Rules sets forth the conditions for listing
on the London Stock Exchange. The margins include annotations to the
related provisions of the EU Listing Conditions Directive, establishing
minimum conditions for admission to the official list of a Stock Ex-
change in the member states.' 79 The conditions are minimal in terms of
market capitalization (Y700,OOO) of the class of shares to be listed.'8 0
The company, however, must have published audited financial state-
ments covering a period of at least three years,1'8 although the Ex-
change may accept a lesser period if deemed appropriate. 8 2 The pub-
lished financial statements must have been prepared in accordance
with the applicant's national law and "in all material respects" conform
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the United Kingdom, or
the United States, or the International Accounting Standards. 8 3 The
176. POS Schedule 4, Pt. 2.
177. POS Schedule 4, Pt. 1, 1 1(c)(iii).
178. POS Schedule 4, Pt. 2, 1 8(1).
179. Directive 79/279 on conditions for admission to official stock exchange listing,
1979 OJL 66 (Mar. 5, 1979).
180. Listing Rules 1 3.16.
181. Listing Rules I 3.3(a).
182. Listing Rules 1 3.4(a).
183. Listing Rules I 3.4(c).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
statements must have been independently audited in accordance with
the auditing standards of the United Kingdom, the United States, or In-
ternational Standards on Auditing.18 4 If a new applicant, the account-
ant's opinion must be an unqualified one.1 85 The applicant must have
carried on as its main activity a revenue producing business for the pe-
riod required to be covered by the financial statements. 86 This leaves
little room for start-up companies, and the Stock Exchange takes the
view that such companies are generally unsuitable for listing.
There are, however, special rules governing application for listing
from companies in a number of different categories as set forth in the
accompanying footnote.18 7 Generally each of these incorporate the pro-
visions of Chapter 3 setting forth the conditions to admission and then
make limited dispensation for companies in the specific categories
and/or add additional conditions. In the case of natural resource com-
panies (mining, oil, and natural gas), for example, it is provided that
the Exchange may list securities of such companies that cannot comply
with paragraph 3.3(a), which is the provision requiring three years of
audited accounts, or paragraph 3.6, which requires a three-year history
as a revenue-producing business. 8 8 The Chapter also, however, re-
quires the company to have proven reserves sufficient to maintain an
operation on a commercial scale for at least two years.18 9 Further, if
paragraphs 3.3(a) and 3.6 are not complied with, the corporate insiders
must agree not to dispose of their stock, except among themselves, until
two years after trading on the exchange commences. 190 In the case of a
scientific research based company, there is no dispensation for three
years of financial statements, but the company does not have to meet
the requirements of paragraph 3.6 requiring three years or revenue
producing activity.' 91 The company, however, must satisfy a number of
enumerated requirements including a demonstrated ability to attract
funds from sophisticated investors, seek to raise at least £10 million
with a view to bringing an identified product to a revenue producing
stage and demonstrated significant commercial achievements in its re-
184. Listing Rules I 3.4(d).
185. Listing Rules 3.4(e).
186. Listing Rules 3.6.
187. Non-UK Companies, Listing Rules, Chapter 17; Property Companies, Listing
Rules, Chapter 18; Mining, Oil and Natural Gas Companies, Listing Rules, Chapter 19;
Scientific Research Based Companies, Listing Rules, Chapter 20; Investment Companies,
Listing Rules, Chapter 21; Public Sector Issuers, Listing Rules, Chapter 22; Debt Securi-
ties, Bonds, Asset-Backed Securities and Covered Warrants, Listing Rules, Chapter 23;
Ordinary Warrants and other Certificates Representing Securities, Listing Rules, Chap-
ter 24; Single-Project Companies, Listing Rules, Chapter 25; Venture Capital Trusts,
Listing Rules, Chapter 26.
188. Listing Rules J 19.3(a).
189. Listing Rules I 19.3(c).
190. Listing Rules I 19 .3 (g).
191. Listing Rules 1 20.2.
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search development as evidenced by certain enumerated factors such as
clinical trials of pharmaceutical products if a pharmaceutical com-
pany.1 92 It seems apparent that the conditions to listing are intended to
attract quality companies.
The company making application for listing must have adequate
working capital prior to admission, and the issuer must make a repre-
sentation to this effect.193 In the case of an application for the listing of
further securities by an applicant with shares already listed the state-
ment of working capital may be prospective - i.e., may be expressed in
the form that the issuer, although not having sufficient working capital
as at the date of the prospectus, has made proposals for the provision of
sufficient working capital that are satisfactory to The Stock Ex-
change. 194 In strict theory it seems that the exchange will refuse an ap-
plication for first listing by a company that needs the proceeds of the is-
sue to satisfy its requirement for working capital. This is not as absurd
as it seems, since the requirement may be rephrased that capital must
be first raised and then employed, and not vice versa. The shares must
be freely transferable; the Exchange may in "exceptional circumstances"
allow the issuer to disapprove of transfers if such restriction "would not
disturb the market in those shares,"195 but it is unlikely that such per-
mission would be given. This does not preclude an issuer from contrac-
tually obtaining a commitment not to transfer shares for a certain pe-
riod of time, as in the case of Regulation S restrictions, for example. The
company, however, would have to enforce the restriction by enforcing
the contract rather than imposing transfer restrictions on the shares.
This may raise serious problems for U.S. issuers offering shares in the
United Kingdom in reliance on Regulation S that attempts to list those
shares on the London Stock Exchange. Rule 905196 provides that such
securities are restricted securities as defined by Rule 144 and can be re-
sold by an offshore purchaser only if registered, exempt from registra-
tion, or in accordance with Regulation S.197 Such restrictions generally
are embodied in the form of a legend on the stock certificate that re-
quires submission of documentation to the issuer before the shares can
be transferred. Although a resale on a Designated Overseas Securities
Market (DOSM) is permitted under Rule 904, and the London Stock
Exchange is a DOSM, such resales are subject to certain albeit limited
conditions.
A sufficient number of shares must be distributed to the public in
EU member states. The holding of shares by the public that are listed
192. Listing Rules 1 20.3.
193. Listing Rules 1 3.10.
194. Listing Rules 1 3.10.
195. Listing Rules 1 3.15.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 230.905.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 230.905.
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in non-member states also will be taken into account. 198 There is
deemed an adequate public float if 25 percent of the class of shares to be
listed are held by the public and a lesser percentage may be acceptable
if a large number of shares of the class are outstanding. 199 The Ex-
change may impose other conditions to admission to listing if it deems it
appropriate to protecting investors, but must inform applicant of
same. 2
00
In order to be listed on the Stock Exchange, a company must have
an acceptable sponsor.20 1 One of the principal responsibilities of a spon-
sor is to make an appropriate investigation of the company and advise
the Stock Exchange that in its opinion the company "is an appropriate
entity to be admitted to listing."202 Some issuers, including issuers of
Eurobonds, covered warrants and other asset-backed securities, may
dispense with the requirement for a sponsor and appoint a listing agent
instead. The role of a listing agent is similar to that of a sponsor, but,
unlike a sponsor, the listing agent is not required to make a declaration
to the Stock Exchange that it is satisfied that the company for whom it
acts is a suitable candidate for listing.20 3 The functions of the sponsor
and listing agent are discussed below in the context of preparing the
prospectus/listing particulars for a company going public and concur-
rently listing the security on the Stock Exchange. See Section XIII(A)(8).
XI. ADMISSION TO TRADING ON THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) has superseded the Un-
listed Securities Market (USM) as a trading market supervised by the
Stock Exchange for securities not admitted to the official list. The con-
ditions for admission to trading on AIM are set forth in Chapter 16 of
the Rules of the London Stock Exchange (the "AIM Admission Rules")
as distinguished from the Listing Rules. In order to apply for admission
to AIM, the applicant is required to prepare a prospectus in accordance
with the POS regulations. 20 4 There are no market capitalization re-
quirements for AIM. AIM itself has no minimum periods for which the
company must have published financial statements or earned revenues,
but the POS regulations require that any prospectus produced must
contain the company's last three year's accounts if it has existed for
that long. The company must be duly incorporated under the laws of the
198. Listing Rules 3.18.
199. Listing Rules 1 3.19. See 3.20 for shares deemed part of the public float.
200. Listing Rules 1 3.1.
201. Listing Rules I 2.3(a). A sponsor must be an authorized person under the Finan-
cial Services Act and satisfy the Exchange that it is competent to discharge its responsi-
bilities as such. Listing Rules 1 2.1.
202. Listing Particulars 2.7[b].
203. Listing Particulars 1 2.19.
204. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.10.
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place of organization and the shares must be freely transferable. 205 To
the extent the issuer has published financial statements, the published
financial statements must have been prepared in accordance with the
issuer's national law and with the accounting standards of the United
Kingdom, or the United States, or International Accounting Stan-
dards. 20 6 Such statements must be audited if that is required by the law
of the place of incorporation of the company. Under provisions applica-
ble generally in the United Kingdom, operating companies are required
to publish annual accounts and the accounts must be audited.20 7 The is-
suer must have a nominated adviser 208 and a nominated broker.20 9 The
same firm, however, may perform both roles.
2 10
The nominated adviser must be an authorized person under the
FSA or a member firm of the Stock Exchange, independent of the is-
suer, and acceptable to the Exchange. 211 The Stock Exchange maintains
a list of nominated advisers who have completed the required applica-
tion forms and meet the general and any special eligibility criteria. 212
The responsibilities, among others, of the nominated adviser include as-
suring that the directors are aware on an ongoing basis of their respon-
sibilities to ensure compliance by the issuer with the AIM Admission
Rules and to confirm to the Stock Exchange that the issuer and the se-
curities are appropriate for admission to trading on AIM.21
3
Although the AIM Rules are considerably less extensive than those
applicable to listed securities, they are not inconsequential. The Rules,
among other things, impose obligations to timely disclose major devel-
opments, 214 report certain transactions, 21 5 notify the Exchange of in-
sider transactions in its shares,21 6 and the like. The Exchange may im-
pose sanctions on the issuer,21 7 directors, 21 8 and nominated adviser 21 9
for non-compliance with their respective responsibilities. The Exchange
may suspend or discontinue trading in the security on AIM. There is a
separate Chapter 17 to the Rules of the Stock Exchange (hereinafter the
"AIM Trading Rules") governing trading in AIM securities. The Trading
Rules provide for registering member firms to act as market maker in
205. AIM Admission Rules 16.1(a)-(b).
206. AIM Admission Rules 16.2.
207. CA 1985 § 235.
208. AIM Admission Rules 16.1(d)(i).
209. AIM Admission Rules 16.1(d)(ii).
210. AIM Admission Rules 16.1(d).
211. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.28.
212. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.29.
213. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.30.
214. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.14.
215. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.22.
216. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.17.
217. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.32.
218. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.37.
219. AIM Admission Rules 1 16.38.
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specific AIM securities and only such market makers can display quota-
tions in the trading system.220 The nominated broker must furnish the
trading system with relevant information relating to the company and
if there is no registered market maker in the security use its "best en-
deavours" when requested to find "matching business" in the secu-
rity. 221 AIM has also adopted the Model Code governing dealings in the
company's securities by directors and employees.
222
There were 298 companies admitted for trading on AIM with a
market capitalization of approximately £5,354,000,000 as of October 31,
1997.223 Since its launch on July 19, 1995 through October 31, 1997, ap-
proximately £1,456,890,000 had been raised by AIM companies. 224 In-
formation Technology companies form a significant component of the
market, approximately 60 such companies with a market capitalization
of approximately £1 billion traded on the AIM market in October of
1997.225
XII. THE LISTING RULES AND THE NEW PROSPECTUS REGIMEN
The Stock Exchange for years has regulated the public offering of
securities of companies going public in conjunction with their admission
to listing. See Section III(B). The Stock Exchange made minimal
changes in The Listing Rules to accommodate the new prospectus regi-
men. Paragraph 5.1(a) of Chapter 5, which continues to be titled "List-
ing Particulars" (see Section VI), provides that an issuer applying for
listing of securities to be offered to public in the United Kingdom for the
first time must submit "a prospectus prepared in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter." Paragraph 5.1(b) provides that in any other
application for listing, listing particulars or a prospectus is to be pre-
pared and submitted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Paragraph 5.1(c) provides that a prospectus and listing particulars
must be published in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8.
Paragraph 5.1(d) provides that the contents of and procedures for sub-
mission for the prospectus are the same as those applicable to listing
particulars, "subject to adaptations appropriate to the circumstances of
a public offer." Paragraph 5.1(e) provides with some enumerated excep-
tions that references in the listing rules to listing particulars unless the
context otherwise requires are applicable to a prospectus "as if any ref-
erence to listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars was a
reference to a prospectus or supplementary prospectus as appropriate."
220. AIM Trading Rules 1 17.5.
221. AIM Trading Rules 17.4(b).
222. Stock Exchange Rules, Appendix 12.
223. Stock Exchange, AIM Market Statistics (Oct. 1997).
224. Id.
225. See Stock Exchange, AIM News (Oct. 1997), at 1.
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The Listing Rules otherwise, with limited exceptions, refers only to
listing particulars, although such references are to both when the
document is a prospectus for purposes of the offering. 226 For conven-
ience of exposition, reference herein generally will be to listing particu-
lars/prospectus to indicate the dual role of the same document under
the Listing Rules.
Paragraph 5.9 provides that the listing particulars/prospectus must
be submitted in draft form to the Exchange (attention Listing Depart-
ment) at least 14 days prior to the expected publication date. Paragraph
5.10 requires that it be submitted earlier in the case of a new applicant
or if there are complex issues to be resolved "to allow proper considera-
tion by the Exchange and consequent amendment and resubmission by
the issuer." Paragraphs 5.11 through 5.23 set forth what is to be in-
cluded in the "filing" and details such as annotated margins to indicate
compliance with specific requirements and redlining of amendments (
5.11). With a bow to "plain English," 5.7 provides that the particu-
lars/prospectus must be written "in as easily analysable and compre-
hensible form as possible." Chapter 6 details the content of the listing
particulars/prospectus, supplemented by Chapter 12 as to the form and
content of financial statements and Chapters 18-23 as to specific indus-
tries (e.g., Chapter 19, Mineral Companies) and specific types of securi-
ties (e.g., Chapter 21, Investment Entities).
A supplement to the Listing Rules, unnumbered but titled "Rules
for Approval of Prospectuses Where No Application for Listing Is
Made," is added at the end of Chapter 26 (the last of the chapters).
These Rules are sometimes hereinafter referred to as the 156A Rules.
The 156A Rules set forth the content of a prospectus and procedures to
be followed if no application for listing is being made in connection with
the offering. 227 The requirements of this section are to be followed in
connection with a first public offering by an issuer electing pursuant to
Section 156A the alternative of complying with the disclosures and pro-
cedures required of listing companies, although the securities are not to
be listed. This part has the effect of disapplying for the most part the
parts of the Listing Rules that are over and above the requirements of
schedule A/B of the Listing Particulars Directive. See Section XIII(B).
The prospectus and other documents are to be submitted in draft form
to the Exchange at least 14 days prior to the expected publication date
or such longer period necessary to allow proper consideration and con-
sequent amendment and resubmission.228 An Appendix to this section
226. Chapter 8, titled "Publication and Circulation of Listing Particulars," although
also applicable to a prospectus, consistently refers to listing particulars with limited ex-
ceptions, although under appropriate circumstances the reference is to a prospectus.
227. Since this part of the Listing Rules has no official designation, it will be referred
to as the 156A Rules.
228. 156A Rules 1 6.
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sets forth those portions of Chapter 6 relating to the content of listing
particulars that apply to the prospectus.
XIII. CONTENT OF THE PROSPECTUS
A. Contents of Prospectus for Offering of Securities
to be Listed
1. Introduction
The assumption made in this section is that the prospectus relates
to the first public offer of shares by a company that has not previously
listed shares and that the shares are to be listed in conjunction with the
public offering of the securities. Table 1 to Appendix 1 to Chapter 5 of
the Listing Rules sets forth seven categories of information that are to
be included in the prospectus and specifically references the applicable
portions of Chapter 6 prescribing the content of the information to be
included in the prospectus. The specific items referenced in Chapter 6
reference other provisions of the Rules; in particular, those relating to
financial information that are set forth in Chapter 12. Reference often
is made in the Listing Rules to the "group" and to "undertakings,"
which are respectively "British speak" for the consolidated entity and
subsidiaries. For convenience of exposition, the consolidated entity is
referred to herein as the issuer or the company. To avoid unduly exten-
sive footnoting, the applicable paragraph of the Listing Rules some-
times is set forth in parenthesis after the description of the specific pro-
spectus disclosure required by the Listing Rules.
2. Description of Business
An extensive description of the company's business is called for in-
cluding the following:
A description of the company's principal activities that sets forth
the main products sold and/or services provided. (6.D.1). Description of
any recent (last 12 months) unfavorable development ("interruption") in
the company's business that has a significant effect on the company's
financial position. (6.D.9)
Information relating to significant new products and/or activities, if
any. (6.D.2)
Net turnover (revenue) for the last three years by business seg-
ments and geographical markets. (6.D.3)
A description by location, size, and manner held of the principal
properties of the company. A principal property is defined in terms of
one that accounts for ten percent of net revenues or production. (6.D.4).
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Description of substantial expenditures being made for new facilities or
otherwise, noting where being undertaken (at home or abroad) and how
financed. (6.D.12-6.D.13)
The occurrence during the relevant period of non-representative
events ("exceptional factors") that materially impacted the company's
principal business activities, products, revenues, or plants. (6.D.5)
A description of the company's research and development policies
during the past three financial years. (6.D.5). Description of substantial
expenditures being made or contemplated on research and develop-
ment, noting where being undertaken (at home or abroad) and how fi-
nanced. (6.D.12-6.D.13)
A description of substantial investments made in acquisition of
other enterprises during the past three fiscal years and the current fis-
cal year, setting forth the amount invested and the interests acquired.
(6.D.11)
A description of legal proceedings that had or may have a signifi-
cant impact on the company's financial position. (6.D.7)
The average number of employees over the last three fiscal years,
by segments of the company's business activities, if possible, noting ma-
terial changes occurring during the period. (6.D.10)
Summary information on the extent the company is dependent, if
at all, on patents, licenses, material contracts, or new manufacturing
processes if of "fundamental importance" to the company's profitability.
(6.D.6.)
If the company is engaged in mining, oil and gas exploration and
development, or similar activities, information relating to mineral re-
serves and other relevant information relating to the exploitation of
same called for separately in Chapter 19 relating to mining companies.
(6.D.16)
3. Financial Statements
a. The Annual Accounts and the Companies Act
The provisions relating to financial information requires some un-
derstanding of the financial reporting required of substantially all com-
panies incorporated as public limited liability companies (plc) in the
United Kingdom as well as the requirements for admission of a stock to
the official list. The Companies Act, with some exceptions for small
companies and so-called private companies, requires all corporations
("companies") to prepare audited annual accounts. 229 The United King-
229. CA 1985 § 226 et. seq.
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dom, in accordance with the Fourth Company Law Directive of the
European Union,230 requires all corporations ("companies") to maintain
adequate accounts and to prepare for each fiscal ("financial") year a
balance sheet and a profit and loss statement, with accompany notes.
231
The format of the financial statements ("annual accounts") and the ac-
companying notes are prescribed in some detail following generally the
requirements of the Fourth Directive. The directors must prepare an
annual report232 and independent auditors must report on the financial
statements. The auditors' report must express an opinion that the fi-
nancial statements are "properly prepared" in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Act and "whether a true and fair view is given" of the
state of affairs at the end of the year and the profit or loss for the
year.233 The notes, among other things, must include information re-
lating to the shareholdings, compensation ("emoluments"), and pensions
of the directors.234 Detailed information relating to subsidiaries, joint
venture arrangements, and the like must be included in the notes for
companies required to file consolidated financial statements ("group ac-
counts"). Similar information must be included in the notes to financial
statements of companies not required to file consolidated statements
but which have subsidiaries. Companies within the medium size cate-
gory as defined by the statute are allowed to include somewhat less in-
formation and small companies as defined are allowed to have the audi-
tors' report prepared by someone meeting lesser standards than
required of other companies. 235 The auditor, however, in each instance
must meet the independent requirements established by statute and
must undertake the "investigation" prescribed by statute.236 The annual
accounts, directors' report, and auditors' report must be sent to all
shareholders ("members"), debenture holders, and other persons enti-
230. Fourth Council Directive on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies,
Directive 78/660 (July 25, 1978).
231. The provisions relating to preparing and publishing financial statements are
found in Part VII of the Companies Act of 1985 (§§ 221-262 and related schedules) and
were extensively amended by Part I of the Companies Act of 1989 (§§ 1-23). Schedule 4 to
Part VII, as amended prescribes the format of the financial statements and the basic con-
tents of the accompanying notes. Schedule 5 to Part VII, as amended, sets forth the in-
formation to be included in the notes relating to subsidiaries. Schedule 6 to Part VII, as
amended, prescribes the information to be included in the notes relating to the directors
(shareholders, compensation, pensions, etc.). In principle the requirement to prepare
Company Accounts to UK standards extends to non-UK companies with established
places of business in the UK (§ 700 of the Companies Act 1985), but the Companies Act of
1989 amendments with limited exceptions do not apply to such companies. See the Over-
seas Companies (Accounts) (Modifications and Exemptions) Order 1990 SI 1990 No. 440.
232. CA 1985 § 234.
233. CA 1985 § 235.
234. CA 1985 § 232.
235. CA 1985 § 248.
236. CA 1985 § 249D.
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tied to notice of the general meeting.237 The annual accounts, directors'
report, and auditors' report must also be filed with the Registrar. 238 The
failure to comply with specific provisions constitutes an offense for
which directors who fail to assert an adequate defense under the statu-
tory provisions can be imprisoned or fined.239 The Secretary of State
(head of the Department of Trade) also has authority to initiate pro-
ceedings to assure compliance with the statutory provisions.
240
b. Financial Reporting History Required for Admission to
Listing
In order for a company to have its equity securities admitted to the
Stock Exchange, absent special dispensation from the Exchange, the
company must have published or filed consolidated financial statements
covering a period of at least three years. The statements must have
been prepared in accordance with the company's national law and "in
all material respects" in accordance with United Kingdom or United
States Generally Accepted Accounting principals, or the International
Accounting Standards formulated by the International Accounting
Standards Committee. 241 The company during the minimum three-year
period covered by the financial statements must have been carrying on
as its main activity a revenue-earning business.
242
c. Comparative Table vs. Audited Report
The Listing Rules assume that any company applying for admis-
sion of the securities for listing has three years of financial statements
that have been published and are available. 243 The financial state-
ments, therefore, do not have to be included in the prospectus, but a
comparative table of financial information based thereon is included in
lieu thereof.244 A comparative table, however, cannot be used in lieu of
an audited report under the following circumstances:
245
A material change to the company's business or structure occurred,
including material acquisitions or dispositions, during the period cov-
ered by the financial statements or during the interim from the end of
the periods covered to the date of application for listing.
A material change has been made in accounting policies or a mate-
237. CA 1985 § 238.
238. CA 1985 § 242.
239. CA 1985 § 233.
240. CA 1985 § 245B.
241. Listing Rules 1 3.3-3.4.
242. Listing Rules 1 3.6.
243. Listing Rules I 12.17(b).
244. Listing Rules 1 12.1.
245. Listing Rules 1 12.1.
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rial adjustment has been made or is required to be made to the pub-
lished audited accounts.
The auditors' report for the last three years "has been qualified or
refers to a matter of fundamental uncertainty."
Notwithstanding none of the foregoing may be applicable, an audi-
tor's report may be required if the Exchange decides for any reason not
to accept the auditors' report of the published statements "or that an
additional report is necessary."
d. The Comparative Table
If a comparative table may be used, it must cover at least three
years to the end of the latest audited financial period. The comparative
table must extract from the audited accounts without material adjust-
ment appropriate profit and loss, balance sheet, and cash flow state-
ment items.246 The cash flow statement may pose some problems as the
annual accounts required of all companies does not specifically require
a cash flow statement, although it may be required by generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. See Section XIII(A)(3)(a). The Listing
Rules specifically require a table showing the changes in financial posi-
tion either in the form of a source and application of funds statement or
a cash flow statement. Rule 6.E.10. Accounting policies should be set
forth as well as notes to the last two balance sheets and for the period
covered by the accountant's report for the profit and loss and cash flow
statements. The presentation must be consistent with the issuer's an-
nual accounts. Rules 12.19-12.20. In the case of an offering of previously
unlisted securities, a letter from the issuer's auditors or reporting ac-
countants, as appropriate, must be submitted to the Exchange. The let-
ter must state that in their opinion the issuer's annual accounts were
prepared and audited in accordance with the standards established by
the exchange and that the comparative financial table was "properly ex-
tracted without material adjustment from the audited accounts." Rule
12.18. The accounting standards acceptable to the Exchange are United
Kingdom or United States Generally Accepted Accounting principles, or
the International Accounting Standards established by International
Accounting Standards Committee. Rule 3.3(c). The annual accounts
must have been independently audited in accordance with the auditing
standards required in the United Kingdom, the United States, or the
International Standards of Auditing established by the International
Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation of Ac-
countants. Rule 3.3(d). The statements must be prepared in accordance
with United Kingdom or United States Generally Accepted Accounting
principals, or the International Accounting Standards. Rule 12.14(d).
246. Listing Rules 1 12.17.
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e. The Accountant's Report
If an accountant's report is required, it must cover the same period
and the same financial statements and related information covered by a
comparative table. Rules 12.19-12.20. The accountant's report must be
prepared by independent accountants qualified to act as auditors under
the Listing Rules. Rule 12.14(c). The rule on independence provides
that the "auditors must be independent of the applicant and comply
with guidelines on independence issued by their national accountancy
bodies." Rule 3.5. The financial statements must be prepared in accor-
dance with United Kingdom or United States Generally Accepted Ac-
counting principals, or the International Accounting Standards. Rule
12.14(d). There are limited circumstances under which the Exchange
will accept financial statements of overseas companies (companies or-
ganized under the laws of a country other than the United Kingdom)
not prepared in accordance with such standards. Rule 17.3. The Report
must contain an opinion of the accountants as to whether or not the fi-
nancial statements "giveo a true and fair view of the financial matters
set out." Rule 12.14[e]. If the opinion is qualified, the opinion must refer
to "all material matters" as to which the accountants have reservations,
the reasons therefor, and, if practicable, quantify the effect thereof.
Rule 12.14(f). If the company has not previously listed securities on the
Exchange, the opinion cannot "contain any qualification or reference to
a matter of fundamental uncertainty which relates to a matter of sig-
nificance to investors." Rule 12 .14(g).
The accountant's report can contain "only such adjustments to the
previously published figures" as the accountants consider necessary.
The accountants must prepare and submit to the Exchange a written
statement of the adjustments in sufficient detail to show how the re-
ported figures reconcile to the corresponding information in the pub-
lished accounts. Rule 12.15.
f. Earnings Per Share
If the issuer includes its own accounts (as distinguished from con-
solidated accounts) in the comparative table or the accountants' report,
as appropriate, it must include the profit or loss per share from ordi-
nary operations ("ordinary activities"), after tax, for each of the last
three financial years. Rule 6.E.4(a). If the issuer includes consolidated
annual accounts, the corresponding figure on a consolidated basis must
be set forth. Rule 6.E.4(b). Dividends paid per share for the last three
financial years must also be included. Detailed specified information
must be included in the notes relating to each company in which the is-
suer owns a significant direct or indirect participating interest, the con-
solidation principles applied, the indebtedness of the subsidiaries in-
cluded in the consolidation, and the aggregate contingent liabilities
(including guarantees) of the consolidated entity. Rules 6.E.11-6.E.13,
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g. Working Capital
The prospectus must include a statement by the issuer that in its
opinion the working capital available to the consolidated entity is suffi-
cient for its "present requirements." Rule 6.E.16. Such statement, made
after "due and careful enquiry" is also a condition to admission for list-
ing. Rule 3.10. In the case of an issuer with securities already listed, if
it can not give such opinion, the prospectus may state how it propose to
provide the additional working capital necessary to meet its present re-
quirements. Rule 6.E.16. In such case, the securities may be admitted
to listing if the Exchange is satisfied that the provision for additional
working capital is satisfactory. Rule 3.10.
h. Interim Period
If more than nine months have elapsed since the end of the last fi-
nancial year for which annual accounts have been published, interim
statements covering at least six months must be included in the pro-
spectus. Such interim statements can be unaudited if it is so stated.
Rule 6.E.7. If there has been any significant change in the financial po-
sition or business ("trading activities") of the issuer since the end of the
last financial period for which either audited financial statements or in-
terim financial statements were published, such changes must be de-
scribed. Rule 6.E.8.
4. Material Trends and Forecasts
The prospectus must include "general information" as to the trends
in the issuer's business since the last published yearly financial state-
ments with emphasis on significant recent trends in production, sales,
inventories ("stocks"), backlog ("order book"), costs and prices. Rule
6.G.1(a). Information as to the issuer's prospects relating "at least" to
the current financial year must be set forth. This should include any
material information relating to such prospects. Specifically, "special
trade factors or risks (if any)" that "could materially affect the profits" if
not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus and if "unlikely to be known
or anticipated by the general public." Rule 6.G.1(b). Statements relating
to future prospects "must be clear and unambiguous." Rule 12.22. The
prospectus does not have to include a profit forecast or estimate, but if
one is included certain limitations are applicable. Rules 6.G.2, 12.22.
The issuer must determine with its sponsor in advance whether state-
ments relating to its future prospects will constitute a forecast or esti-
mate. Rule 12.22. An estimate pertains to a financial period that has
expired, but for which results have not yet been published. Rule 12.21.
Any words that expressly or by implication state a minimum or maxi-
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mum likely level of profits for a period subsequent to the published
audited accounts or contain data from which "an approximate figure for
future profits or losses may be made" is, as appropriate, a profit forecast
or estimate. This follows whether or not the word "profit" is used. A
dividend forecast may also be a profit forecast if "the issuer has a
known policy of relating dividends to earnings" or because of the level of
retained earnings or otherwise such dividend forecast "implies a fore-
cast of profits." Rule 12.23. The forecast or estimate normally should be
to the end of the issuer's accounting period. The forecast or estimate
normally should be before tax. If the tax charges are expected to be ab-
normally high or low that should be disclosed separately as well as any
exceptional item. Rule 12.26.
The principal assumptions upon which the issuer based its profit
forecast or estimate must be set forth in the prospectus. Rule 6.G.2. A
profit forecast or estimate must be reported on by the auditors or re-
porting accountants and by the sponsor. Rule 12.24. The prospectus
must include a report of the accountants setting forth their opinion as
to whether the profit forecast has been properly complied on the stated
basis and that the accounting basis for such forecast or estimate is
"consistent with the accounting policies of the issuer." Rule 12.24 and
Rule 6.G.2. The report of the sponsor must confirm that the profit fore-
cast, if included, "has been made after due and careful enquiry by the
directors." Rules 6.G.2. The sponsor's report included in the prospectus
must also state "that it has satisfied itself that the forecast or estimate
has been made after due and careful enquiry by the issuer." Rule 2.15.
It is interesting that the UK in contrast to the U.S. places more empha-
sis on assuring that appropriate care is employed and procedures
adopted for making profit forecasts than surrounding the forecast with
cautionary statements designed to protect against liability. This may be
explicable by virtue of the fact that there are no class actions as such in
the UK and to date few entrepreneurial lawyers making a career out of
bringing private actions alleging securities fraud.
5. Persons Responsible for the Prospectus
The prospectus must set forth information relating to the persons
responsible for the prospectus, the auditors, and other advisers. Rule
6.A. This information is of particular significance since it is closely re-
lated to the provisions imposing civil liability. See Section XIV(B). The
information in this category includes a prescribed declaration of the di-
rectors. The declaration of the directors is to the effect that they assume
responsibility for the information in the prospectus. To the best of their
knowledge and belief (taking "reasonable care to ensure that such is the
case") the information set forth in the prospectus "is in accordance with
the facts and does not omit anything likely to affect the import of such
information." Rule 6.A.3. This is consistent with the provisions of Sec-
tion 152(1)(b) of the FSA, which includes the directors of the issuers
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among the persons responsible (and, hence, potentially liable under
Section 150) for untrue or misleading statements in the prospectus. It is
also a consistent with the defense of a responsible person under Section
151(1) that "he reasonably believed, having made such enquiries (if any)
as were reasonable, that the statement was true and not misleading or
that the matter whose omission caused the loss was properly omitted."
The directors' declaration can be limited to specific parts of the prospec-
tus if so indicated (Rule 6A.2), but, presumably, can only exclude parts
for which someone else has primary responsibility such as portions at-
tributed with their consent to experts. The name and home or business
address of each of the directors must be set forth in the prospectus. Any
statement or report included in the prospectus and attributed to a per-
son as an expert must set forth that such statement or report was in-
cluded with the consent of such expert in the form and context in which
it appears in the prospectus and that such person has authorized the
contents of such part of the prospectus for purposes of section 152(1)(e)
of the FSA. Rule 6.A.9. Section 152(1)(e) imposes responsibility and po-
tential liability on any person "who has authorised the contents of, or
any part of' the prospectus. The inclusion of such report of an expert
with the expert's consent would also appear to be covered by Section
152(d) imposing responsibility on persons who accept responsibility for
any part the prospectus, which seems apropos since 152(1)(e) is appli-
cable to any person not otherwise responsible under Section 151. This
appears to include the accountants who furnish the accountants' report
if required by Rule 12.1[a]-[d]. It is not clear, however, whether it is ap-
plicable to the accountant's opinion required by Rule 12.18 relating to
the comparative financial table, since it is furnished in the form of a let-
ter to the Stock Exchange rather than as part of the listing particu-
lars/prospectus. See Section XIII(A)(3)(c). Section 152, however, would
apply to the accountants' report required under Rule 12.2 if an account-
ant's report is presented in substitution for a comparative table or the
published accounts. Similarly, it appears applicable to the accountants'
report required under Rule 12.24 if the prospectus includes a profit
forecast or estimate. See Section XIII(A)(4). There may, of course, be
other reports of experts included in the prospectus with consent (e.g.,
mineral or hydrocarbon reserves (Rules 19.12 to 19.16)), in which event
an appropriate statement relating to their consent and authorization
must be included. The prospectus must also include the names and ad-
dresses of the reporting accountants and of any other expert to whom a
statement or report in the prospectus is attributed. Rule 6.A.8. The pro-
spectus must include a statement that the issuer's annual accounts (fi-
nancial statements) have been audited for the last three years (Rule
6.A.5) and the names, addresses, and qualifications of the auditors who
audited such statements (Rule 6.A.4). A statement of what other infor-
mation audited by the auditors and included in the prospectus must
also be set forth. Rule 6.A.6. If any audit reports have been refused by
the auditors on any of the above referred to financial statements or con-
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tain qualifications, such refusal or qualification must be set forth "in
full and the reasons given." Rule 6.A.5. If during the last three financial
years auditors have resigned, been removed, or not re-appointed, addi-
tional disclosure may be triggered. In such event, if they delivered a
statement to the issuer of circumstances they believe should be brought
to the attention of the shareholders or creditors of the issuer, the pro-
spectus must set forth such information, if material. Rule 6.A.7.
6. Legal Advisers
The prospectus must also include the names and addresses of the
issuer's legal advisers and of the legal advisers to the issue. This ap-
pears to be for informational purposes rather than liability purposes,
except to the extent the prospectus may include an opinion of such legal
adviser as an expert. Section 152(8) of the FSA specifically provides
that no person shall be deemed responsible for the prospectus "by rea-
son of giving advice as to their contents in a professional capacity." The
names and addresses of the issuer's bankers must also be set forth in
the prospectus. This also appears to be for informational purposes only.
7. Sponsor
The prospectus must also set forth the name and address of the
sponsor. Rule 6.A.8. The sponsor (who also may be and usually is the
underwriter) as sponsor plays an unique role and its responsibility for
the prospectus or portions thereof is not clear beyond the fact that there
is no specific reference to the sponsor as a person responsible for the
prospectus in Section 152 of the FSA. The Listing Rules set forth a
number of responsibilities of the sponsor (Rules 2.1-2.18), but specifi-
cally provides that "[T]hese responsibilities are owed solely to the Ex-
change." Rule 2.5. Failure of the sponsor to carry out its responsibilities
may result in censure and publication of such censure and removal from
the Exchange's register of qualified sponsors and publication of such
removal. Rule 2.25. The obligations imposed on the sponsor generally
require it to play an important role in the preparation of the prospectus,
including "seeking the Exchange's approval of the listing particulars
[prospectus]." Rule 2.16(c). Some of those rules relate to specific infor-
mation to be included in the prospectus. For example, the sponsor must
obtain written confirmation from the issuer that its working capital is
sufficient for its present requirements and that such confirmation of the
issuer was "given after due and careful enquiry by the issuer" and that
the financial institutions providing working capital "have stated in
writing" that relevant financing arrangements exist between the issuer
and the financial institution. 2.14. The issuer in turn has to make ap-
propriate representations as to the adequacy of the working capital in
the prospectus, but no specific reference is made to the role of the spon-
sor in that regard. See Section XIII(A)(3)(g). The one area in which the
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sponsor has to submit a report to be included in the prospectus pertains
to a profit forecast or earnings estimate if such forecast or estimate ap-
pears in the prospectus. In that event, a report from the sponsor must
be included in the prospectus stating that "it has satisfied itself that the
forecast or estimate has been made after due and careful enquiry by the
issuer." Rule 2.15. See also Section XIV(C). Under these circumstances,
arguably, the sponsor is the person responsible for such report under
the provisions of Section 152(d) imposing responsibility on persons who
accept responsibility for any part the prospectus. The Exchange also
has authority to require a responsibility statement from persons other
than directors. Rule 5.4. This might be utilized, for example, in the case
of shadow directors or control persons who exercise the functions of a
director without formal appointment as such.
8. Distribution Arrangements
The Listing Rules specifically call for limited information relating
to the nature of the offering and the distribution terms. The prospectus
must set forth the number of shares offered (6.B.15(b)); the offering
price (6.B.15(d)(i)); the method of payment of the price (6.B.15(d)(iii));
the period during which the offering will remain open (6.B.15(f)); the
names, addresses and description of the underwriters and the amount
of the offering being underwritten (6.B.15(h)); an estimate of the aggre-
gate and per share expenses of the offering payable by the issuer
(6.B.15(i))); the total remuneration of the underwriter, including un-
derwriting commissions or similar compensation of the financial inter-
mediaries (6.B.15(i)), and the estimated net proceeds to be received by
the issuer. (Rule 6.B.15(f)). If a tranche of the offering is being reserved
for marketing in other countries, details relating to same must be set
forth. If securities of the same class concurrently are being placed pri-
vately details relating to such placing must be set forth. Rule 6.B.22.
Details of the aggregate number of shares reserved for allocation to ex-
isting shareholders, directors, employees and past employees of the is-
suer or its subsidiaries and any other preferential allocation arrange-
ments have to be included in the prospectus. Rule 6.B.26. The date the
securities are expected to be admitted to listing and on which dealings
is to commence is to be set forth. Rule 6.B.18. If listed on another stock
exchange or traded in a regulated recognized securities market, such
information should be included. Rules 6.B.19-6.B.20. The prospectus
also must set forth the intended application of the net proceeds from the
offering. Rule 6.B.15(j).
9. Management of the Company
This part provides for disclosure of information about the persons
having the management control of the company and, in particular, the
following:
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(i)An indication of the main activities of the directors outside the
group where such activities are significant with respect to the group,
together with a description of any other relevant business interests or
activities they may have. Rule 6.F.1-6.F.2.
(ii)Details of directors' remuneration and benefits (of whatever de-
scription) in the last financial year. Rule 6.F.3.
(iii)Details of the beneficial and non-beneficial interests of any di-
rectors in the shares or debentures, or in rights to subscribe for shares
or debentures, in the issuer, any subsidiary or holding company and
any subsidiary of any holding company (including, in the case of inter-
ests in the shares or debentures themselves, the interests of the spouse
and children of the director). If a director does not have any such inter-
est, it must be so stated. Rule 6.F.4.
(iv)Particulars of the interests of any director in transactions which
were either unusual in their nature or conditions or significant to the
business of the group and were effected by the issuer in the current or
preceding financial year or remain in any respect outstanding or unper-
formed. If there have been no such transactions, there must be a state-
ment to that effect. Rule 6.F.6.
(v)Details of any employees' share or share option schemes.
(vi)Details of the directors' service contracts (including unexpired
term, notice periods, remuneration, commissions or profit sharing ar-
rangements and any other matters necessary to enable investors to es-
timate the possible liability of the company on early termination). How-
ever, it is not necessary to give such details if the service contract in
question was available for inspection in accordance with paragraph 16.9
before the last annual general meeting and that service contract has not
subsequently been varied. There must also be an estimate of the
amounts payable to the issuer's directors by the group in the financial
year current as at the date of the listing particulars. Rules 6.F.10-
6.F.12.
10. Basic Information
Certain basic information about the issuer is required: its name,
place of incorporation and basic information about its capital and
changes to its capital over the preceding three years. Information must
be included about persons having preferential subscription rights; con-
vertible debt securities; options; shareholdings exceeding three per cent
of share capital and potential controlling interests. Rules 6.C.1-6.C.6,
6.C.10-6.C.16. The following also must be included.
(i)Availability of documents for inspection. Paragraph 6-C.7 re-
quires that various documents be made available for inspection for at
least 14 days at a named place in or near the City of London (or such
other place as the Stock Exchange may determine), at the issuer's regis-
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tered office and (if any) the offices of its paying agents in the United
Kingdom. The most important of the documents which are to be dis-
played include the following:
(a)Material contracts (see below) and directors' contracts;
(b)Reports, letters, balance sheets, valuations and statements pre-
pared by any expert, which are extracted or referred to in the listing
particulars;
11. Material Contracts
A summary must be given of the principal contents of each material
contract (not being a contract entered into in the ordinary course of
business) entered into by any member of the group in the two years
immediately preceding the publication of the listing particulars. 247 The
summary must include particulars of dates, parties, terms and condi-
tions and any consideration passing to or from the issuer or any other
member of the group, unless such contracts have been on view during
the two years preceding publication, when a statement referring to
them collectively as being on view will suffice. Paragraph 5.22, follow-
ing section 148 of the Act, lays down a procedure under which the Stock
Exchange may allow all or part of a material contract to be withheld
from public inspection. A written request must be made to the Stock
Exchange setting out the ground upon which the request is made. This
ground must be one of the three set out in the Listing Rules ( 5.18);
the most likely ground will be "detriment" to the issuer by reason of
trade competitors obtaining access to sensitive commercial information.
It is often difficult to determine whether a contract is material and
whether it was entered into in the ordinary course of business. The
Listing Rules do not provide (and neither did the Companies Act 1985
from which the phrase was derived) a definition of "material contract."
The relevant case law dates to the 19th century. It would seem to indi-
cate that materiality should be looked at from the point of view of the
investor rather than the company. In Sullivan v. Mitcalfe,248 the court
considered that a material contract is one that "upon a reasonable con-
struction of its purport and effect would assist a person in determining
whether he would become a shareholder of the company"). 249 It has been
held that a director who knows of the existence of a contract cannot es-
cape liability for nondisclosure of that contract by professing ignorance
of its content or materiality. Quite apart from the specific requirements
of the Listing Particulars, it may be necessary to disclose any other con-
247. Listing Particulars § 6.C.20.
248. (1880) 5 CPD 455.
249. See also Twycross v. Grant, (1877) 2 CPD 469, and Broome v. Speak, (1903) 1 Ch.
586.
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tract that is material, e.g., a vital long-term supply contract that is
about to expire, even if it was entered into in the ordinary course of
business and/or more than two years before publication of the particu-
lars. 2
50
12. Dealings with Promoter(s)
Details must be given of any payment or benefit made or given to a
promoter of the company to the extent that disclosure is required by
law. In addition The Stock Exchange may require to be included in the
listing by name of any promoter of the company or any of its subsidiar-
ies and the amount of any cash, securities or benefits that are proposed
to be or have been, within the two years preceding publication, paid, is-
sued or given to any promoter and the consideration given therefor.
251
A "promoter" has been defined as a person who "undertakes to form
a company with reference to a given project and to set it going, and who
takes the necessary steps to accomplish that purpose."252 This definition
might appear to limit the term to persons who are involved in the for-
mation of the company. If that were so, the consequences could be over-
come by purchasing a ready-made company. In fact, this is not a com-
plete definition and it is submitted that the relevant factor is the
promotion of a project with a company as the vehicle, so that the pur-
chaser of the ready-made company would be a promoter if he also pro-
moted the project. Thus, a parent company floating off a subsidiary
would usually be a promoter as would an initial subscriber or director
who has taken the initiative in setting up the company. An issuing
house, on the other hand, will not usually be a promoter simply by vir-
tue of its responsibilities as an underwriter, although it may cross the
line if it actively participates in setting up the company, has represen-
tatives on the board and is otherwise significantly involved in the deci-
sion to float the company.
13. Supplementary Prospectus
If, between the time when the prospectus/listing particulars have
been formally approved by the Stock Exchange and commencement of
dealings in those securities, the persons responsible for the listing par-
ticulars become aware of any significant change regarding any matter
included in the listing particulars/prospectus or any significant new
matter, the inclusion of which would have been required in the listing
particulars if it had arisen at that time, the Stock Exchange must be in-
formed immediately and supplementary listing particulars/prospectus
250. FSA § 146.
251. Listing Rules I 6.C.21.
252. Twycross v. Grant, (1877) 2 CPD 469.
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submitted for approval and, when approved, published (FSA § 147). The
Listing Rules ( 8.20) set out how supplementary listing particulars are
to be published; this includes circulation to shareholders if the listing
particulars were themselves circulated. A significant change or a sig-
nificant new matter for purposes of section 147(2) of the Act refers to
such information as specified in section 146 of the Act that investors
reasonably require for the purposes of making an informed assessment.
See Section XIII(A)(15) below.
14. General Duty of Disclosure
Quite apart from the listing rules, section 146 of the Act imposes on
the persons responsible for, the listing particulars a duty to disclose in
the listing particulars all such "information as investors and their pro-
fessional advisers reasonably require, and might reasonably expect to
be included for the purpose of making an informed judgment about the
value of the securities as an investment. The information to which the
duty applies is that which is within the knowledge of the persons re-
sponsible for the listing particulars or which it would be reasonable for
them to ascertain by making enquiries. The Listing Rules ( 5.5) now
require as part of the listing application procedure that the issuer must
provide the Stock Exchange with a letter signed by or on behalf of each
director of the issuer confirming that the listing particulars contain all
such information.
15. Verification
Directors in the UK, like directors in the United States, must exer-
cise appropriate diligence to avoid liability for misrepresentations in a
prospectus by verifying to the extent reasonable representations set
forth therein. Obviously, each director of a company cannot be expected
to know every fact relating to the company. With respect to some
statements it may be proper for a director to rely on other people, in-
cluding the company's advisers, to check particular parts of the prospec-
tus or listing particulars. Reliance on an appropriate person to carry out
a detailed verification should afford a director reasonable grounds for
his belief that a particular statement is true, provided that it was rea-
sonable to rely on that person in the circumstances and the director be-
lieves on reasonable grounds that he has in fact verified the statement.
See further discussion of director's liability at Section XIV.
It is often very difficult to impress on directors the extent of their
individual responsibility for the prospectus and the significance in
terms of limiting potential liability. To assist directors and others to
show that reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of the pro-
spectus or listing particulars, and thereby minimize the risk of liability
under section 150 of the Act or under Regulation 14 of the POS Regula-
tions (see also section 151(1) and Regulation 15(1), and the conditions
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thereto discussed at Section XIV(E)), should it subsequently be found to
be untrue or misleading, the practice has grown up of preparing verifi-
cation notes as part of the verification process. This process as a whole
should involve:
(a)the identification of at least one source for the verification of
every statement of fact;
(b)the recording in writing of that source;
(c)the recording in writing of a reasonable basis for each statement
of opinion;
(d)each of the directors having sufficient time to consider and com-
ment on the prospectus and the notes (so that they may be corrected
and/or amplified if necessary); and
(e)the notes, including copies of documents resulting from the veri-
fication process, being presented to the board meeting at the time when
the prospectus is finally approved.
It is obviously desirable that a full board meeting attended by every
director should consider the prospectus substantially in its final form
while it is still possible to incorporate any amendments considered nec-
essary. It must be emphasized that the responsibility for statements in
the prospectus does not end with its issue but continues for a period of
time (section 150(1) of the Act or Regulation 14(1) of the POS Regula-
tions). See Section XIV(C).
16. Timetable for Listing Application
The timetable for an application for listing is as follows:
Applications for listing are considered on Wednesday and Friday of
each week. Not later than 14 days prior to the intended publication date
of the listing particulars/prospectus, three copies of the following docu-
ments must be submitted to the Stock Exchange in draft:
253
Listing particulars and cover;
Application forms to purchase or subscribe shares;
Formal notices of the offer;
Mini-prospectus (if used);
Summary particulars (if used);
Text of the accountant's report (if any);
Sponsor's working capital letter;
Text of the directors' letter confirming that to their knowledge the
prospectus contains all relevant information;
253. Listing Rules 1 5.9.
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The text of any relevant letter of application for any derogation
from the listing rules. The two most important of these letters are the
"non applicable letter" - a letter specifying all information required by
the listing rules but not contained in the prospectus, along with an ex-
planation as to why not - and the "omission" letter, requesting the Ex-
change to authorize the omission of any required information.
The Exchange will not permit an application for listing to proceed
until it has reviewed and accepted all these documents. However, ex-
cept in the case of the application letters the Exchange has very limited
discretion in that it (probably) cannot reject a prospectus that complies
with the listing requirements on grounds not related to the content of
the document. In practice, however, the Exchange has been able to dis-
courage inappropriate applicants from listing without having to test
this point.
Forty-eight hours before consideration of the application for listing,
the following documents must be delivered to the exchange: 25 4
The application form for listing;
Two copies of the listing particulars;
A copy of the national newspaper advertisement (if any) containing
listing particulars, mini-prospectus, offer notice, formal notice or other
such document;
A copy of the board resolution allotting the securities;
In the case of a new applicant, various constitutional documents of
the company.
No later than 9:00 a.m. on the day the application for listing is to be
considered, the following must be delivered to the exchange: 255
Payment of the listing fees;
A statement of the total shareholdings in the company broken down
by class;
Where no prospectus has been published, a letter confirming that
the securities have not been offered to the public.
17. Publication of the Listing Particulars/Prospectus
Chapter 8 of the Listing Rules sets forth the publication require-
ments applicable to Listing Particulars. The same provisions are made
applicable subject to adaptation appropriate for a public offer to a pro-
spectus when an issuer applies for listing in connection with the first
offer of the securities to the public in the United Kingdom. 256 The listing
254. Listing Rules 7.5.
255. Listing Rules 7.7.
256. Listing Rules 5. 1(a)-(d).
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particulars/prospectus cannot be published until formally approved by
the Stock Exchange 257 and cannot be circulated or made available pub-
licly until published in accordance with the procedures described imme-
diately below. 258 The listing particulars/prospectus is published by
making printed copies thereof available to the public free of charge at
the Company Announcement Office of the Exchange, the issuer's regis-
tered office in the UK (if any), and the offices of any paying agent of the
issuer in the United Kingdom. 259 A notice of the availability of the list-
ing particulars/prospectus must be published in at least one national
newspaper no later than the next business day following publication.
260
Copies of the listing particulars/prospectus must be available at the
registered office of the issuer and the offices of its paying agent for at
least 14 days, commencing in most instances with the day on which the
notice of availability is published. 26 1 In addition, at least 30 copies and
such additional copies necessary to satisfy public demand must be
available at the Company Announcement Office of the Stock Exchange
for at least the first two of the 14 days.
262
B. Contents of Prospectus for 156A Securities
The Exchange has adopted Rules for Approval of Prospectuses
Where No Application for Listing is Made (hereinafter the "156A
Rules"). The 156A Rules follow Chapter 26 and have no Chapter desig-
nation. Strictly speaking, the 156A rules apply to an issuer who is not
applying for a listing that proposes to offer securities to the public in
the UK for the first time AND the securities are to be offered to the
public or are to be the subject of an application to the official list in an-
other member state simultaneously or within a short time (normally
within three months) of the offering in the UK.263 There, of course, is
little reason for an issuer to comply with the 156A Rules unless it in-
tends to offer and/or list the securities in another member state, but,
presumably, this does not require the issuer to go forward with the of-
fering and/or listing application in another member state. The approach
of the 156A Rules as to the content of the prospectus is to identify and
disapply those of the Listing Rules that are over and above the disclo-
sure standards set by Schedules A/B of the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive. The Listing Particulars Directive establishes minimum standards
257. Listing Rules 1 8.1.
258. Listing Rules 8.2. Draft listing particulars/prospectus clearly marked as a
draft, however, can be circulated by to approval and prior to publication for purpose of
arranging a placing or syndication or underwriting. See Listing Rules 1 8.3.
259. Listing Rules 1 8.4.
260. Listing Rules 1 8.7. For content of such notice, see Listing Rules 11 8.10-8.11.
261. Listing Rules 1 8.5.
262. Listing Rules 1 8.6.
263. 156A Rules 1 1.
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that each Member State must adopt. Schedule A of the Listing Par-
ticulars Directive sets forth the disclosure required in for the admission
of shares to the official list and Schedule B sets forth the disclosure re-
quired for the admission of debt securities to the official list. The Lon-
don Stock Exchange has incorporated comparable standards into the
Listing Rules, but has added a number of additional requirements that
go beyond Schedules A/B. Those that are required by Schedules A/B are
identified in the Listing Rules by an annotation referencing the rele-
vant provision of Schedules A/B being followed. Article 12 of the Pro-
spectus Directive requires as to a prospectus seeking the benefit of the
mutual recognition provisions that it meet the standards established by
the Listing Particulars - i.e., by Schedules A/B. The 156A Rules re-
quire that the prospectus contain the information set out in Chapter 6
(which prescribes the content of the listing particulars/prospectus for a
company applying for listing) to the extent required by the Appendix to
the 156A Rules. Paragraph 3 of the 156A Rules Appendix lists the pro-
visions of Chapter 6 that are not applicable to a 156 prospectus and by
this process for the most part leaves only those items required by
Schedule A/B as applicable to a 156A prospectus. There are a few in-
stances, as indicated below, in which the prospectus goes beyond
Schedule A/B. This leaves a document consisting of the following:
Business Activities. Identical to prospectus for securities to be
listed. See Section XIII(A)(2).
Financial Statements. The financial information can be presented
in the form of a comparative table in lieu of the accountants' report.
264
The issuer's auditors or reporting accountants, as appropriate, must
deliver a letter to the Stock Exchange to the effect that the comparative
table of financial information was extracted from the issuer's annual
accounts and that the annual accounts were prepared and audited in
accordance with the appropriate accounting standards. 265 This letter,
however, is not part of the prospectus. The circumstances under which
the accountants' report has to be used are not applicable. The prospec-
264. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes I 6.E.2 of the Listing Rules from the infor-
mation to be included in an 156A prospectus. Paragraph 6.E.2 sets forth by incorporating
relevant provisions of Chapter 12 the requirements as to the financial statements to be
included in and the form of the accountant's report. An applicant for listing, except under
specified circumstances or unless it elects to file an accountant's report, can use a com-
parative financial table meeting the requirements of I 6.E.1 of the Listing Rules instead
of an accountant's report. See § 1.13[1] [c] [iiij. Paragraph 6.E.1 incorporates by reference
the relevant provisions of Chapter 12 setting forth the content and form of the compara-
tive table. Since the Appendix to the 156A Rules provides that the prospectus of a 156A
filer "shall not include information required by paragraph... 6.E.2" the assumption is
made that such filers are to use a comparative table meeting the requirements of I 6.E.1
rather than an accountant's report.
265. See 156A Rules, Appendix 1 3 incorporating Listing Rules I 6.E.1, which in turn
incorporates 1 12.18.
VOL. 27:3
1999 THE PUBLIC OFFER OF SECURITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 421
tus, therefore, should include a comparative financial table similar with
limited exceptions to that required in the case of securities to be listed.
See Section XIII(A)(3)(c). Since there is no requirement that the issuer
have been in business for at least three financial years, specific provi-
sion is made for including information relating to the company's ac-
counts for such shorter periods, if any, that are applicable. 266 The most
significant other exception is that a statement as to the adequacy of the
working capital otherwise required by Rule 6.E. 16 is not required.
267
Material Trends and Forecasts. The general requirements as to the
discussion of trends in the company's business since the end of the last
financial years as to which its financial reports relate and information
relating to its prospects for the current financial year are the same as in
the case of a company making application for listing (see Section
XIII(A)(4)). If, however, the company chooses to include a profit forecast
or estimate it is not required as is the company applying for a listing to
set forth (a) the principal assumptions on which it is based; (b) the fore-
cast or estimate does not have to be examined and reported on by the
reporting accountants or auditors; and (c) the sponsor does not have to
confirm that the forecast was made after due and careful inquiry by the
auditors. 268 A company as a matter of disclosure, however, should con-
sider doing so. See Section XIII(A)(4).
Persons Responsible for the Prospectus. There are a number of sig-
nificant differences. No disclosure has to be made relating to the resig-
nation, removal, or failure to re-appoint the auditors during the last
three financial years. 269 No obligation to disclose information such audi-
tors regarded warranting the attention of shareholders or creditors.
270
No statement required as to reports of experts included in the prospec-
tus that such reports were included with the consent of the experts who
authorized the inclusion for purposes of section 152(1)(e). 271 Of lesser
significance, names and addresses of the issuer's bankers, legal advisers
and sponsor, legal advisers to the issue, and the reporting accountants
do not have to be included.2 7 2 The omission of these specific require-
ments is consistent with the general approach under the 156A Rules of
requiring disclosure mandated by Schedules A/B of the Listing Par-
ticulars Directive since they go beyond what Schedule A/B require. See
266. 156A Rules, Appendix 4.
267. 156A Rules, Appendix j 3.
268. 156A Rules, Appendix 3 excludes 6.G.2, which includes such limitations on
profit estimates or forecasts by a company applying for listing.
269. 156A Rules, Appendix 1 3 excludes J 6.A.7, which requires such information be
included if the company is applying for a listing.
270. Id.
271. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes 6.A.9, which requires such information be
included if the company is applying for a listing.
272. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes 6.A.8, which requires such information be
included if the company is applying for a listing.
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Section XIII(A)(6) for discussion of the requirements in the case of secu-
rities to be listed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, by virtue of Section
156A(3) the prospectus relating to 156A securities is subject to Sections
146, 150, and 152 of the FSA. Section 146 provides that any FSA Part
IV prospectus, which a 156A prospectus is, in addition to the informa-
tion called for by the Stock Exchange "shall contain all such information
as investors and their professional advisers would reasonably require,
and reasonably expect to find there, for the purpose of making an in-
formed assessment of - (a) the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities." Deroga-
tory information from former auditors would seem to fall into this cate-
gory. The question who may have civil liability for the failure to comply
with § 146 in this regard is a complex one. See Section XIV(e).
Distribution Arrangements. No significant differences. See Section
XIII(A)(9). 1.13[11] [i].
Management. There are substantially lesser requirements in that
directors' relevant business interests and activities do not have to be
described, 273 considerably less information is included relating to direc-
tors' remuneration and service contracts with the issuer. 274 See Section
XIII(A)(10) for description of requirements relating to securities to be
listed.
Promoters: The prospectus must include the name of any promoter
of the company or any of its subsidiaries and the amount of any cash,
securities or benefits that are proposed to be or have been, within the
two years preceding publication, paid, issued or given to any promoter
and the consideration received for same. This provision, which is appli-
cable to companies applying for listing, is one of the few instances in
which the disclosure of a 156A company goes beyond Schedule AIB.275
See Section XIII(A)(13).
Material Contracts: The Listing Rules require that in the case of a
company applying for a listing that the listing particulars/prospectus
set forth that it will make available for inspection for 14 days from the
date the prospectus is published or for the period of the offer, if longer,
at a designated place in or near the City of London a long list of docu-
ments, including all material contracts entered into within two years of
the date of publication of the prospectus. 276 See Section XIII(A)(12). The
listing particulars/prospectus must also include a summary of each such
273. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes I 6.F.2, which requires such information be
included if the company is applying for a listing.
274. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes 6.F.10-6.F.13, which requires such infor-
mation be included if the company is applying for a listing.
275. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 does not exclude 6.C.21, which requires such infor-
mation be included if the company is applying for a listing.
276. Listing Rules 6.C.7(c), incorporating 6.C.20.
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material contract.277 The 156A Rules do not require that the issuer
make the material contracts available for inspection, 278 but do require
that the listing particulars/prospectus include a summary of the mate-
rial contracts entered into within two years of the date of publication.
279
This is another of the few instances in which the 156A Rules go beyond
what is required by Schedules A/B.
The Issuer and Its Capital. Substantially the same information re-
quired of securities to be listed with the exception noted below. See Sec-
tion XIII(A)(11). The requirement that documents be available for in-
spection for not less than 14 days at a named place in or near the City
of London (6.C.7) and that the availability of such documents be set
forth in the prospectus is not applicable to the following documents: (a)
Articles of Association of the issuer; (b) any trust deed referred to in the
prospectus; (c) written statement of the auditors or accountants of ad-
justments made by them to the annual accounts, and (d) the audited ac-
counts of the issuer for each of the two financial years preceding publi-
cation of the listing particulars. 28 0 The absence of the statement of
adjustments follows from the fact that no auditors or accountants report
is included in the prospectus. The absence of the audited accounts from
the list of documents to be available for inspection seems lax since the
required comparative financial table is based on them. 28 1 Presumably,
they are available at the office of the relevant Registrar since if a com-
pany organized under the laws of the UK such annual statements have
to be filed with the Registrar. See Section XIII(A)(3)(a). Any report, bal-
ance sheet, valuation or other statements made by an expert included
or referred to in the prospectus must be made available for inspection
during normal business hours for not less than 14 days from the date of
the prospectus or for the duration of the offer, if longer, at a named
place in or near the City of London.
282
The 156A prospectus cannot be published until formally approved
277. Listing Rules 6.C.20.
278. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes J 6.C.7(c), which requires such material con-
tracts be made available for inspection if the company is applying for a listing.
279. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 does not exclude 6.C.20, which requires such infor-
mation be included if the company is applying for a listing.
280. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3 excludes 6.C.7(a), (b), (f), and (g), which require such
documents be referenced and be made available for inspection if the company is applying
for a listing.
281. The Rule 156A prospectus, however, does have to reference and the issuer must
make available for inspection reports and balance sheets included in or referred to in the
listing particulars/prospectus. 156A Rules, Appendix, 1 3, does not exclude 6.C.7(e),
which require such documents be referenced and be made available for inspection if the
company is applying for a listing. Since the comparative financial table at least indirectly
has to reference the published balance sheet; perhaps, this requires that it be made avail-
able for inspection by a 156A issuer.
282. 156A Rules 1 14.
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by the Stock Exchange 283 and cannot be circulated or made available
publicly until published in accordance with the procedures described
immediately below. 28 4 The publication requirements are the same as
those applicable to a POS prospectus (see Section VIII) with the qualifi-
cation noted immediately below.28 5 Any announcement of the public of-
fer must be submitted to the Stock Exchange for approval prior to use
and must state that a prospectus has been or will be published and the
addresses and the times at which copies are available to the public. 28 6 A
press release that merely includes a reference to the public offer, how-
ever, does not have to be submitted for approval.
28 7
C. Content of Prospectus of Other Unlisted Securities Not Traded on
AIM
The content of the prospectus of securities not to be listed and as to
which reliance is not being placed on Section 156A is determined by
Schedule 1 to the POS Regulations. Schedule 1 to a significant degree,
although numbered differently, follows the principal categories of in-
formation called for by the Listing Particulars for a first offering of
shares. The following description lists the significant similarities and
differences from the prospectus for shares to be listed.
Business Activities. Schedule 1, Part VI. Somewhat less information
is required than is required of securities to be listed. See Section
XIII(A)(2). For example, there is no requirement to furnish revenue by
products or by geographical areas. The specific requirements include (a)
a description of the company's business and "exceptional factors" that
impact the business; (b) dependence on contracts, licenses, patents, and
intellectual property of "fundamental importance" to its business; legal
proceedings, pending or threatened, that "may have a significant effect
on the issuer's financial position," and (d) information relating to sig-
nificant "investments in progress."
Financial Statements. Schedule 1, Part VII. In some respects, the
requirements appear to be more onerous than in the case of securities to
be listed or the 156A requirements. If, as is generally the case for an
UK issuer, the company has been required to publish its annual ac-
counts under Part VII of the Companies Act of 1985 (see Section
XIII(A)(3)(a)), the following requirements are applicable: Three years'
283. Listing Rules 8.1 as incorporated into 156A Rules 1 13.
284. Listing Rules 1 8.2 as incorporated into 156A Rules 1 13. Draft prospectus
clearly marked as a draft, however, can be circulated prior to approval and prior to publi-
cation for purpose of arranging a placing or syndication or underwriting. See Listing
Rules 1 8.3 as incorporated into 156A Rules 1 13.
285. 156A Rules 1 12.
286. 156A Rules 1 16.
287. 156A Rules 1 17.
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annual accounts (covering a continuous period of at least 35 months)
must be set out together with a statement by the directors that the ac-
counts have been prepared in accordance with the law and that they ac-
cept responsibility for them. "Annual accounts" has the same meaning
as in the Companies Act 1985 and so, by section 261(2) of that Act, must
include the notes to those accounts. The name and address of the audi-
tors has to be given together with a copy of the auditors' report on those
accounts. The prospectus is required to include a statement by the audi-
tors that they consent to the inclusion of their reports in the prospectus
and accept responsibility for them, and have not become aware, since
the date of any report, of any matter affecting the validity of that report
at that date. As an alternative to the foregoing, it is possible to include
a report by a person qualified to act as an auditor with respect to the
state of affairs and profit and loss shown by the issuer's annual ac-
counts for the last three years. If the company has been in existence for
less than three years, the requirement is qualified so that the prospec-
tus must contain the accounts that have actually been prepared for fi-
nancial years during its existence (disregarding a financial year that
ended less than three months before the date on which the offer is first
made). If more than nine months have elapsed at the date on which the
offer is first made (i.e., the date of publication of the prospectus) since
the end of the last financial year, the prospectus is also required to in-
clude interim accounts. The interim accounts need not be audited but
must be prepared to the standards required for annual accounts. The
prospectus must state the name and address of the person responsible
for the interim accounts, and a statement by him that the interim ac-
counts have been properly prepared in accordance with the law and
that he consents to the inclusion of the accounts and a statement in the
prospectus to that effect. Alternatively, a report covering that period
with respect to the state of affairs and profit and loss of the issuer, by a
person qualified to act as an auditor, may be included. If such alterna-
tive is utilized, the name and address of the person who audited the ac-
counts must be included. In addition, the prospectus must include a
statement by the person preparing the report "that in his opinion the
report gives a true and fair view of the state of affairs and profit or loss
of the issuer and its subsidiary undertakings, and that he consents to
the inclusion of his report in the prospectus and accepts responsibility
for it; or a statement why he is unable to make such a statement."
It is interesting to note that neither the prospectus for securities to
be listed nor the 156A rules require the consent of the auditors who
prepared the annual accounts to be included in the prospectus. Neither
require someone to specifically accept responsibility for the interim
statements. Neither specifically require the directors to accept respon-
sibility for the financial information. See Section XIII(A)(3)(c)-(e). In the
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case of a 156A prospectus, no statement accepting responsibility for the
financial information (which is included in the form of a comparative
table) included in the prospectus is required. 288 See Section XIII(B).
Recent Developments. Profit forecasts and estimates. Schedule I,
Part IX. See Section XIII(A)(4) as to securities to be listed. There are no
requirements relating to profit forecasts and estimates. The issuer,
however, must include information relating to "the issuer's prospects for
at least the current financial year of the issuer." In addition, "signifi-
cant recent trends concerning the development of the issuer's business"
must be included. Such information, however, is limited to develop-
ments since the end of the financial year.
Distribution Arrangements. Schedule 1, Part IV. See Section
XIII(A)(1) as to listed securities. The Schedule calls for limited informa-
tion relating to the nature of the offering and the distribution terms.
The prospectus must set forth the number of shares offered (1 19); the
offering price, or, if applicable, the procedure, method and timetable for
fixing the price (1 26); the method of payment for the shares and time-
table for delivery of the shares (1 27); the period during which the of-
fering will remain open (1 25); the names of the underwriters (the pro-
cedure, method and timetable for fixing the price); an estimate of the
expenses of the offering and by whom payable (1 23); commissions pay-
able to the underwriter (1 23), total proceeds expected from the offering
and net proceeds after deducting expenses to the issuer (1 20). The pro-
spectus must also state whether (a) the securities being offered have
been admitted to dealings on a recognized investment exchange; or (b)
an application for such admission has been made.
(2) If no such application for dealings has been made, or such an
application has been made and refused, a statement as to whether or
not there are, or are intended to be, any other arrangements for there to
be dealings in the securities and, if there are, a brief description of such
arrangements. Whether the securities are admitted to or application for
admission to dealings has been made on a "recognised investment ex-
change." If not, a brief description of the market in which it is expected
such securities will trade (1 16).
The purposes for which the securities are being offered must be set
forth (1 17). If the offer is by subscription, the following information
must be set forth concerning the use of the proceeds (1 21):
(a)The minimum amount which, in the opinion of the directors of
288. 156A Rules, Appendix 3 does incorporate Listing Rules 6.E.1, which in turn
incorporates 1 12.18. Paragraph 12.18 requires a letter to the Exchange from the issuer's
auditors or reporting accountants as appropriate to the effect that the comparative table
of financial information was extracted from the issuer's annual accounts and that those
were prepared and audited in accordance with the appropriate accounting standards. This
letter, however, is not part of the prospectus.
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the issuer, must be raised by the issue of those shares in order to pro-
vide the sums (or, if any part of them is to be defrayed in any other
manner, the balance of the sums) required to be provided in respect of
each of the following-
(i)The purchase price of any property purchased, or to be pur-
chased, that is to be defrayed in whole or in part out of the proceeds of
the issue;
(ii)Any preliminary expenses payable by the issuer and any com-
mission so payable to any person in consideration of his agreeing to
subscribe for, or of his procuring or agreeing to procure subscriptions
for, any shares in the issuer;
(iii)The repayment of any money borrowed by the issuer in respect
of any of the foregoing matters;
(iv)Working capital; and
(b)The amounts to be provided in respect of the matters mentioned
otherwise than out of the proceeds of the issue and the sources out of
which those amounts are to be provided.
In many respects this is considerably more specific than what has
to be disclosed concerning the use of proceeds as to securities to be
listed. See Section XIII(A)(1).
Management. Schedule 1, Part VIII. See Section XIII(A)(10) as to
securities to be listed. This part of Schedule 1 requires a concise de-
scription of the directors' existing and proposed service contracts of
more than one year's duration. Details also have to be given of the ag-
gregate remuneration paid and benefits in kind granted to the directors
of the issuer during its last completed financial year together with an
estimate for the current year. The prospectus must also set out the in-
terests of each director in the share capital of the issuer, distinguishing
between beneficial and non-beneficial interests. For this purpose it is
assumed that the provisions of sections 324 to 328 of the Companies Act
1985 are relevant for determining the interests of the directors.
Persons Responsible. Schedule 1, Part III. See Section XIII(A)(6) as
to securities to be listed. The prospectus must set forth the names and
addresses of the persons responsible for the prospectus, specifying the
portions for which they are responsible. The persons responsible are
those on whom responsibility is imposed by Section 13 of the POS
Regulations, which is comparable in most respects to Section 152 of the
FSA. See Section XIV(C). In some respects this is more specific than
what is required in connection with a prospectus relating to securities
to be listed. A statement of the directors must be set forth in the pro-
spectus that "to the best of their knowledge the information contained
in the prospectus is in accordance with the facts and that the prospec-
tus makes no omission likely to affect the import of such information."
There is no specific reference to the statement being made after enquiry
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as in the case of the declaration required in a prospectus of securities to
be listed. See Section XIII(A)(6). The provisions of the POS Regulations
imposing liability for untrue statements or misleading statements,
however, require, as in the case of securities to be listed, that directors
established that they exercised due care and made appropriate inquir-
ies to avoid liability. See Section XIV(E). The prospectus must also in-
clude "a statement by any person who accepts responsibility for the pro-
spectus, or any part of it, that he does so." This is without prejudice to
the provisions of 45 imposing responsibility on certain persons with
respect to the financial information included in the prospectus. See Sec-
tion XIV(C).
Securities to Which the Prospectus Relates. Schedule 1, Part IV. See
Section XIII(A)(11) as to securities to be listed. The securities being of-
fered must be described and a detailed summary of rights attaching to
those securities must be included in the prospectus. Particulars must be
given of tax on income from the securities withheld at source, including
tax credits.
General Information. Schedule 1, Part II. A number of general
items of information are required to be included in the prospectus, in-
cluding such fundamental matters as the name of the issuer and the
address of its registered office. If the offeror is different from the issuer,
the name and address of the offeror must be given. The date of publica-
tion of the prospectus is required to be stated and a statement must be
included that the prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with the
POS Regulations.
The preparation of the prospectus for unlisted securities is not in
fact significantly less onerous than securities to be listed. The signifi-
cant difference, however, is that there is no review of the prospectus.
The prospectus for unlisted securities is filed with the Registrar who
has limited authority not to accept it for filing and the prospectus is not
reviewed by anyone.
D. Contents of Prospectus for Securities to be Admitted to Trading on
AIM
A company making a public offering and applying for admission to
trading on AIM in connection therewith must comply with the prospec-
tus requirements of the POS.289 The company, however, must include
the additional information prescribed by the AIM Admission Rules; 290
in other words, a working capital adequacy statement, a statement of
the basis of any profit forecast, a notice to the effect that application has
been made for listing on AIM; some further disclosure as to directors;
289. AIM Admission Rules (AIM Rules) 16.10.
290. AIM Rules 1 16.11.
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the name and address of the nominated advisor, and the names of any
persons who are interested in more than three percent of the issuers
capital, along with a statement of the amount of their holding. If the
main business of the company has not realized revenues for at least two
years prior to admission, the directors, employees, and their associates,
other than those owning less than two percent of the outstanding
shares, must agree, and the prospectus must disclose, that for a period
of one year from the date trading commences such persons will not dis-
pose of their shares except in the event of death and under other limited
circumstances. 29 1 The prospectus must include on the first page (ex-
cluding the cover, if any) in prominent lettering a prescribed legend
that notes the company has applied for admission to trading on AIM,
that AIM is primarily for emerging or smaller companies with a "higher
investment risk" than established companies, prospective investors
should take the risks into account and "invest only after careful consid-
eration and consultation with his or her own independent financial ad-
viser." The legend must also note that AIM has less demanding rules
than the Official List, that no application has been made for admission
to the Official List, and "the Exchange itself has not approved the con-
tent of the document."292 The prospectus is submitted as part of the ap-
plication procedure, and in the case of a new applicant must be deliv-
ered to the AIM office of the Stock Exchange not less than five business
days prior to the date the issuer wishes the securities to be admitted.
293
The document is not reviewed by the AIM office, which relies entirely
upon the statement by the nominated adviser to the effect that the
document complies with all relevant rules. A company applying for ad-
mission to AIM must publish a prospectus conforming with the POS
regulations whether or not it is making an offer of its securities to the
public. 294 The prospectus is an Article 11 prospectus for purposes of the
Public Offers Prospectus Directive, not entitled to mutual recognition
by other member states. See § 1.09. Presumably an issuer could follow
the Section 156A procedures, in which event the Stock Exchange would
review the prospectus and it would be entitled to mutual recognition.
See § 1.13[2].
E. Acceptance of Applications and Allotment of Shares
A prospectus will usually invite the public to apply for shares by re-
turning an application form. The prospectus will state the time by
which the application forms must be received (normally the time when
the subscription lists open and immediately afterwards close) and to
291. AIM Rules 1 16.9(c), 16.11(d).
292. AIM Rules 16.11[c].
293. AIM Rules I 16.4C(c).
294. AIM Rules 16.10.
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whom they should be sent. In the case of large issues, they will nor-
mally be sent to receiving bankers who are appointed specifically to re-
ceive and deal with applications. Usually, the application must be ac-
companied by a check and the issuer or vendor will probably reserve the
right to clear all checks. The prospectus or listing particulars will con-
tain detailed terms and conditions on the basis of which applications
will be made. For example, the issuer or vendor will reserve the right to
reject any application and, if it is considered appropriate, to aggregate
multiple applications (or perhaps prohibit multiple applications by in-
cluding a warranty made by signing and submitting an application form
that it, the application form being signed, is the only application form
that has or will be made by the applicant).
Allotments and the treatment of applications in respect of unlisted
securities offered for sale or subscription are regulated by Companies
Act 1985.295 Applications made pursuant to a prospectus issued gener-
ally (i.e., issued to persons other than existing members or debenture
holders) may not be accepted until the beginning of the third working
day after the prospectus is first issued or until such later time as is
specified in the prospectus. 296 The period during which the offer is open
must be stated in the prospectus. 297 The word "issue" is given a special
meaning for this purpose if the prospectus is issued as a newspaper ad-
vertisement. If it is so issued before the third day after it is issued in
some other manner, the date of issue is the date on which it first ap-
pears as a newspaper advertisement. In any other case the date of issue
is the first date on which the prospectus was issued in any manner. 298
This provision ensures that applicants have a reasonable opportunity to
consider the prospectus and return the application before the subscrip-
tion lists open.
The Companies Act 1985 does not specify a date by which the sub-
scription lists must be closed and it is theoretically possible for a com-
pany to issue a prospectus and seek applications for its shares on the
basis of that prospectus over a long period of time. The burden on the
295. Part IV. (The Financial Services Act 1986 prospectively repealed sections 81 to
83, 86 and 87 and certain parts of CA 1985 § 84 and CA 1985 § 85. Under the Financial
Services Act 1986 (Commencement) (No. 3) Order 1986 (SI 1986 No. 2246) the repeal of
those sections was brought into force "to the extent to which they would apply in relation
to any investment which is listed or the subject of an application for listing in accordance
with Part IV of the [Financial Services] Act." By contrast, the Financial Services Act 1986
(Commencement) (No. 13) Order 1995 (SI 1995 No. 1538), which has effect to repeal CA
1985, Part III relating to prospectuses, does not bring the repeal of sections 81 to 87 of
that Act into force; indeed, a saving is made in the repeal of Part III of, and CA 1985, 3
Sch. to the extent necessary for the purpose of giving meaning to sections 81 to 87 (and
various other sections).)
296. CA 1985 § 82(1).
297. POS Regulations, Sch. 1, 1 25.
298. CA 1985 § 82(3).
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directors and other persons responsible for the prospectus of ensuring
that the information in the prospectus remained accurate during that
period, however, would be very arduous. The prospectus, therefore is
likely to set forth a closing date. In addition, the Companies Act pro-
vides that where there is an offer to the public for subscription of
shares, no allotment of shares can be made unless the minimum
amount that in the opinion of the directors must be raised after the ex-
penses of the offering for any proposed acquisition and for working capi-
tal has been subscribed. If this minimum amount has not been raised
within 40 days after the first issue of the prospectus, all money that has
been received from applicants has to be repaid to them forthwith with-
out interest or, if it is not repaid within 48 days after the issue of the
prospectus, with interest. 299 A prospectus under the POS Regulations is
required to include a statement of the minimum subscription required
to close the issue.30 0 Section 82(7) provides that applications made pur-
suant to a prospectus issued generally will not normally be revocable
until after the expiration of the third working day after the opening of
the subscription lists. Accordingly, applications, which in contractual
terms are offers, should be accepted by the issuer before the end of that
third day. Within one month of making an allotment of shares, a return
must be made to the Registrar of Companies on Form 88(2).301
XIV. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR LISTING PARTICULARS AND PROSPECTUSES
A. Introduction
The issue of civil liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus
can arise in connection with a prospectus prepared in conformity with
the POS regulations (POS prospectus), a prospectus prepared in con-
junction with a listing application on the London Stock Exchange (list-
ing particulars/prospectus), and a prospectus prepared in accordance
with Section 156A (a 156A prospectus). Liability relating to a listed pro-
spectus and a 156A prospectus (hereinafter collectively sometimes re-
ferred to as "Part IV prospectuses") is governed by Part IV of the Finan-
cial Services Act. Sections 146, 147, and 150-152 of the FSA, as
amended by Section 154A, are the critical provisions of the FSA deter-
mining liability for misrepresentations in connection with listing par-
ticulars/prospectus of listed companies. Section 156A of the FSA specifi-
cally extends these provisions with variations in terminology as
appropriate to a 156A prospectus. Liability for misrepresentations in a
POS prospectus is determined under §§ 13-15 of the POS. There are
299. CA 1985 § 83.
300. POS, Sch. 1, 21. That paragraph equates with CA 1985, 3 Sch. 2 which is in-
corporated into CA 1985 § 83(1).
301. See Companies (Forms) (Amendment) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988 No. 1359).
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many similarities, but also some apparent and, perhaps, real differ-
ences in the relevant provisions governing persons liable for misrepre-
sentations relating to POS prospectuses and Part IV prospectuses.
There may also be difference in application of Part IV to listing par-
ticulars/ prospectus and a 156A prospectus as the former play a dual
role as listing particulars and as a prospectus. The absence of authori-
tative judicial interpretations of these provisions leaves some important
issues unresolved.
Section 150 of the FSA (POS Regulation 14) provides a remedy to
an investor who acquires securities or an interest in securities and suf-
fers loss by reason of false or misleading information in the listing par-
ticulars/prospectus. This remedy is in addition to any other statutory or
common law remedy available to the injured party. There are two as-
pects of liability as follows:
Any person responsible for the listing particulars/prospectus (see
§ 1.14[3]) will be liable to compensate anyone who has acquired any of
the securities in question, and suffered loss in respect of them, as a re-
sult of any untrue or misleading statement in them or the omission of
any matter required to be included under section 146 (Regulation 9)
(general duty of disclosure) or section 147 (Regulation 10) (supplemen-
tary listing particulars or supplementary prospectus) (section 150(1)).
For the purposes of this provision, if the listing rules or the POS Regu-
lations require a statement either as to the existence of a matter or, if
there is none, a negative statement, the omission of the information is
treated as a statement that there is no such matter (section 150(2) and
Regulation 14(2)).
Any person who fails to issue supplementary listing particu-
lars/prospectus when they are required or otherwise fails to comply
with section 147 (Regulation 10) will be liable to pay compensation to
anyone who has acquired the securities and suffered loss as a result of
the failure (section 150(3) and Regulation 14(3)).
B. Who May Assert a Claim for False or Misleading Statements in a
Prospectus or Listing Particulars?
Section 150 of Part IV as amended by Section 154A creates a pri-
vate action "in any person who has acquired any of the securities in
question and suffered loss in respect of them as a result of any untrue or
misleading statement in the particulars or the omission from them of
any matters required to be included in them by Sections 146 and 147."
The antecedent of "in the particulars" is "listing particulars" and "sup-
plementary listing particulars." Section 154A makes this provision ap-
plicable to a prospectus and supplemental prospectus issued in connec-
tion with a public offer of securities by a company concurrently applying
for listing and Section 156A makes it applicable to a 156A prospectus.
Section 14 of the POS Regulations creates a private action in "any per-
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son who has acquired the securities to which the prospectus relates and
suffered loss in respect of them as a result of any untrue or misleading
statement in the prospectus or supplementary prospectus or the omis-
sion from it of any matter required to be included by regulation 9 or 10."
A potential issue is whether the cause of action is limited to those who
purchase in the offer to which the prospectus relates or whether those
who buy in the trading market also can assert a claim. The only differ-
ence in Section 150 vis-a-vis a prospectus or supplemental prospectus
and Regulation 14 pertains to the italicized phrases. In Possfund, a
lower court by way of dicta, since neither provision was involved, con-
cluded that the Regulation 14 language "securities to which the pro-
spectus relates" limits the cause of action to those who purchase in the
offering, whereas the language of Section 150 "any of the securities in
question" refers to the listed securities and is applicable whether pur-
chased in the offering or after trading has commenced. 302 The latter is a
tenable assumption as at the time Section 150 was adopted it was ap-
plicable only to listed securities and listing particulars and the securi-
ties in question had to be the listed securities. 303 Section 150 is now ap-
plicable to 156A securities as well and such securities will not be listed
and the reference to the securities in question has to be to the securities
described in the prospectus. The POS language establishing a right of
action for misrepresentations in a prospectus was taken from Section
166 of Part V of the FSA. Since Part V never became effective (see Sec-
tion III(D)), Section 166 was never applied although Possfund alludes to
302. See Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd. v. Diamond, (1996) 2 All ER 774. The court,
nonetheless, with respect to a prospectus relating to unlisted shares refused to grant a
motion to dismiss as to those who purchased the securities in the trading market. The
court acknowledged that in the seminal case of Peek v. Gurney, (1873) LR 6 HL 377, the
House of Lords held that under the law of deceit an after market purchaser could not as-
sert a claim based on misrepresentations in a prospectus. The court regarded it as "at
least arguable" that "in the light of changed market practice and philosophy" that the is-
suer intended that the prospectus be relied upon not only by those who purchased in the
offering, but those who purchase in the after market. This was suggested by the fact that
the prospectus referenced that the securities would be dealt in after the offering closed on
the Unlisted Securities Market (USM). In the court's view, it should be determined at
trial whether it was intended that the prospectus could be relied upon by purchasers in
the after market. See further discussion of Peek v. Gurney at § 1.14[6] [c].
303. The court in Possfund in concluding that after market purchasers of a listed se-
curity could assert a claim also relied on "the listing rules (which the Act required to be
complied with) required listing particulars to be constantly updated in respect of any in-
formation affecting, inter alia, the value of the listed securities." It is not entirely clear
what the court is referencing vis-a-vis a duty to update after the offering is completed.
The Listing Rules do require that a listed company notify "without delay" the Stock Ex-
change's Company Announcement Office of price sensitive "major new developments."
Listing Rules 11 6.1-6.2. These Rules are not phrased in terms of updating the Listing
Particulars and are not specifically required by the FSA. Schedule 4 to the FSA, however,
does require the Stock Exchange as a Recognized Investment Exchange to require issuers
of securities dealt with on the Exchange to provide "persons dealing in the investments
[securities] proper information for determining their value."
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it as limiting the cause of action to those who purchase in the offering.
The reference in Regulation 14 to "securities to which the prospectus
relates," although susceptible to the interpretation adopted by the
court,30 4 describes the securities but doesn't definitively resolve whether
they have to be purchased in the offering. The prospectus describe a se-
curity and it describes an offering. The prospectus relates to a specific
class of shares of a specific issuer and in that sense one who purchased
them in the trading market also acquired the securities to which the
prospectus relates. Regulation 14 is not specifically limited "to the of-
fering to which the prospectus relates." Regulation 14 as to such un-
listed securities supplants Section 67(a) of the Companies Act of 1985,
which created a private action in "all those who subscribe for any
shares or debentures on the faith of the prospectus for the loss or dam-
age which they may have sustained by reason of any untrue statement
included in it." This provision in contrast by the use of the term of art
"subscribe for" makes it clear that it related to purchasers in the offer-
ing.
The defenses discussed below available to prospective defendants
also have some subtle differences between Part IV prospectuses and a
POS prospectus. For this purpose, it is necessary to distinguish between
the accuracy at the time the listing particulars/prospectus and supple-
mental listing particulars/supplemental prospectus are approved by the
London Stock Exchange from any general duty to update after comple-
tion of the offering, which is not addressed by the referenced provisions.
The Listing Rules require that before dealings on the exchange have
commenced the listing particulars/prospectus must be updated with a
supplemental listing particulars/prospectus if there have been any sig-
nificant changes. Under Section 151(1), the speaking date as of which
liability is determined for false or misleading statements is the dates as
of which the listing particulars/prospectus and the supplemental listing
particulars/prospectus were or should have been submitted to the Ex-
change. Under Section 151(1)(d) of Part IV of the FSA defendant (1)
must reasonably believe that same were not false or misleading at such
speaking date, (2) defendant continued in that belief after commence-
ment of dealings on the exchange, and (3) "the securities were acquired
after such a lapse of time that he ought in the circumstances to be rea-
sonably excused." The latter proviso suggests that after an appropriate
lapse of time, whatever that may be, the defendant no longer has liabil-
ity even though prior to the acquisition of the shares he no longer had
reason to believe that the representations were not false or misleading
at the time as of which the document spoke. The negative implication of
304. The plaintiffs apparently did not challenge this view, relying instead on the ar-
gument that the changes in marketing of the securities warranted extending responsibil-
ity for misrepresentations under the law of deceit so as to protect purchasers in the after
market if the prospectus was intended to influence their decision to purchase the security.
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this is that one who purchases securities after trading commences on
the exchange can assert a claim based on false or misleading represen-
tations in the prospectus at the relevant date provided an unreasonable
period of time has not elapsed since the securities commenced trading.
Section 10 of the POS Regulations requires after the POS prospec-
tus has been delivered to the Registrar that so long as the offering re-
mains open that in the event of any significant change or significant in-
accuracy in the prospectus, the offeror is to deliver to the Registrar a
supplemental prospectus appropriately updating and/or correcting the
prospectus. The speaking date of the prospectus for determining liabil-
ity of prospective defendants that the prospectus is not false or mis-
leading under Regulation 15 is the time the prospectus and supplemen-
tal prospectus were or should have been delivered to the registrar. To
avoid liability, defendant under § 15(1)(a) must have continued in that
belief until the securities were acquired or under § 15(1)(d) "that the se-
curities were acquired after such lapse of time that he ought in the cir-
cumstances to be reasonably excused." If only persons who bought in
the offer can assert a claim, the latter provision is a redundancy unless
it is designed to preclude a person who purchases in the offering that
has remained open for a long period of time to be precluded from recov-
ery because of the time that had elapsed since the offering commenced.
This appears unlikely, particularly in view of the fact that the offeror at
least has an obligation to file a supplemental prospectus to update the
prospectus for significant developments and/or correct significant errors
in the prospectus as long as the offering remains open. Section 15(1)(d)
adds, if the securities are dealt in on an approved exchange (which
would be AIM presently, see Section XIII(D)), defendant must have con-
tinued to believe that the prospectus or supplemental prospectus at the
relevant date was not false or misleading "after commencement of
dealings on that exchange." This does not limit the applicability of the
lapse of time provision to securities admitted to dealings on the ex-
change. Further, with respect to such securities that are admitted to
dealings, this provision suggests that purchasers of the securities dealt
on AIM after the offering closed can assert a claim and that defendant
can avoid liability only by proving that after dealings commenced on
AIM he continued to hold the reasonable belief that the prospectus and
supplemental prospectus were not false or misleading at the relevant
date. Since the AIM prospectus is a POS prospectus, it is subject to the
"to which the securities relate" limitation of § 14(1) of the POS. If that
language limits the plaintiffs to those who purchased in the offering, it
is at odds with the implication of § 15(1)(d) as to securities dealt on the
Alternative Investment Market after completion of the offering.
30 5
305. The prospectus involved in Possfund was issued in April 1992 in connection with
a flotation of shares on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM). The USM is a market for
dealings in unlisted securities on the London Stock Exchange that has since been dis-
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In the case of the 156A prospectus, the relevant provisions are
those pertaining to a listed security except the language relating to con-
tinuing to believe following admission of the securities to the official list
is deleted and the identical language discussed above relating to
§ 15(1)(d) of the POS Regulations is added.30 6 The same conclusion ap-
pears to follow, that these provisions suggests that one who purchased
after completion of the offering can assert a claim as these provisions
otherwise would serve no purpose.
C. Against Whom May a Claim be Asserted?
The provisions in Part IV of the Act and Part II of the POS Regula-
tions as to liability and responsible persons are very similar. The term
listing particulars/prospectus will be used to include any supplementary
listing particulars or supplementary prospectus. Under section 152 of
the Financial Services Act, there are five categories of person responsi-
ble for listing particulars/prospectus, as follows:
(i)The issuer of the securities;
(ii)The directors of the issuing company at the time the listing par-
ticulars/prospectus are submitted for approval (or, in the case of POS
Regulation 13, at the time the prospectus is published);
(iii)Each person who is named in and has authorized himself to be
named in the listing particulars/prospectus as a director or as having
agreed to become a director either immediately or at a future time;
(iv)Any person who accepts and is stated in the listing particu-
lars/prospectus as accepting responsibility for the particulars or any
part thereof (but only for that part); and
(v)Any other person who has authorized the listing particu-
lars/prospectus or any part thereof (but only for that part).
Under Regulation 13 of the POS Regulations, two additional cate-
gories of person may be responsible for a prospectus:
The offeror of the securities, where he is not the issuer; and
Where the offeror is a company, but is not the issuer and is not
making the offer in association with the issuer, each person who is a di-
rector of that company at the time when the prospectus is published.
placed by AIM. The plaintiffs did not raise the issue of the resolution of its status under
Section 166 of Part V of the FSA, since it never went into effect and was clearly inapplica-
ble. The court, however, in concluding that the "to which the securities relate" limitations
of Section 166 would have limited claims thereunder to purchasers in the offering failed to
take into account why it would have been necessary, if the provision were applicable, for
the defendant to continue reasonably to believe after securities commenced trading on the
USM that the prospectus was not false or misleading.
306. FSA § 156A(3)(d).
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The additional provisions were necessary as the Prospectus Direc-
tive on which it is based adopted a somewhat different approach from
the FSA to the use of the prospectus as the requirement is phrased in
terms of the first offer to the public of a security in the member state.
The first offer to the public in a specific EU country may be by someone
other than the issuer. It is the offeror of POS securities that must pub-
lish the prospectus and that must file the prospectus with the Regis-
trar.307 This is likely to be the issuer, but it is not necessarily the issuer.
A person, for example, may have acquired securities in circumstances
that did not involve an offer to the public, but subsequently offers them
to the public. In that event, it is that person, and not the issuer of the
securities, who must publish the prospectus and file the prospectus
with the Registrar. 308 The apparent reason for imposing liability on the
offeror is in view of the eventuality that the prospectus requirement
might be triggered by an offeror who is not the issuer. In such a case,
provided the issuer has not authorized the offer, neither the company
that issued the securities nor the directors of that company have any
liability for the contents of the prospectus.
309
Since the FSA was enacted before the Prospectus Directive was
adopted, it did not anticipate the first public offer approach of the Pro-
spectus Directive. It is not surprising, therefore, that Section 152 does
not refer to the offeror as a person responsible for this purpose. The dis-
tinction, however, may only be apparent. Section 154A was added to the
FSA at the same time the POS regulations were adopted. Section 154A
is designed to make the relevant provisions of the FSA governing
preparation of the listing particulars applicable to the prospectus re-
quired in connection with the offering for the first time in the United
Kingdom of listed securities. Section 154A provides that the reference
in Section 152(1)(a) to the issuer of the securities, notwithstanding Sec-
tion 142(7) (the definition of an issuer), is also "a reference to the person
offering or proposing to offer them." Section 152(1)(a) is the provision
that imposes responsibility (and, hence, liability) on the issuer of the se-
curities for the listing particulars/prospectus. Section 156A was added
to the FSA at the same time as the POS regulations was adopted. Sec-
tion 156A is designed to apply the relevant provisions of Part IV of the
FSA relating to listing particulars the 156A prospectus. See Section VI.
Section 156A(3)(e) also provides that the reference in Section 152(1)(a)
307. POS § 4(1)-(2).
308. POS § 4(1)-(2).
309. POS § 13(2). Under the 1999 amendments, however, if the issuer has authorized
the offering an offeror who is not an issuer is not subject to the prospectus related civil
liability provisions if (a) the issuer has responsibility for the prospectus under the regula-
tions (which is ordinarily the case if it has authorized the offering), (b) the prospectus was
drawn up primarily by the issuer or persons acting on behalf of the issuer, and (c) the of-
feror is making the offer in association with the issuer. POS 1999 Amendments, § 2(n)
adding to the POS § 13(2A).
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to the issuer of the securities is also "a reference to the person offering
or proposing to offer them." Notwithstanding the somewhat awkward
language and convoluted manner of doing so, the offeror appears also to
be a responsible person with respect to the civil liability provisions ap-
plicable to listed securities and 156A securities. This, of course, as in
the case of a POS prospectus, was necessary to impose liability for the
prospectus on the person who makes the first public offer of the security
when it is not the issuer.
Only the issuing company itself may apply for listing of securities,
so that liability as to listed securities can only arise in respect of listing
particulars/prospectus prepared by the company itself. It appears,
therefore, that the issuer and its directors continue to be responsible
persons even if the first public offer in the United Kingdom is made by
someone other than the issuer. This tends to be confirmed by the fact
that unlike the POS310 Section 152 does not include a provision to the
effect that the issuer and its directors are not responsible persons with
respect to an offer made by someone without its authorization. A 156A
prospectus has to be submitted to and approved by the London Stock
Exchange. See Section XIII(B). Unlike a prospectus or listing particu-
lars pertaining to securities to be listed, the provisions of the Stock Ex-
change governing a 156A prospectus provide that "the prospectus may
be submitted by the issuer, or with the consent of the issuer, by the of-
feror to the Exchange for approval."3 11 Section 156A(3) incorporates
those provisions of Section 152 that make the issuer and directors of the
issuer responsible persons vis-a-vis the 156A prospectus without the
POS provision absolving them from responsibility with respect to a first
public offer by a person other than the issuer. The apparent reason for
such exclusion is that even though the 156A prospectus can be submit-
ted by the offeror, the offeror must have the issuer's authorization to do
so. One suspects that an issuer would not be inclined to grant such
authorization without provision for indemnification against liability.
Further, even though the offeror is responsible for submitting a POS
prospectus to the Registrar and for its publication, it would be difficult
for it to obtain much of the information it needs to meet the POS re-
quirements without the participation of the issuer. The POS does pro-
vide that an offeror who is not the issuer and is not acting pursuant to
an agreement with the issuer may omit information not available to
him because he is not the issuer.312 He, however, is excused from fur-
nishing such information only if is unable to obtain it after "making
such efforts (if any) as are reasonable, to obtain the information."313
310. POS § 13(2).
311. Rules for Approval of Prospectuses Where No Application for Listing Is Made,
2.
312. POS § 11(2).
313. POS § 11(2)(c).
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Query, if the issuer furnished such information, does it constitutes an
authorization of the offer, making the issuer and its directors responsi-
ble persons? An issuer under these circumstances would be well advised
not to cooperate with the offeror absent indemnification and/or compel-
ling reason to do so.
The need to impose offeror liability is apparent in view of the struc-
ture of the prospectus regime imposed by the EU Prospectus Directive,
although the Directive itself includes no liability provisions and does
not require a country to impose civil liability for a false or misleading
prospectus. The imposition of liability on the offeror under the POS
Regulations and the FSA as amended may have some unforeseen and
apparently unintended consequences. The civil liability provisions of
the Directors Liability Act of 1890 was designed to impose liability in
connection with a prospectus that went beyond the law of deceit as re-
flected in Derry u. Peek. That Act is the precursor of civil liability for
false or misleading prospectuses both in the UK and the United States.
That Act did not impose liability on the underwriter and the successor
provisions in the Companies Act of 1985 and Section 152(a) of the FSA
also do not make underwriters qua underwriters responsible persons.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, notwithstanding the outspoken
opposition at the time of Wall Street, specifically imposes liability on
the underwriters in connection with misrepresentations in a registra-
tion statement filed under that Act. The unanswered and generally un-
asked question is whether Section 13 of the POS Regulation and Section
152 of Part IV as amended by Sections 154A and 156A, inadvertently or
otherwise, impose liability in certain types of offerings on the under-
writer(s). Do these provisions make the underwriter a responsible per-
son in connection with an offer of sale or any other type of offering in
which the underwriter purchases the securities from the issuer and of-
fers them as principal? See Section II. Section 142(7A) of the FSA,
added at the same time as the POS regulations, provides that for pur-
poses of Part IV of the Act "(a) a person offers securities if, as principal
- (i ) he makes an offer which, if accepted, would give rise to a contract
for their issue or sale (which for this purpose includes any disposal for
valuable consideration) by him or by another person with whom he has
made arrangements for their issue or sale; or (ii) he invites a person to
make such an offer, but not otherwise; and, except where the context
otherwise requires, 'offer' and 'offeror' shall be construed accordingly."
Section 5 of the POS Regulations includes a substantially identical
definition of offer and offeror. These provisions may fit the underwriter
in certain types of offerings. See Section If(A). If construed in that
fashion, underwriters could have offeror liability. A possible escape
from such construction is that the definition of offer and offeror are
qualified by the language, "except where the context otherwise re-
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quires."
314
Interestingly, the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange im-
pose considerable responsibility on the sponsor, and the sponsor ordi-
narily is the underwriter. Those responsibilities include, among others,
assuring that the issuer is "properly guided" in complying with the
listing rules, that all the relevant requirements of the listing rules have
been complied with in preparing the listing particulars, that all the di-
rectors are aware of their responsibilities and obligations as directors of
a listed company, obtain written confirmation from the issuer and those
providing the issuer with financing facilities that the issuer's working
capital is sufficient to meet its present needs, and confirm in writing
that any profit forecast or estimate that appears in the listing particu-
lars "has been properly complied." 315 The sponsor must submit as part
of the listing application and procedure for approval of the listing par-
ticulars/prospectus that it has "discharged all of its responsibilities set
out in Chapter 2 of the listing rules with due care and skill."316 The only
"report" of the sponsor, however, that must appear in the listing par-
ticulars/prospectus is that pertaining to any profit forecast or estimate,
as to which it may be a responsible person for civil liability purposes.
See Section XIII(A)(8). The Listing Rules take care to provide that the
responsibilities of the sponsor "are owed solely to the Exchange."
317 If
the Exchange determines that the sponsor has failed to carry out its re-
sponsibilities, it may impose sanctions in the form of a censure, publica-
tion of such censure, and/or removal from the register of sponsors main-
tained from the Exchange. The latter could seriously impact the firm's
investment banking business. The Stock Exchange, fortuitously, is a
recognized investment exchange and not a recognized self-regulatory
organization. 31 8 A breach of its rules, unlike the rules of a self-
regulatory organization, 31 9 is not within Section 62 of the FSA. Section
314. The 1999 amendments to the POS Regulations and counterpart amendments to
the Financial Services Act may have alleviated this problem. Under the 1999 amend-
ments, an offeror who is not an issuer is not subject to the prospectus related civil liability
provisions if (a) the issuer has responsibility for the prospectus under the regulations
(which is ordinarily the case if it has authorized the offering), (b) the prospectus was
drawn up primarily by the issuer or persons acting on behalf of the issuer, and (c) the of-
feror is making the offer in association with the issuer. POS 1999 Amendments, § 2(n)
adding to the POS § 13(2A). The reference to offers made in association with the issuer
appears concerned with situations in which the issuer and selling shareholders may both
be making an offering or the issuer is facilitating an offering by a large shareholder. The
reference to an offer made in association with the issuer, however, may be broad enough
to cover the underwriter acting as principal. In any event, this could raise some interest-
ing questions as to by whom the prospectus was primarily drawn up.
315. See Listing Rules 11 2.6-2.17.
316. Listing Rules 1 2.8 and Schedule 4A.
317. Listing Rules 2.6.
318. FSA § 36.
319. See FSA § 62(2).
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62 permits under limited circumstances a private action to be brought
by a person who suffers a loss as a result of a breach of a rule of a self-
regulatory organization. 320
It is interesting to note that if a comparative chart of financial in-
formation is used in lieu of an accountants' report, the accountants who
reported on the financial statements extracted in the chart do not ac-
cept responsibility for the financial statements upon which the chart is
based or the chart. The accountants who prepare the chart and submit
a letter to the Stock Exchange to the effect in their opinion the refer-
enced statements were properly prepared and that the table properly
extracts such information also assume no responsibility for the prospec-
tus and apparently have no liability under Part IV of the Exchange act.
See Section XIII(A)(3). This leaves the issuer and the directors as re-
sponsible for the financial information and they are not in a position to
claim reliance on an expert since the financial statements have not been
included with the consent of the accountants.
Part IV of the FSA, in a concession to the market in Eurobonds, ex-
cludes from the persons responsible for the listing particu-
lars/prospectus directors of "an issuer of international securities."
321
There is no comparable provision applicable to a POS prospectus. An
offering of Eurobonds generally is exempt from the requirement that a
prospectus be used in connection with a first public offer of securities as
Euro-securities or otherwise. See Section VII. It is the general practice,
nonetheless, for Eurobonds to be listed on at least one stock exchange
within the European Union even if the securities are not going to be
traded on the exchange. The provision exculpating directors of an issuer
of international securities comes into play primarily with respect to the
listing particulars relating to Eurobonds. The definition of "interna-
tional securities," however, although vague in some respects, is broader.
International securities are defined as listed debt securities that are
denominated in a currency other than sterling or are otherwise associ-
ated with a country outside the United Kingdom and are of a kind likely
to be dealt in by corporations and persons resident in a country other
than the United Kingdom.322 The securities must also be of a class of
debt securities that the Listing Rules of the Stock Exchange provide are
suitable "for persons of the kind who may be expected normally to buy
or deal in the securities." 323 Chapter 23 of the Listing Rules of the Lon-
don Stock Exchange include specific and somewhat less stringent re-
quirements as to the content of the listing particulars of specialist secu-
rities, including Eurobonds. Specialist securities are defined by the
Listing Rules as "securities which, because of their nature are normally
320. See FSA § 62 as amended by § 62A.
321. See FSA § 152(5).
322. FSA § 152(6).
323. FSA § 148(1)(c) as incorporated into § 152(5).
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bought and traded by a limited number of investors who are particu-
larly knowledgeable in investment matters. 324 If Eurobonds are listed
on the London Stock Exchange, the issuer is a responsible person vis-a-
vis the Listing Particulars, but the directors of the issuer are not.
D. What Must Plaintiff Prove
The question of when plaintiff must have purchased the security
and the speaking date of the prospectus and supplementary prospectus
are discussed at § 1.14[2]. Assuming an appropriate plaintiff, plaintiff
must prove at the speaking date of the prospectus or the supplementary
prospectus that the prospectus or supplementary prospectus, as appro-
priate, contained an untrue or misleading statement or omitted infor-
mation required to be included therein. 325 Plaintiff must prove his loss
was a result of the untrue or misleading statement or the omitted in-
formation. The relevant provisions do not specifically require that the
misrepresentations or omissions relate to a material fact, but it would
be necessary to establish materiality to prove that the plaintiffs loss re-
sulted from the misrepresentations. There is no specific provision as to
how such loss is to be computed, which leaves it to the analogous meas-
ure of damages under common law in an action of deceit. See Section
XIV(F)(3).
E. What Are the Defendants'Defenses?
A defendant with respect to statements not made on the authority
of an expert can defend by carrying the burden of proof that "having
made such enquiries (if any) as were reasonable" "he reasonably be-
lieved" at the relevant times "that the statement was true and not mis-
leading or that the matter whose omission caused the loss was properly
omitted."326 If the statement was made on the authority of and with the
consent of an expert, defendant can avoid liability by carrying the bur-
den of proof that at the relevant times "he believed on reasonable
grounds" that the expert "was competent to make or authorise the
statement and had consented to its inclusion in the form and context in
which it was included."327 The speaking date of the listing particu-
lars/prospectus and defendant's belief at the time of the acquisition of
the shares by the plaintiffs is discussed at § 1.1412] in connection with
the discussion of who may assert a claim for a misrepresentation in the
prospectus.
In addition, a defendant may defend vis-a-vis a particular plain-
324. Listing Rules 1 23.1(a).
325. POS Regulations § 14(1); FSA § 150(1).
326. POS Regulations § 15(1); FSA § 151(1).
327. POS Regulations § 15(2); FSA § 151(2).
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tiff(s) on the ground that it was not "reasonably practicable" to bring a
correction of the statement 328 (or the fact that an expert relied upon was
not competent or had not consented)329 "to the person likely to acquire
the securities." Alternatively, it is a defense if defendant carries the
burden of proof that he took all reasonable steps to "secure that a cor-
rection [of the statement] was [forthwith, under the POS Regulation]
brought to the attention" of such persons. 330 It is a defense that defen-
dant took all reasonable steps "to secure" that the fact that the expert
relied upon was not competent or had not consented to the use of his
report [if such was the case] "was forthwith brought to the attention" of
prospective purchasers. 33 ' Note that both the POS and the FSA require
as to correcting the statements relating to the competence and consent
of the expert, that it be brought to the attention of prospective purchas-
ers "forthwith," whereas only the POS provision includes the word
"forthwith" with respect to the correction of misrepresentations gener-
ally. It is also a defense if the correction of misrepresentations or the
fact that the expert was not competent or had not consented is "pub-
lished in a manner reasonably calculated to bring it to the attention of
persons likely to acquire the securities" before plaintiff acquired the se-
curities. 332 Similarly, it is a defense that defendant took reasonable
steps "to secure such publication and reasonably believed that it had
taken place before the securities were acquired." 333 Defendant can also
defend by carrying the burden of proof that plaintiff knew at the time
he acquired the securities that the statement was false or misleading.
334
There are some additional defenses, but the foregoing and those
discussed at § 1.14[2] are the defendant's principal defenses applicable
to POS prospectus, listing particulars and prospectus of a listed or to be
listed company, and to 156A prospectus.
F. Common Law Liability for Listing Particulars and Prospectuses
Apart from the specific remedies provided by the Financial Services
Act 1986 and the POS Regulations, a person suffering loss by virtue of
any untrue or misleading statement (or omission) in a prospectus or
listing particulars may have remedies in contract and tort. In this sec-
tion the term "prospectus" includes listing particulars.
328. POS Regulations § 15(1)(b); FSA § 151(1)(b).
329. POS Regulations § 15(2)(b); FSA § 151(2)(b).
330. POS Regulations § 15(1)(c); FSA § 151(1)(c).
331. POS Regulations § 15(2)(c); FSA § 151(2)(c).
332. POS Regulations § 15(3)(a); FSA § 151(3)(a).
333. POS Regulations § 15(3)(b); FSA § 151(3)(b).
334. POS Regulations § 15(5); FSA § 151(5).
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1. Negligent Misstatement
The principles enunciated in obiter dicta in Hedley Byrne & Co.
Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.335 established a remedy for loss suffered
as a result of a negligent misstatement, provided that the person mak-
ing the statement owed a duty of care to the person suffering loss in re-
liance on it. Such a duty of care will arise when there is a special rela-
tionship between the parties (i.e., a relationship between the function
that the defendant was requested to perform and the transaction in re-
lation to which the plaintiff said he had relied on proper performance);
see, for example, the discussion of the duty of care owed by auditors
generally in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman and others,336 Al Saudi
Banque and others v. Clark Pixley,337 Berg Sons & Co. Ltd. and others v.
Adams and others,338 Galoo Ltd. and others v. Bright Grahame Murray
and another.339 It has been held that such a relationship exists between
the persons putting their names behind a prospectus and persons who
subscribe or purchase shares in reliance on that prospectus; Al-Nakib
Investments (Jersey) Ltd. and another v. Longcroft and others.340 How-
ever, the case still stands as authority for the proposition that any duty
of care that is owed in relation to a prospectus is owed only to the initial
subscribers and not to subsequent purchasers. By contrast, in Morgan
Crucible Co. PLC v. Hill Samuel & Co. Ltd. and others,341 a profit fore-
cast was made in a contested take-over. The bidder claimed to rely on
this. On a preliminary point it was held arguable that there was a rela-
tionship that was sufficient to give rise to a duty of care, but the point
was never brought to trial.
2. Contract and the Misrepresentation Act 1967
Actions for damages for breach of contract will be available only
against persons who have privity of contract with the claimant. Thus
only the actual vendor of the shares to the claimant would be liable in
contract. However, an incorrect statement in a prospectus will not give
rise to a breach of contract unless the statement became a term of the
contract; the courts are not usually prepared to regard statements in
prospectuses as other than mere representations that induce a sub-
scriber to apply for shares to be allotted to him.
If the prospectus contains an untrue or misleading statement, or
there is an omission that renders a statement in the prospectus mis-
335. (1964) AC 465.
336. (1990) 2 AC 605.
337. (1990) 1 Ch. 313.
338. (1992) BCC 661.
339. (1995) 1 All ER 16.
340. (1990) 1 WLR 1390.
341. (1991) Ch. 295.
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leading, the injured party may have a remedy under the Misrepresenta-
tion Act 1967.342 The remedies provided by the Misrepresentation Act
are rescission of the contract and/or damages. The remedy of rescission
will be lost if the subscriber or purchaser affirms the contract by failing
to act within a reasonable time of discovering the truth. Furthermore,
the right of rescission only extends to the original purchaser or sub-
scriber and not to a subsequent purchaser. As in the case of an action
founded on breach of contract, a claim under the Misrepresentation Act
lies only against another party to the contract, i.e., the issuer in an offer
for subscription or the vendor in an offer for sale. It is a defense to a
claim for damages, but not rescission, for the defendant to prove that he
believed on reasonable grounds, up to the time the contract was made,
that the statement complained of was true.
Formerly, under the rule in Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow
Bank,343 a subscriber (by contrast with a purchaser under an offer for
sale) was only able to maintain an action for damages if he rescinded
the contract. A subscriber lost the right to rescind if he affirmed the
contract or the company went into liquidation before he had rescinded
(since the intervention of third party rights is a bar to rescission). How-
ever, CA 1985, § 111A (inserted by the Companies Act 1989) has in ef-
fect abolished that rule. Section 111A states as follows:
A person is not debarred from obtaining damages or other compen-
sation from a company by reason only of his holding or having held
shares in the company or any right to apply or subscribe for shares or to
be included in the company's register in respect of shares.
3. Deceit
The prospectus action originally developed out of the action in the
tort of deceit. This action was originally a satisfactory remedy for defec-
tive prospectuses since it lay for any inaccuracy and might be brought
by any person to whom the deceitful representation had been made. It
was robbed of its usefulness by two late-nineteenth century decisions,
Peek v. Gurney,344 in which it was held that only a subscriber might sue
in deceit, and not a market purchaser, and Derry v. Peek,345 in which it
was held that "deceit" embraced only a deliberate intention to deceive,
and did not encompass a negligent failure to inform. However, it should
be noted that the statute that was passed to reverse the effect of Derry
v. Peek, the Directors Liability Act 1890, was the direct ascendant of the
342. The Act is not applicable to Scotland, but see section 10 of the Law Reform (Mis-
cellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985.
343. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 317.
344. (1873) LR 6 HK 377. But see discussion of Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd. v.
Diamond, (1996) 2 All ER 774 at § 1.14[2].
345. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337.
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§ 150/Reg. 14 provisions imposing statutory liability upon directors for
defective prospectuses. Consequently, it is clear that the measure of
damages in any case brought on a breach of § 150/Reg. 14 will be the
deceit measure (i.e., all consequential loss without regard to questions
of mitigation or remoteness) rather than the ordinary tortious meas-
ure.346
XV. PUBLIC REMEDIES
Section 47 of the FSA makes it an offense, hence a crime punish-
able by imprisonment up to seven years or to a fine, or both, to know-
ingly or recklessly make a statement, promise or forecast that is mis-
leading, false, or deceptive or knowingly "dishonestly conceals any
material facts" to induce the purchase or sale of a security. The same
section makes it unlawful to create "a false or misleading impression as
to the market in or the price or value of a security" for the purpose of
inducing others to purchase or sell a security. 347 Although no private ac-
tion is provided for violations of Section 47, the SIB can apply to an ap-
propriate court for a restitution order directing one who has violated
Section 47 or any rule of an SRO to pay over profits or make restitution
for loss to persons who were the victims of the violations. 348 The court
may order payment by the defendant into court of such amounts as it
deems just, which the court is to distribute among the persons from
whom the defendant realized the profit or the persons suffering loss as
a result of such violations. 349
XVI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Public Offers of Securities Regulations in 1995
and the amendment of those regulations in 1999, brings to a close a
process that commenced with the adoption of the Financial Services Act
in 1985. There is now in place in the United Kingdom an overall regula-
tory scheme for determining when a prospectus must be used, what it
must contain, who is to review it, how it is to be delivered, and liability
for any prospectus misrepresentation. The scheme of things to some ex-
tent was delayed because of the adoption of the European Union Pro-
spectus Directive in 1989 and the need to conform to that Directive. The
EU has provided member state companies with a road map for com-
346. Clark v. Urquhart, (1930) AC 228, and see Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v.
Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd., (1996) 4 All E.R. 769.
347. Section 47(2) is similar to Section 9(a)(4) of the Exchange Act which makes it
unlawful to effect transactions in a listed security "creating actual or apparent active
trading.., or raising or depressing the price... for the purpose of inducing the purchase
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pleting a Union-wide public offering using a single prospectus prepared
in compliance with the laws of any member state that conform with the
Directive. There have been few offerings to date, however, that have
taken advantage of the mutual recognition of prospectuses among the
member states. The 1999 amendments to the POS regulations attempt
to encourage such offerings by eliminating the translation of the pro-
spectus requirement permitted by the Directive. It remains to be seen
whether other member states will follow this lead and how effective it
may be in encouraging multiple member state offerings.







Contemporary Canadian politics has been defined by Quebec's vi-
sion of the province as a linguistically distinct society and by its 1980
and 1995 sovereignty referendums.' Quebec's rejection of Canada as a
bilingual nation, embodied in the 1982 Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, 2 and Canada's obsession with keeping Quebec in Canada have,
however, left unexamined the impact of the province's language policies
on its anglophone minority. In Quebec, the enactment of the Charter of
the French Language 3 and the government's promotion of a French cul-
ture have intruded upon the Canadian Charter freedom of its anglo-
phones to conduct their business in English and their Canadian Char-
ter right to have their children educated in English.4 In response, the
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University of Kentucky, 1984; Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1977; and
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1. Studies of minority language include the following recent examples: LANGUAGE
RIGHTS IN CANADA (Michael Bastarache ed., 1987); MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA 90-127 (1989); SCOTT REID,
LAMENT FOR A NOTION: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF CANADA'S BILINGUAL DREAM (1993);
TOWARDS RECONCILIATION? THE LANGUAGE ISSUE IN CANADA IN THE 1990'S (Daniel Bonin
ed., 1992); CAROLYN TUOHY, POLICY AND POLITICS IN CANADA: INSTITUTIONALIZED
AMBIVALENCE 298-345 (1992); JEREMY WEBBER, REIMAGINING CANADA: LANGUAGE,
CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1994); Denise Reaume & Les-
lie Green, Education and Linguistic Security in the Charter, 34 MCGILL L. J. 777 (1989);
Leslie Green, Are Language Rights Fundamental?, 25 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 639 (1990).
2. CANADIAN CONSTITUTION ACT, Part I: CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS(1982) being Schedule B to the CANADA ACT, R.S.Q., ch. 11 (1982) (Can.)
[hereinafter CANADIAN CHARTER].
3. CHARTER OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE, R.S.Q., ch. 11 (1977) (Can.) [hereinafter Bill
101].
4. Peter H. Russell, The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada? 26 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 33-37 (1993).
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Quebec anglophones have litigated business and education language is-
sues in provincial, national, and international courts and made the
suppression of their language a significant part of the debate over Ca-
nadian national unity and Quebec sovereignty.
Canadian constitutional lawyers and political scientists suggest
that three dimensions have structured the politics of minority language
rights. One defines the nature of domestic constitutional politics and
distinguishes between micro- and macro-level constitutional disputes,
i.e. between litigation over the meaning of legislative and constitutional
provisions and disputes about the nature of the state. The second fo-
cuses on the participants in these constitutional conflicts, provincial
governments and their official language minorities, and examines the
interrelationship of the micro and macro-constitutional actions they
take to advance their linguistic objectives.5 The third considers the in-
fluence of the international legal environment on the participants in
domestic constitutional politics who rely upon international law and le-
gal institutions with their commitment to human rights and charters
and their sensitivity to the interests of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural
minorities. 6
This study of Canadian minority language rights weaves together
these three dimensions. Part I identifies three language law regimes
that structure the micro-constitutional litigation over minority lan-
guage politics. Parts II through V use this framework to explore the
domestic and international litigation over Quebec anglophone rights -
the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in the Quebec Protestant
School Boards Case (1984)7 and the Ford Public Signs Case (1988),8 and
the UN Human Rights Committee decision in Ballantyne v. Canada
(1993) 9-and its impact on the current domestic and international legal
initiatives by anglophones to establish the right of Quebec children to
be taught and businesses to advertise in English. Part VI briefly ex-
plores the interplay between this micro-level litigation by Quebec an-
glophones and the macro-level efforts of their provincial government to
either redesign the Canadian Constitution to further the linguistic and
cultural objectives of its distinct society or to separate from Canada.
Then Part VI brings the article to a close by asking: what might be the
5. See F. Morton, Judicial Politics in Canadian-Style: The Supreme Court's Contri-
bution to the Constitutional Crisis of 1992, in CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT: CANADA
AFTER THE REFERENDUM OF 1992 132-148 (Curtis Cook ed., 1994).
6. Maxwell Cohen, Reflections on Human Rights, The Canadian Charter, and Inter-
national Influences, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 159-
68 (Irwin Cotler & F. Pearl Eliadis eds., 1992).
7. A.G. (Que.) v. Que. Ass'n of Protestant Sch. Bds. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 [hereinafter
Quebec Protestant School Boards]
8. Ford v. Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford].
9. Ballantyne, Davidson, and McIntyre v. Canada, U.N. Comm. H.R., 47th Sess.,
CCPR/C/47/D359/D385/1989 (1993) [hereinafter Ballantyne].
VOL. 27:3
SCHOOLS, SIGNS, AND SEPARATION
status of anglophone minority language rights if Quebec chooses to
sever its federal ties and become a sovereign state?
II. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SETTING OF MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS
IN CANADA
In Canada, the dispute over English and French has been defined
primarily by domestic politics and has been entangled in the macro-
constitutional question of whether Quebec, as a uniquely French cul-
ture, shares enough in common with the Rest of Canada "to go on
sharing a common constitution."'10 Canada has addressed this question
in its debate over the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Accord,
and since the razor-thin 1995 Quebec referendum rejecting separation,
Quebec separation and partition. This question, along with the micro-
constitutional litigation over minority language rights, has also been
shaped by the international arena." The growth of nationalism and
ethnicity, the support for constitutionally-entrenched bills of rights, and
the emergence of an international body of human rights law have influ-
enced the definition of three language regimes -the Quebec priority
regime, the Canadian bilingual regime, and the UN non-discriminatory
regime- which have provided the structure for the language rights liti-
gation involving Quebec anglophones and their provincial government.
The Quebec language regime is based on the Charter of the French
Language (Bill 101) which declares French to be the official language of
the provincial legislature, courts, government agencies, and public
schools. 12 French is also the official language of provincial commerce,
business and labor relations.13Tempered by amendments and court de-
cisions, Bill 101's unilingual character now gives priority to French
while not prohibiting the use of other languages.' 4 Its business provi-
sions which regulate the use of French and other languages in the
names, signs and advertising of private firms have generated substan-
tial anglophone opposition.' 5 So have its education provisions which re-
quire that instruction in provincial "elementary and secondary schools
shall be in French,"' 6 even though they permit limited access to English
10. PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 75 (1993).
11. ALAN CAIRNS, CHARTER VERSUS FEDERALISM: THE DILEMMAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM 11-32passim (1993).
12. BILL 101, supra note 3, at §§7-29. Sections 7-13 govern the legislature and the
courts and sections 14-29 govern civil administration.
13. Id. at §41-71. Sections 41-50 govern labor relations and sections 51 to 71 govern
commerce and business.
14. The Charter of the French Language has been amended several times but it is
still known by the title of its original legislation: Bill 101.
15. Bill 101, supra note 4, at §§51-71.
16. Id. at §72.
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language education. 17 In sum, Bill 101 defines Quebec's current lan-
guage policy and, along with Party Quebecois policy statements,
18 it
provides the framework for Quebec's language policy as a sovereign
state.
The Canadian bilingual language regime has its origins in the
British North America Act. 19 Now called the Constitution Act, 1867, it
contains in Section 133 a bilingual language requirement for provincial
legislatures and courts. 20 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms of 1982 (Canadian Charter) substantially extends this bilingual
regime. Section 2(b)'s guarantee of freedom of expression includes lin-
guistic expression. 2 1 Section 16 establishes English and French as Can-
ada's official languages. 22 Sections .17 to 20 guarantee bilingual rights
in federal parliamentary and judicial proceedings and records and in
public communications with the federal government. 23 Section 23
grants the right to publicly funded minority language education to the
children of three categories of English-speaking parents in Quebec and
French-speaking parents in the other provinces as long as the "the
number of children ... is sufficient to warrant the expenditure of public
funds."24 In sum, these Charter provisions and Section 133, define Can-
ada's bilingual language policy.
The United Nations nondiscriminatory language regime is based on
the UN Charter. As a UN member, Canada's legal commitment flows
from the International Bill of Rights: the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights25 and UN treaties such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1976),26 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976),27 and the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (1989).28 As a signatory to these treaties, Can-
ada has committed itself to the general principle of linguistic non-
discrimination. Canada did not sign the UNESCO Convention Against
17. Id. at §§73-86.
18. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS, QUEBEC IN A NEW
WORLD (Robert Chudos trans., 1984) [hereinafter PARTI QUEBECOIS].
19. Constitution Act, 1867, 30&31 Vict., ch. 3 (Eng.) [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1867].
20. Id. at §133.
21. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §2(b).
22. Id. at §16.
23. Id. at §§17(1), 18(1), 19(1), and 20(1).
24. Id. at §23(3).
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICPR Covenant].
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter IESCR Covenant].
28. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25
(1989) [hereinafter UNRC Convention].
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Discrimination in Education (1960),29 because education is subject to
provincial jurisdiction, but as a UNESCO member, it has accepted the
Recommendation Against Discrimination in Education. 30 In sum, these
international human rights documents define the UN language regime.
Together these language regimes give expression to major features
of the international community: the pervasiveness of ethnic national-
ism, the commitment to charters of individual rights entrenched in do-
mestic constitutions, and the growth of a cosmopolitan body of human
rights law. 31 These language regimes also provide the framework for the
micro-constitutional litigation of Canadian minority language rights by
domestic and offshore courts. The Canadian Charter confers upon the
Supreme Court of Canada the final domestic authority to decide
whether Quebec's language statutes governing private business and
public education violate the constitutional language rights of the prov-
ince's anglophones. 32 However, Canada's UN membership and commit-
ment to international human rights treaties grant international tribu-
nals the authority to determine whether Quebec language laws and the
Canadian Supreme Court's Charter decisions violate the linguistic hu-
man rights of Quebec anglophones.3
3
III. THE CANADIAN AND QUEBEC LANGUAGE REGIMES PRIOR TO 1982
The Canadian constitutional odyssey began with Quebec's Quiet
Revolution of the 1960's which led to the creation of the province's pri-
ority language regime based on Bill 101. 34 Before then provincial laws
were silent on the language of education. In 1969, Quebec's Union Na-
tionale government passed an Act to Promote the French Language in
Quebec (Bill 63) which took the first tentative steps towards making
French the priority language in the province, but explicitly recognized
the freedom of linguistic choice in education. 35 The Liberal government
repealed Bill 63 in 1974 and ended linguistic equality by replacing it
29. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, December 15, 1960, 93 U.N.T.S. 6193 [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention].
30. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Recommenda-
tion Against Discrimination in Education, Dec.14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter
UNESCO Recommendation].
31. See CAIRNS, supra note 11.
32. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §52(1).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. But personal human rights claims are
not always available: See discussion infra, notes 184 and 195.
34. For studies of the Quiet Revolution, see, e.g., WILLIAM JOHNSON, A CANADIAN
MYTH: QUEBEC, BETWEEN CANADA AND THE ILLUSION OF UTOPIA 19-34 (1994); MARC
LEVINE, THE RECONQUEST OF MONTREAL: LANGUAGE POLICY IN A BILINGUAL CITY 39-64
(1990); RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 72-106; Towards Patriation: Constitutional Reform,
1960-1982, in WEBBER, supra note 1, at 92-120.
35. An Act to Promote the French Language in Quebec, R.S.Q., Bill 69 (1969).
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with the Official Language Act (Bill 22) which declared that "French is
the official language of Quebec." 36 Bill 22 did not create a French uni-
lingual language regime, but gave official priority to French in govern-
ment, business, and education. English schooling was still guaranteed,
but French was encouraged by the requirement that access to English
schools was only available to Francophones and immigrants who passed
an English proficiency test. Otherwise, they were required to attend
French language schools. 37 Quebec's commitment to qualified bilin-
gualism ended with election of a Parti Quebecois government in 1976
and its enactment of the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) the
following year.
38
Quebec anglophones had only limited Canadian constitutional
means to challenge its provincial government's language laws. The
Constitution Act 1867, contains in Section 133 a bilingual language re-
quirement for provincial legislatures and courts, but no provision gov-
erning the language of education. 39 Constitutional authority over educa-
tion was entrusted to the provinces. Section 93 of the Constitution Act
1867 permits provincial legislatures to "exclusively make Laws in rela-
tion to education" including the language of instruction. 40
When Bill 22 ended linguistic choice and gave French official prior-
ity as the language of education, Quebec anglophones relied upon Sec-
tion 93 to challenge its language education provisions. In Protestant
School Boards of Greater Montreal v. Minister of Education of Quebec
(1976), however, the Quebec Superior Court found no constitutional
violation, because Section 93 protected denominational rights, not lin-
guistic rights.41 In 1978, the Quebec Court of Appeals dismissed the ap-
peal, because the new Parti Quebecois government had repealed Bill 22
and replaced it with Bill 101.42 Then Quebec anglophones challenged
Bill 101's requirement which permitted only French to be used in the
drafting and enactment of provincial legislation, but allowed their
printing and publication in an unofficial English translation. 43 In Attor-
ney General of Quebec v. Blaikie (1979), the Canadian Supreme Court
found that Bill 101's French-only requirement for provincial legislation
violated Section 133 which mandated the use of both English and
French.
44
36. The Official Language Act of 1974, R.S.Q., Bill 22, preamble (1974).
37. LEVINE, supra note 34 at 98-109.
38. Bill 101, supra note 3. See also LEVINE, supra note 34, at 114-20.
39. Constitution Act, 1867 supra note 19, at § 133.
40. Id. at §93.
41. Protestant Sch. Bd. Of Greater Montreal v. Minister of Educ. of Que., [1976] 83
D.L.R. 645.
42. Protestant Sch. Bd. of Montreal v. Minister of Educ. of Quebec, [1978] 83 D.L.R.
679.
43. Id. at §§7-15.
44. A.G. (Que.) v. Blaikie [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016.
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Neither Bill 101's business language provisions, nor those govern-
ing public education confronted any constitutional legal challenges, be-
cause the freedom of speech guarantee in the 1960 Canadian Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government, 45 and Section 93 be-
stowed upon provincial governments constitutional authority over edu-
cation. 46 This constitutional landscape would change dramatically with
the patriation of the Constitution and the promulgation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
IV. THE CANADIAN AND QUEBEC LANGUAGE REGIMES AFTER 1982:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OVER THE LANGUAGE OF EDUCATION AND
BUSINESS
The defeat of Quebec's sovereignty association referendum of 1980
gave Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau the opportunity to pa-
triate the Constitution and obtain a constitutionally-entrenched Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter).47 The Supreme Court
of Canada upheld his efforts and laid the foundation for Quebec aliena-
tion from post-Charter Canada with its decisions in the Patriation Ref-
erence (1981) that a constitutional convention required only a "substan-
tial degree" of provincial consent,48 and in the Quebec Veto Reference
(1982) that Quebec's consent was not necessary to satisfy the "substan-
tial degree" requirement.
49
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms substantially expanded the
scope of the Canadian language regime in two ways that are important
to the micro-constitutional disputes over the language of business and
education. The Charter's Section 2(b) provides a broad guarantee of
freedom of expression which extends to the choice of linguistic expres-
sion.50 The Charter's Section 23, as the federal government's direct re-
sponse to the Bill 101, grants the right to a minority language educa-
tion by conferring upon English-speaking parents in Quebec and
French-speaking parents in the other provinces "the right to have their
children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the [mi-
nority] language in that province" 51 if "the number of children ... is suf-
45. The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C., ch. 44, §1(d) (1960) (Can.). The Canadian Bill
of Rights is a statute which binds only the federal government.
46. Constitution Act, 1867 supra note 19, at §93.
47. For studies of the patriation of the Constitution, see, e.g., PETER HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 51-59 (3d ed. 1992); JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 175-88;
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 107-27.
48. Patriation Reference (RE: Amendment to the Constitution) [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753,
905.
49. Quebec Veto Reference (RE: Objection to Resolution to Amend the Constitution)
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 817-18. See also, Morton, supra note 5, at 138.
50. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §2.
51. HOGG, supra note 47, at 122.
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ficient to warrant the provision of minority language education... in
minority language education facilities."
52
The Quebec Clause, the Language of Education and the Quebec
Protestant School Boards Case (1984)
Shortly after the patriation of the constitution and the promulga-
tion of the Canadian Charter, Quebec anglophone parents relied upon
the Charter's Section 23 to challenge Bill 101's Quebec Clause, which
largely limits English language instruction to children whose parents
have received their education in English in Quebec.53 The Quebec Asso-
ciation of Protestant School Boards asked the provincial Superior Court
to decide whether the Quebec Clause violated Section 23's Canada
Clause, which confers the right to a minority language education upon
the children of Canadian parents in Quebec "who received their primary
school instruction in Canada in English or French;"54 and the Sibling
Clause, which grants Canadian parents the right to minority language
education for the brothers and sisters of their children who are receiv-
ing or have received "their primary or secondary school instruction in
English in Canada."55
The Quebec Superior Court ruled in favor of the school boards, and
the Quebec Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed its judgment.5 6 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Quebec v.
Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards first examined the pur-
poses of the framers of Section 23 and then turned to the true nature
and effects of Bill 101's education provisions. 57 The Court found that the
framers of Section 23 were well aware of the preferred treatment Bill
52. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §23(3).
53. Bill 101, supra note 3 at §73. The Quebec Clause, Section 73 states that "the fol-
lowing children ... may receive their instruction in English: (a) a child whose father or
mother received his or her elementary instruction in English, in Quebec; (b) a child whose
father or mother, domiciled in Quebec on the date of the coming into force of this act
[August 26, 1977] received his or her elementary instruction in English outside Quebec;
(c) a child who, in his last year of school in Quebec before [August 26, 1977], was lawfully
receiving his instruction in English, in a public kindergarten class or in an elementary or
secondary school; [and] (d) the younger brothers and sisters of a child described in para-
graph c.
54. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §23(1)(b). Section 23's Canada Clause con-
fers the right upon the children of parents who "received their primary school instruction
in Canada in English or French and who reside in a province where the language in which
they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority
population of the province."
55. Id. at §23(2). Section 23's Sibling Clause confers upon the children of a third cate-
gory of parents: those who have any child who "has received or is receiving... instruction
in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive.., in-
struction in the same language."
56. A.G. (Que.) v. Que. Ass'n of Protestant Sch. Bds. [1983] C.A. 77, 1 D.L.R. (4th)
139, affg [1982] C.S. 673, 140 D.L.R. (3rd) 33, 3 C.R.R. 114.
57. See Quebec Protestant School Boards, [19841 2 S.C.R. 66, at 79.
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101 gave to French language instruction and they had drafted Section
23 to correct Bill 101's special language regime. "The framers' objective
appears simple," the Court said: "to adopt a general rule guaranteeing
the francophone and anglophone minorities in Canada an important
part of the rights which the anglophone minority in Quebec had enjoyed
with respect to the language of instruction before Bill 101 was
adopted."5 8 When the Court compared Section 23 with Sections 72 and
73, it found that the combined effect of the latter two provisions consti-
tuted "a permanent alteration of the classes of citizens who are entitled
to the protection afforded [by Section 23 and has] the effect of depriving
an entire class of individuals of the right conferred by [section] 23."
59
Then the Court turned to Canadian Charter Section 1 which pro-
vides that the Charter's rights and freedoms are subject to "reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be justified in a free and democratic so-
ciety."60 The Court acknowledged that Section 1 applied without excep-
tion to all Charter rights including Section 23,61 but rejected its applica-
tion in this case, because of the framers' purpose to use Section 23 to
override Bill 101.62 Nor was Section 73 saved by the Canadian Charter
Section 33's Notwithstanding Clause, which permits legislation to con-
tinue in force in spite of a judicial decision that it violates the Charter,
because Section 33 applies only to Charter Sections 2 and 7-15.63 Fi-
nally, the Court found that Section 73 had altered the effect of Section
23 without following the Constitution's amending procedures set forth
in Charter Clauses 38 to 49.64
In sum, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the Que-
bec Clause violated Section 23 of the Canadian Charter and that Que-
bec government had to admit the children of Canadian parents and sib-
lings who had been educated anywhere in Canada to provincial English
language schools. The Court's decision affirmed the bilingual vision of
Canada by restoring to Quebec's anglophone minority parents the right
to have their children receive an education in their minority language.
As Christopher Manfredi observed, the Court "simply restored rights
that English-speaking Quebecers had enjoyed prior to Bill 101 ...
through the relatively straightforward remedy of judicial nullifica-
tion."65 Since Section 23 is restricted to Canadian citizens, English,
French and allophone (speakers of other languages) immigrant parents
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id. at 87.
60. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at § 1.
61. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 85.
62. Id. at 84.
63. Id. at 86.
64. Id.
65. Christopher Manfredi, Constitutional Rights and Interest Advocacy, in EQUITY
AND COMMUNITY: THE CHARTER, INTEREST ADVOCACY, AND REPRESENTATION 103 (F. Les-
lie Seidle, ed., 1993).
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were, however, still required by Section 23 to send their children to
French-language schools.
In effect, the Supreme Court's first post-Charter language case led
the Quebec government, unable to use Section 33's Notwithstanding
Clause to override the Court's decision, to respond to federal govern-
ment's invitation to open macro-constitutional negotiations to gain the
province's agreement to the 1982 Constitution. 66 Known as the Quebec
Round, it produced the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 which included
Quebec's proposal to amend the Canadian Charter by inserting a clause
recognizing the province as a distinct society. 67 Quebec clearly intended
the clause to serve as a "constitutional trump card," allowing the prov-
ince to argue in future Charter litigation that the preservation of its
culture would require the Supreme Court to uphold provincial language
education legislation under Section 1 as a reasonable limitation on its
anglophones' Charter 23 rights.68
The Quebec French-Only Signs Law and Ford v. Quebec (1988)
In spite of the Blaikie and Quebec Protestant School Boards cases,
Bill 101 had "generated a sense of 'relative linguistic security' in the
French-speaking community" which led the Party Quebecois govern-
ment to pass Bill 57.69 The bill met some of the anglophone community's
concerns by amending Bill 101's preamble to meet "anglophone de-
mands for 'institutional' as opposed to 'personal' bilingualism in English
language hospitals, schools, and social service agencies."70 The 1985
provincial elections brought in a Liberal Party government which sub-
sequently enacted legislation further modifying Bill 101 by granting
amnesty to students enrolled in English language schools,71 streamlin-
ing the language bureaucracy, 72 and guaranteeing anglophones the
right to receive social and health services in English.7 3 The Liberal
Party election also signaled the relaxed enforcement of Bill 101's
French-only commercial signs provisions, but the government took no
legislative action to modify the signs provisions.74
Quebec anglophones had already initiated a legal challenge to the
French-only signs requirement when the Supreme Court decided the
66. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, at 88.
67. LEVINE, supra note 34 at 128.
68. Morton, supra note 5, at 139.
69. For studies of the Meech Lake Accord, see, e.g., DAVID JAY BuRCUSON & BARRY
COOPER, DECONFEDERATION: CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC 199-131 (1991); JOHNSON, supra
note 34, at 199-251; P. MONAHAN, AFTER MEECH LAKE: THE INSIDE STORY (1991);
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 127-53; and WEBBER, supra note 1, at 121-76.
70. Morton, supra note 5, at 142.
71. LEVINE, supra note 34, at 128.
72. Id. at 130.
73. Id. at 131-33.
74. Id. at 133-34.
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Quebec Protestant School Boards Case. In 1984, five anglophone busi-
nesses 75 claimed that Section 58 requiring French-only commercial
signs, posters, and advertising, 76 and Section 69 requiring French-only
commercial firm names,77 infringed their freedom of linguistic expres-
sion protected by Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms 78 and Section 3 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms (Quebec Charter).
7 9
The Quebec Superior Court agreed that Section 58 violated Section
3 of the Quebec Charter, but not Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter.8 0
Two years later (1986), the Quebec Court of Appeals unanimously held
that the Quebec government could require signs to include French, but
Sections 58 and 69's French-only provisions violated both Section 2(b)
and Section 3.81 The Court of Appeals' decision provoked considerable
linguistic discord in Quebec, but the Liberal Party government ruled
out any legislative action until the Supreme Court of Canada decided
the signs issue.
82
The Supreme Court's unanimous per curiam decision, handed down
December 15, 1988, held that freedom of expression guaranteed by Sec-
tion 2(b) included the freedom to express oneself in the language of
one's choice. 83 "Language is so intimately related to the form and con-
tent of expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression by
means of language if one is prohibited from using the language of one's
choice."84 This freedom to choose, given the Court's "large and liberal
interpretation" of Section 2(b) in Dolphin Delivery (1986)85 and Irwin
Toy (1989),86 extended to the commercial expression addressed by Sec-
tions 58 and 69, because it "plays a significant role in enabling indi-
viduals to make informed economic choices, an important aspect of in-
75. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 722-23.
76. Bill 101, supra note 3,'at §58. Section 58 states: "Signs and posters and commer-
cial advertising shall be solely in the official language."
77. Id. at §69. Section 69 states: "[O]nly the French version of a firm name may be
used in Quebec." Bill 101, R.S.Q. 1977, §69.
78. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §2(b)
79. QUEBEC CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 3
(1977)(Can.).
80. Ford v. Quebec, [1985] C.S. 147, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 711.
81. Ford v. Quebec, [1986] R.J.Q. 80, 5 Q.A.C. 119, 36 D.L.R. (4th) 374.
82. LEVINE, supra note 34, at 134.
83. See Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 712. A companion case, Divine v. Quebec (AG) [1988]
2.S.C.R. 790, held that other sections of Bill 101 which did not require the exclusive use of
French for brochures, orders, invoices, and other business documents also violated the
CANADIAN CHARTER, §2(b). For studies of the Ford case, see e.g.: R. Yalden, Liberalism
and Language in Quebec: Bill 101, the Courts, and Bill 178 47 U.T. FAc. L.REV. 973
[1984].
84. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 748.
85. RWDSUV v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
86. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. A.G. (Que.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
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dividual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy."87 The Court did not
decide that Section 58 violated Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter,
because it was protected by a valid Notwithstanding Clause,88 but it did
hold that Section 58 violated Section 3 of the Quebec Charter 9 and that
Section 69 violated both Section 2(b) and Section 3, because they pro-
hibited Quebec anglophones from using the language of their choice. 90
Then the Court addressed whether limits imposed on freedom of
expression by Sections 58 and 69 were justified by Quebec as reasonable
limits under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter and Section 3 of the
Quebec Charter. Using a two part test it had created in R. v. Oakes
(1986),91 the Court first asked whether Quebec's legislative purpose was
sufficiently important. Quebec had argued that the French-only signs
and firm names provisions were enacted to respond to "the vulnerable
position of the French language in Quebec and Canada,"92 and "to as-
sure that the 'visage linguistique' of Quebec would reflect the predomi-
nance of the French language."93
The Court agreed that these purposes were "serious and legiti-
mate,"94 and then turned to the second requirement: that Sections 58
and 69, as legislative means, be proportional or appropriate to these
purposes. Applying the Oakes proportionality element, the Court found
that there was a "rational connection" between Sections 58 and 69 and
the provincial government's goals of protecting the French language
and communicating the reality of Quebec society, but their prohibition
on the use of any language other than French was not necessary to
achieve those goals.95 "Predominant display of the French language,
even its marked predominance," the Court suggested, "would be propor-
tional to the goal of promoting and maintaining a French 'visage lin-
guistique' in Quebec... [because it would] reflect the reality of Quebec
society."96 In sum, the Court recognized Quebec's distinct character, but
concluded that Bill 101's signs provisions were not tailored to protect
and enhance the French language in the province while minimally im-
pairing the freedom of expression of its anglophone minority.
Bill 178
A week after the Supreme Court decision, the Quebec Liberal gov-
87. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 748 at 767.
88. Id. at 742.
89. Id. at 767.
90. Id.
91. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, aff'd in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768-69.
92. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 777.
93. Id. at 778.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 780.
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ernment enacted Bill 178, which amended Section 58 to require the ex-
clusive use of French on outside commercial signs, but permitted Eng-
lish inside small businesses as long as French was predominant, and
protected both Sections 58 and 69 with a notwithstanding clause provi-
sion.97 Bill 178's "indoor outdoor compromise" may have satisfied the
Ford "predominant display standard,"9 8 but the bill and its Notwith-
standing Clause were politically controversial in Quebec and across
Canada. 99
Bill 178 helped doom the Meech Lake Accord and its centerpiece, a
"distinct society" clause which was included to entice Quebec to sign the
1982 Constitution. The rest of Canada saw the use of Section 33 "as an
attack on the Charter and a betrayal of national bilingualism ... and
the distinct society clause as a clever ruse that would allow Quebec to
achieve indirectly what it was now perceived as doing directly [by
means of Section 33]: denying equality to its English-speaking minor-
ity."100 Bill 178 also had an impact on the 1989 Quebec election which
returned the Liberal Party to power. An alienated anglophone commu-
nity created the Equality Party and, "running on the single issue of op-
position to Bill 178," elected four members to the provincial legisla-
ture'0 1 and then supported the appeal of Bill 178 to the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
102
V. THE UNITED NATIONS LANGUAGE REGIME AND THE LANGUAGE OF
BUSINESS: BALLANTYNE V. CANADA (1993)
John Ballantyne and Elizabeth Davidson, two Quebec anglophone
business people, initiated a UN Human Rights appeal in April 1989.103
Later joined by Gordon McIntyre, 0 4 they claimed that Sections 58 and
69 violated their rights under Articles 2, 19, 26 and 27 of the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICPR Covenant), because
they had been forbidden to use any language other than French on their
commercial signs and in their firm names. 10 5 They also claimed that
Bill 178's notwithstanding clause overrode their human rights guaran-
tees in the Canadian Charter and Quebec Charter and that the override
97. An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., §10 (1988) (Can.)
[hereinafter Bill 178].
98. RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 145.
99. LEVINE, supra note 34 at 135. See also JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 262-67;
Yalden, supra note 83.
100. Morton, supra note 5 at 143.
101. LEVINE, supra note 34 at 137.
102. MAURICE J. KING, THE FIRST STEP 207 (1993).
103. Ballantyne, supra note 9. (Communication No. 359/1989).
104. Id, communication No.385/1989. The McIntyre case was financially supported by
the Chateauguay Valley English-Speaking People's Association (CVESPA), a Quebec
Anglophone organization and was chronicled in KING, supra note 102.
105. Ballantyne, supra note 9 at 3.1.
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provisions in those charters tolerated human rights abuses and violated
Canada's obligation under Article 2 of the ICPR Covenant.106
Ballantyne v. Canada
The UN Human Rights appeal was a lengthy process which the UN
Human Rights Committee (Committee) did not decide until March
1993.107 Canada, given six months to respond to the complaints, pro-
vided its submission on December 28, 1990.108 After receiving responses
from the anglophone authors of the communication (authors), the
Committee declared the complaints admissible on April 11, 1991.109
With six months to address the merits of the complaint, Canada de-
layed its response until March 6, 1992 when it made two submissions:
one requested a review of the Committee's admissibility decision and
the other, prepared by Quebec, addressed the merits of the author's
complaints.llo After receiving the authors' responses,III the Committee,
once again, declared the complaints admissible and then decided their
merits. 1
12
Article 2 of the ICPR Covenant's Optional Protocol permitted Que-
bec anglophones, as private parties, to submit their complaints to the
UN Human Rights Committee, but since the Committee serves as an
international tribunal of last resort, Article 2 also protects its jurisdic-
tion by requiring private parties to exhaust their domestic remedies.
1 3
Canada objected to the admissibility of the complaint, because it
claimed that the anglophone businesses who had made no attempt to
challenge Bill 178 could still apply for a declaratory judgment that Bill
178 was invalid. 1 4 The authors denied that a declaratory judgment ac-
tion would have any legal value, because Bill 178 contained a Notwith-
106. Id. at §3.1 & §3.3. See also THE CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §33(1);
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, §52 (1977) (Can.); and
ICPR Covenant, supra note 27, at §2.
107. The appeal of Bill 101 to the UN Human Rights Committee was a lengthy process
which was handled solely in writing. After the Committee received the communications,
the first (Ballantyne and Davidson) on April 10, 1989 and the second (McIntryre) on
November 21, 1989, Canada replied on December 28, 1990 challenging the admissibility
of the complaints. In April 11, 1991, the Committee decided that the communications
were admissible. Canada requested reconsideration and submitted its arguments on the
merits on March 6, 1992. The Committee declined to reconsider its decision on
admissibility, decided the case on the merits, and announced its views on March 31, 1993.
See KING, supra note 102.
108. Ballantyne, supra note 9, at 5.1-5.5.
109. Id. at 6.1-6.10 & 7.1-7.4.
110. Id. at 8.1-8.10.
111. Id. at 9.1-9.10
112. Id. at 10.1-10.5.
113. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, art.
2, Mar. 23, 1976, U.N.T.S. 302, [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
114. Ballantyne, supra note 9, at 8.2.
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standing Clause.11 5 They also rejected Canada's argument that the Ca-
nadian Charter's Notwithstanding Clause was compatible with Can-
ada's obligations under Article 2 of the ICPR Covenant, because the
clause rendered inoperable the rights to "freedom of expression and pro-
tection from discrimination protected under the [ICPR] Covenant."
116
The Committee declared the author's communications admissible,
because it "disagreed with the State party's contention that there were
still effective remedies available."' 17 Even though Bill 101's business
provisions had been declared unconstitutional, the Committee found
that they had been replaced by provisions similar in substance and pro-
tected by Bill 178's notwithstanding clause which was not at issue in
the cases before the Quebec courts. 118 The Committee then found that
the authors might have a claim as victims of a violation of the ICPR
Covenant's Optional Protocol." 9
When the Committee turned to the merits, it held that Bill 178 did
not violate Article 26 of the ICPR Covenant. The Committee accepted
Quebec's argument that Sections 58 and 69 are "general measures ap-
plicable to commercial advertising which lay down the same require-
ments and obligations for all tradesmen, regardless of language." 120 The
French-only restrictions on commercial advertising and firm signs, the
Committee concluded, met Article 26's equality before the law require-
ment, because they apply equally to francophones and anglophones.
12'
Nor did Bill 178 violate Article 27. The Committee also accepted Que-
bec's argument that Article 27's protection of linguistic minorities could
not be invoked by Quebec anglophones, because the article is intended
to protect the language and culture of Quebec francophones.' 22 The
Committee agreed that Quebec francophones would be entitled to pro-
tection under Article 27, but not Quebec anglophones, because the arti-
cle applies to linguistic minorities within states, including federal
states, not to a linguistic minority within a province.'
23
Bill 178 did, however, violate Article 19 of the ICPR Covenant. The
Committee rejected Quebec's narrow reading of Article 19(2) that free-
dom of expression "concerns only political, cultural, and artistic expres-
sion and does not extend to the area of commercial advertising," and
even if this were not the case, "freedom of expression in commercial ad-
vertising requires lesser protection than that afforded to political
115. Id. at 9.1
116. Id. at 9.10.
117. Id. at 7.2.
118. Id. at 10.2-10.3
119. Id. at 10.4
120. Id. at 11.5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 11.2 in response to Quebec's arguments in 8.5.
123. Id.
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ideas."124 The Committee held that Article 19 should be interpreted "as
encompassing every form of subjective ideas and opinions capable of
transmission to others" and the form of commercial expression did not
remove "this expression from the scope of protected freedom."125 Then
the Committee crafted a three part test for any restriction on freedom of
expression: "[1] it must be provided for by law, [2] it must address one
of the aims enumerated in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 19, and[3]
[it] must be necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose."1
26
Applying the test to Bill 178, the Committee acknowledged that the
French-only commercial signs and firm names were provided for by law
and the "rights of others," as the aim of Article 19(3)(a), "could only be
the rights of the francophone minority within Canada under Article
27... to use their own language. 127 But the French-only provisions
which prohibited others from advertising in English were not necessary
"to protect the vulnerable position in Canada of the francophone
group .... This protection," the Committee concluded, "may be
achieved in other ways that do not preclude freedom of expression [by
Quebec anglophones] in a language of their choice .... The law could
have required advertising be in both French and English."'128
The Committee's definition of freedom of expression, its test for
governmental restrictions on expression, and its decision that Bill 178's
French-only commercial signs and firm names requirements violated
Article 19, was a defining moment in Canadian constitutional language
politics. The Committee, acting as an off-shore constitutional court, had
used the human rights guarantees in the ICPR Covenant, an interna-
tional treaty, to provide a binding offshore constitutional legal standard
for Canada's language debate that may have partially overruled the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the Ford case.
Ballantyne and Ford Cases Compared
The Human Right Committee (Committee) and the Canadian Su-
preme Court (Court) agreed that freedom of expression in Article 19
and Section 2(a) should be given a broad reading that includes freedom
of linguistic choice in commercial expression. The Committee and the
Court also agreed that Bill 178's French-only public signs and firm
names requirements served at least a legitimate purpose, but were not
necessary to protect the Quebec francophone community in Canada.
However, the Committee's conclusion did not address the issue of the
role of the French language in the public domain: whether Quebec could
use the French-only requirement to assure the province's visage linguis-
124. Id. at 8.9.
125. Id. at 11.3.
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tique. Finally, the Committee and the Court agreed that Quebec could
have achieved its purposes in other ways that did not preclude freedom
of choice in linguistic expression.
Thereafter, the Committee's and the Court's analyses diverged. For
the Committee, a State could choose one or more official languages, but
it could not deny the private use of the language of one's choice. Then it
suggested that "the law could have required advertising be in both
French and English." 129 The Court went much further. Using the Oakes
proportionality test, it focused on Quebec's public domain argument
(which the Committee had not considered) and found that "the
[p]redominant display of the French language, even its marked pre-
dominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting and main-
taining a French 'visage linguistique' in Quebec ... [because it would]
reflect the reality of Quebec society."
130
Given the controlling character of the Committee's decision for Ca-
nadian constitutional law, the question is whether the Ford decision is
consistent with Ballantyne. The answer depends on whether the Article
19(3)(a) grounds, "rights of others" which the Committee read to include
"the rights of the francophone minority within Canada under Article
27... to use their own language," 131 is the exclusive basis under domes-
tic law to uphold a government's action which limits freedom of linguis-
tic choice. If it is not, then the Court's consideration of the importance
of French in the public domain of Quebec and its use of the Oakes pro-
portionality test to allow both languages to appear, but for French to be
given "marked predominance," does not violate Ballantyne. If the test is
exclusive, then Ballantyne, as it has been incorporated into Canadian
constitutional law, has partially overruled Ford, because it does not
permit Quebec to give "marked predominance" to French in commercial
signs and firm names.
In sum, the UN Human Rights Committee decision in the Ballan-
tyne case has brought about a major change in Canadian minority lan-
guage politics. No longer are language issues defined solely in terms of
the Quebec and Canadian language regimes, nor will its participants be
guided solely by the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the
Canadian Charter provisions governing the use of language on commer-
cial signs and in public schools. The Ballantyne decision has expanded
the parameters of the micro-constitutional debate over Canadian mi-
nority language rights to include the UN language law regime.
Bill 86
The UN Human Rights Committee's Ballantyne decision, adopted
on March 31, 1993, called upon Canada to remedy its Article 19 viola-
129. Id.
130. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 780.
131. Ballantyne, supra note 9 at 11.4.
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tion by "an appropriate amendment of the law."'132 On December 22,
1993, the Quebec Liberal government enacted Bill 86 which contained
substantial changes in the use of language in business and education.
133
Bill 86, and the regulations which it authorizes the Quebec government
to promulgate, currently define the province's language law regime, the
political debate about the role of language in the life of the province,
and the basis for anglophone legal challenges to its business and educa-
tion provisions.
Bill 86 incorporated the language from the Ford decision by revis-
ing Section 58 to read: "public signs and commercial advertising must
be in French, [but t]hey may be both in French and in another language
provided that French is markedly predominant." 134 Section 63 requires
firm names to be in French, but Bill 86 revises Section 68 to permit a
firm name to "be accompanied with a version in a language other than
French provided that.., the French version of the firm name appears
at least as prominently."'' 35 Section 58 and 68 also delegate authority to
determine, by regulation, where commercial signs, posters, and adver-
tising and firm names "must be in French only, where French need not
be predominant, or... may be in another language."
1 36
Bill 86 was also a belated response to the Quebec Protestant School
Boards decision. The provincial government had impeded access to
English language education for nine years. 137 Now Bill 86 provides ac-
cess to anglophone schools to the children of Canada Clause and Sibling
Clause parents by revising Section 73 to incorporate as Section 73(1)
and (2) a version of the Canadian Charter Section 23(1)(b) and Section
23(2).138 But these parents are required by Section 73 to make a request
to have their children receive instruction in English. 39 Then Section 80
132. Id. at 13-14.
133. An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language R.S.Q. (1993) (Can.)
[hereinafter Bill 86].
134. Id. at §58.
135. Id. at §68.
136. Id. at §§58. Section 68 states: "In public signs and posters and commercial
advertising, the use of a version of a firm name in a language other than French is
permitted to the extent that the other language may be used in such signs and posters or
in such advertising pursuant to section 58 and the regulations enacted under that section.
Bill 86, supra note 133, at §68.
137. See TASK FORCE ON ENGLISH EDUCATION, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF
EDUCATION OF QUEBEC (1992); see also, Don C. Donderi, English-Language Population of
Quebec Has Shrunk, MONTREAL GAZETTE, August 17, 1995, at B3.
138. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §73.
139. But cf., Bill 86, supra note 133, at §73(1)-(2); CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at
§§23(1)(b) and 23(2). Note that Bill 86 is more restrictive than §23. The Canadian
Charter's §23(1)(b), unlike Bill 86's §73(1) does not require that the parent's "instruction
constitutes the major part of the elementary he or she received in Canada." The Canadia
Charter §23(2) does not require, as does §73(2) that to be entitled to an English language
education in Quebec, a child must have a parent and siblings who have "received or is
receiving elementary or secondary instruction in English in Canada... provided that that
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authorizes the provincial government to prescribe by regulation the
procedures these parents must follow and "the elements of proof they
must furnish in support of their request" to receive a certificate of eligi-
bility for their children. 140 Still Bill 86 gives the province's francophone
and immigrant anglophone and allophone parents no choice. They must
send their children to French language schools.
In sum, Bill 86 was the Liberal government's attempt to bring the
Quebec language law regime into compliance with the Supreme Court
of Canada's interpretation of the Canadian Charter's Section 23 linguis-
tic education rights in the Quebec Protestant School Boards case and
the Charter's Section 2(b) freedom of linguistic choice in the Ford case.
At the same time, it does not appear that the Liberal government in en-
acting Bill 86's business provisions was sensitive to UN Human Rights
Committee's interpretation of the ICPR Covenant in the Ballantyne
case, nor to the ICPR Covenant and other UN human rights treaties by
its authorization of the provincial government to promulgate regula-
tions governing the language of business and education. So it is not pos-
sible to indulge a presumption of constitutionality on behalf of the
regulations Bill 86 authorizes the provincial government to promulgate,
and those it has promulgated, nor is it possible to indulge a presump-
tion of their conformity, and the conformity of the legislation's business
provisions, with UN human rights treaties.
VI. THE UNITED NATIONS LANGUAGE REGIME: THE CONTINUING
CONFLICT OVER THE LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS AND EDUCATION
The Quebec anglophone community, encouraged by the Ballantyne
case, has explored a challenge to Bill 86's business and education provi-
sions as violations of the Canadian and international language re-
gimes. 14' The Montreal-based Parents Support Group, then the Equal-
instruction constitutes the major part of the elementary or secondary instruction by the
child." For the regulations which impede access to English language schools further, see
infra, note 140.
140. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §80.(Regulations Adopted Under the Charter of the
French Language); Regulations Respecting Requests to Receive Instruction in English,
R.S.Q., ch. C-11, §4-2 (1981) (Can.). These regulations further impede access to English
language schools to Canada Clause and Sibling Clause children.
141. Several Anglophone organizations have considered both domestic and interna-
tional legal challenges to Bill 101's education provisions: the Parent's Support Group,
Equality Party, the Chateauguay Valley English-Speaking Peoples Association (CVESPA)
and Alliance Quebec.
The Parents Support Group, an association of Quebec English and French parents
which offered advice and assistance to parents seeking admission for their children to
English language schools, raised the issue of Quebec's compliance with the UNESCO Rec-
ommendation on Discrimination in Education and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child before the Commission on the Sovereignty of Quebec on February 10,
1995. See B. TYLER, BRIEF OF PARENTS SUPPORT GROUP SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION
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ity Party, and now Alliance Quebec have not limited their legal chal-
lenge to the ICPR Covenant and its provisions governing the freedom of
expression, 142 equality before the law 1 43 and linguistic freedom.
144
Rather, they have considered other UN treaties which define the
meaning of Canadian linguistic human rights. These treaties include
the International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant
(IESCR Covenant), which bestows the right to an education without
discrimination on linguistic grounds; 45 the United Nations Rights of
the Child Convention (UN Convention), which recognizes the educa-
tional rights of children;1 46 and the UNESCO Recommendation on Edu-
cation, which recognizes the right of national minorities to carry out
their own educational activities.1 47 In sum, the willingness of Quebec
anglophones to rely upon these human rights treaties further expands
the parameters of the micro-constitutional debate over Canadian mi-
nority language rights.
The Bill 86 Signs Provisions: Canadian and International
Legal Issues
Do Bill 86's commercial signs provisions violate Section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter and Article 19 of the ICPR Covenant? Section 58's
requirement that the use of French on commercial signs be "markedly
predominant" clearly complies with the Ford standard and Section 68's
requirement that the French version of the firm name appear "at least
as prominently" as another language is more generous than Ford re-
quires. 148 Whether Sections 58 and 68 violate the ICPR Covenant de-
pends on whether the Ford decision is consistent with Ballantyne. If the
Article 19(3)(a) grounds, "rights of others," is the exclusive basis under
ON SOVEREIGNTY OF QUEBEC ON THE SUBJECT OF QUEBEC'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
IN THE AREA OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION (1995) [hereinafter BRIEF OF PARENTS
SUPPORT GROUP].
Similar testimony was given to provincial and federal government by the Equality
Party and CVESPA. See: Keith Henderson, Equality Party Submission to the Estates
General on Education (1995); Joint Presentation of the Chateauguay Valley English-
Speaking Peoples Association (CVESPA) (1997). When William Johnson became presi-
dent of Alliance Quebec in June 1998, he proposed that the Alliance Quebec challenge
Bill 101's education and business language restrictions on the ground that they violate
the UNESCO Recommendation on Discrimination in Education and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Diane Francis, Johnson Wins an Important
Skirmish in the Language War, FIN. POST, June 4, 1998; Herbert Bauch, Alliance Foes
Bury Hatchett: Group "Moving Harmoniously Forward", MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 21,
1998, at A3.
142. ICPR Covenant, supra note 26, at art. 19.
143. Id. at art. 26.
144. Id. at art. 27.
145. IESCR Covenant, supra note 27, at art.13.
146. UNRC Convention, supra note 28, at art.28.
147. UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 30, at art.5(c)
148. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §§58 & 68.
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domestic law to uphold a government's action which limits freedom of
linguistic choice, then Quebec may not give "marked predominance" to
French in commercial signs, but it may require the French version of
the firm name to appear "at least as prominently."'149 If the Article (19)
(3)(a) grounds are not exclusive, then Quebec may give consideration to
the importance of French in the public domain of the province, per
Ford, by giving French "marked predominance."'15 0
The language regulations which Bill 86's authorizes the provincial
government to enact do, however, clearly fail to meet the standards es-
tablished in Ford-and Ballantyne and provide the basis for a legal chal-
lenge in the Quebec courts with an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, and, perhaps, to the UN Human Rights Committee, because
they transfer to the Quebec government the authority to determine by
regulation, where commercial signs, posters, and advertising and firm
names "must be in French only, where French need not be predomi-
nant, or ... may be in another language."'151 As a consequence, Sections
58 and 68 delegate to the government the discretion to prohibit the use
of a language other than French on billboards, the sides of buses, and in
metro stations and, thereby, to deny freedom of linguistic expression to
Quebec anglophones guaranteed by Article 2(a) and Article 19.152
The Bill 86 Education Provisions: Canadian and International
Legal Issues
Bill 86's language education provisions, Section 73's Canada Clause
and Sibling Clause, respect the Canadian Charter. Bill 101 does not
contain the Canadian Charter's Section 23(1)(a) Mother Tongue
Clause, 15 3 but its omission does not violate the Canadian Constitution,
because Section 59(1) of the Canadian Charter provides that Section
23(1)(a) will not apply to Quebec until its legislature approves, which it
has not yet done. 5 4 Yet Bill 101, even with its Bill 86 revisions, may
violate Canada's international legal obligations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICPR Covenant commits Canada in Article 2 "to respect and
ensure" the rights of individuals without linguistic distinction, 55 which
149. ICPR Covenant, supra note 26, at art.19(3)(a).
150. Id.
151. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §58.
152. Id. at §§58 & 68.
153. Canadian Charter, supra note 3, at §23(1)(a). Section 23's Mother Tongue Clause
confers the right to a minority language education upon the children of parents whose
"first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic mi-
nority population of the province in which they reside."
154. Id. at §59(1).
155. ICPR Covenant, supra note 26, at art.2
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Article 27 defines to include the right of persons belonging to linguistic
minorities not to "be denied the right, in community with others of their
group .... to use their own language." 156 Article 27's right does not ex-
plicitly extend to minority language education. Even so, it has been
widely accepted that Article 27 does apply, but "requires only that the
State Parties allow minorities to set up private schools, at their own ex-
pense, to provide instruction in their own language. The State is not le-
gally obligated either financially or materially to assist the minorities
concerned.., or set up a minority public school system for their bene-
fit."157 If this is so, then Section 73 will not violate Article 27, because it
does not hinder private anglophone and allophone private education. It
only discourages Section 73 Canada Clause and Sibling Clause parents
from sending their children to English language public schools and re-
quires allophone immigrants who choose to have their children edu-
cated at public expense to attend French language schools.
158
Canada has probably violated Article 26 of the ICPR Covenant
which prohibits a state from discriminating on the basis of language,
national origin, and birth, because Section 23 (1) (a), the Mother
Tongue Clause, does not apply in Quebec. 159 Since all the provinces, ex-
cept Quebec, have adopted Section 23(1) (a), francophone immigrant
parents living in Ontario have a constitutional right to send their chil-
dren to a French language public school as long as there is a sufficient
number of eligible students, but anglophone immigrants parents living
in Quebec would not have a corresponding right under Bill 101 to send
their children to an English language education public school.1 60
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (IESCR Covenant) commits Canada in Article 2(2) to guarantee
the right to an education without discrimination on the basis of lan-
guage, as set forth in Article 13(1).161 Article 13(1), like Article 27 of the
ICPR Covenant, may be read to apply to minority language education,
and, like Article 27, does not bestow a positive right which will require
the state to provide minority language education at public expense.
Rather, it confers a negative right which forbids the state from intrud-
ing upon the right of linguistic minorities to set up private minority
156. Id. at art. 27
157. Jose Woehrling, Minority Cultural and Linguistic Rights and Equality Rights in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 31 MCGILL L.J. 50, 58 (1985).
158. Supra note 133 with regard to Canadian Anglophones, but not Anglophone and
allophone immigrants who must comply with Bill 101, §72, supra note 3, requiring a
French language public education, since they do not qualify for a public English language
education.
159. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §59(1).
160. Woerhling, supra note 157, at 72.
161. IESCR Covenant, supra note 27, at §§ 2(2) & 13(1).
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language schools at their own expense. 162 As a consequence, Section 73
does not violate Article 13(1), just as it does not violate Article 27 of the
ICPR Covenant, because it does not hinder private anglophone and al-
lophone education. 163 If, however, Articles 2(2) and 13(1) are read jointly
and incorporate Article 2(2)'s prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of national origin and birth, Canada may also violate the IESCR Cove-
nant, as it may violate Article 26 of the ICPR Covenant, by permitting a
province, using Section 59(1) of the Canadian Charter, to discriminate
on the basis of language, national origin, and birth in providing publicly
financed education. 164 Since all the provinces except Quebec have
adopted Section 23(1)(a), the difference in the treatment of Canadian
and anglophone and allophone immigrants creates a difference in
treatment within Canada in violation of the IESCR Covenant. 165
UNESCO Recommendation Against Discrimination in Education
The UNESCO Recommendation Against Discrimination in Educa-
tion (UNESCO Recommendation) gives member states the freedom to
organize their school systems, but only grudgingly permits separate
education.1 66 Section 1 prohibits "any distinction, limitation or prefer-
ence which, being based on ... language.... national origin .... or
birth, has the purpose or effect ... of nullifying or impairing equality of
treatment in education and in particular of depriving any person or
group of persons of access to education.., and establishing or main-
taining separate educational systems for persons or groups of per-
sons."1 67 Section 2 , however, allows states to establish separate lin-
guistic educational systems "if participation and attendance is
optional,"16 8 so long as they do not prohibit national minorities whose
attendance is also optional "from understanding the language and cul-
ture of the community as a whole."1
69
Quebec anglophones will argue that Bill 101 violates the UNESCO
Recommendation. 170 Section 73 has the purpose of creating a distinct
francophone community in Quebec by establishing two separate and
unequal linguistic educational systems for three groups of parents and
denying those parents the option to participate in a francophone educa-
tional system. Section 73 furthers this purpose by giving a preference to
francophone education and placing limitations on the access to anglo-
162. Woerhling, supra note 157, at 58.
163. Id.
164. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 3, at §59(1).
165. Woerhling, supra note 157, at 72.
166. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 289
(1991).
167. UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 30, at § 1(1).
168. Id. at §2(b).
169. Id. at §5(c)(i) & (iii).
170. Supra note 141; see also: B. Tyler, Bill 101 Regarding Signs and Access to Schools,
the Facts Underlying the Pending Language Debate, DIALOGUE, April 1996, at 24.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
phone education in a manner which nullifies or impairs equality of
treatment by depriving parents of the option to participate in the fran-
cophone educational system. Canadian anglophone parents who qualify
under Section 73's Canada and Sibling Clauses do have a choice, but
not an unburdened one. Section 73 requires them to request a public
anglophone education for their children1 7l and then, per Section 80, to
comply with detailed administrative regulations to receive a certificate
of eligibility in order to attend anglophone schools.1
72
Bill 101 does not require francophone and immigrant parents to re-
quest a public francophone education for their children, nor obtain cer-
tificates of eligibility for them to attend French schools, because atten-
dance at anglophone schools is not an option for these parents. Their
children are required to attend francophone schools. Bill 101 also vio-
lates the UNESCO Recommendation Section 5 rights of these fran-
cophone and immigrant allophone parents. Since they are members of
Canadian national minorities who are deprived of access to anglophone
education, they are prevented from "understanding the culture and lan-
guage of the [Canadian] community as a whole and from participating
in its activities."173 In sum, Quebec anglophones will make a persuasive
argument that Bill 101 violates the UNESCO Recommendation, be-
cause it limits "access to children whose parents were Canadian citizens
educated in Canada .... [and] denies to immigrants and French-
speaking Quebecers... the freedom of choose between two publicly
funded systems of education in Quebec."1
74
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN
Convention) commits Canada in Article 2(1) to guarantee that child's
right to an education, as set forth in Article 28(1), without discrimina-
tion on the basis of the child's or his or her parent's language, national
origin, or birth.1 75 States are bound by Article 28(1) to recognize this
right of the child to an education by making "primary education com-
pulsory," secondary education "available and accessible," and both
freely available to all children.176 Do Section 23 of the Canadian Char-
ter and Section 73 of Bill 101 violate the UN Convention?
A child's Section 23 Charter right to a minority language education
depends upon the parents' citizenship, provincial residence, and lan-
guage of instruction. Quebec children do not have access to English
schools under Section 23(1) (a), the Mother Tongue Clause, because the
171. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §73
172. Id. at §80
173. UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 30, at §5(c).
174. BRIEF OF PARENTS SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 141, at 1.
175. UNRC Convention, supra note 28, at arts. 2(1) & 28(1).
176. Id. at art. 28(1).
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Quebec government has not enacted legislation authorized by Section
59(1) of the Canadian Charter. 177 "This means that children of British,
American, or Australian parentage are discriminated against by not
being allowed to go to school in their mother tongue."'178 Nor do French
and allophone immigrant Quebec children have access under Bill 86 or
Section 23 Canada and Sibling clauses. 79 In fact, Bill 86 further re-
stricts the child's right to an education, because it mandates French as
the language of instruction for the children of all Quebec, Canadian,
and immigrant francophone parents. 8 0 As a consequence, Quebec par-
ents argue that a child's right to a minority language education depends
upon some factual characteristic of his or her parents and, thereby, con-
stitutes discrimination on language, national origin, and birth in viola-
tion of the UN Convention.
The UN Convention is unlikely to bear the weight of the Quebec
parents' argument when their claim includes "a right to choose on be-
half of their children between two publicly funded systems of [language]
education" in Quebec.' 8 ' Article 28(1), like Article 13(1) of the IESCR
Covenant and Article 27 of the ICPR Covenant, does not require Quebec
to provide minority language education at public expense, but merely
prohibits the province from intruding upon the right of a linguistic mi-
nority to establish private minority language schools at their own ex-
pense. 8 2 As such, Section 73 does not violate Article 28(1), because it
does not hinder private minority language education. At the same time,
Canada may violate Article 2(1) and 28(1) of the UN Convention, as it
may violate Article 26 of the ICPR Covenant and Article 13 of the
IESCR Covenant, by not requiring Quebec to be bound by Section
23(1)(a), the Mother Tongue Clause, and, thereby, permitting Quebec,
unlike other provinces, to discriminate in the provision of public educa-
tion to Canadian and immigrant anglophones.18
3
Summary
The Quebec anglophone community has taken the opportunity to
expand the legal parameters of the micro-constitutional debate over
Canadian minority language rights by exploring the possibilities of both
domestic and international language regime challenges to Bill 86's
business and education provisions. Bill 86's business language provi-
sions, Sections 58 and 68, do not violate the Canadian Charter.
177. CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §59(1)
178. Diane Francis, UN Committee Says Quebec Discriminates Against Children, FIN.
POST, July 20, 1995, at 11.
179. See CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 2, at §23(1)(b); Bill 86, supra note 133 at
§§73-86.
180. Bill 86, supra note 133, at §§72-73.
181. Brief of Parents Support Group, supra note 141, at 7.
182. Woerhling, supra note 157, at 58.
183. Id. at 72.
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Whether they violate the ICPR Covenant will depend on whether the
Ford decision is consistent with Ballantyne. However, there should be
no doubt that the regulations which Bill 86 authorizes the provincial
government to promulgate fail to meet the standards established in
Ford and Ballantyne and provide the basis for domestic and interna-
tional legal challenge as violations of Article 2(a) of the Canadian Char-
ter and Article 19 of the ICPR Covenant.
Bill 86's education provision, Section 73, may also violate the ICPR
Covenant, IESCR Covenant, UNESCO Recommendation, and UN Con-
vention which prohibit discrimination on the basis of language, nation-
ality, origin, and birth. All but the ICPR Covenant explicitly extend this
prohibition to education. Together they could provide the basis for
challenging Section 23 of the Canadian Charter and Section 73 of Bill
101. At the same time, all of these international human rights docu-
ments confer negative educational rights which forbid Quebec from in-
truding upon the freedom of anglophone and allophones to establish a
privately funded minority language education, but do not obligate Que-
bec to financially or materially assist them or to provide a public school
system for them. The ICPR Covenant, IESCR Covenant, and the UN
Convention should also providethe basis for a claim that Section 23 of
the Canadian Charter, because of its joint operation with Section 59(1)
permits Quebec to discriminate on the basis of language, national ori-
gin, and birth in the provision of public education.
Whether Quebec anglophones will have the opportunity to have
these human rights complaints heard will depend upon whether the in-
ternational procedures permit private persons to submit complaints.
The UN Human Rights Committee and the UNESCO Committee on
Conventions and Recommendations in Education will be able to hear
Quebec anglophone claims submitted under the ICPR Covenant and the
UNESCO Recommendation, because the ICPR Covenant contains an
optional protocol and the UNESCO's 1978 procedure permits human
rights advocates to submit individual cases.'8 4 Since the IESCR Cove-
nant and the UN Convention do not contain any procedures for individ-
ual complaints, Quebec anglophones will be unable to initiate a legal
complaint in spite of their persuasive case against Bill 101.185 Still, the
Quebec anglophones may be able to use their international human
rights complaints to influence the direction of the current national
unity discussions and, if Quebec separates from Canada, the debate
184. See Optional Protocol, supra note 113 and UNESCO Executive Board, 1978: Deci-
sion 104 EXI3.3. On the UNESCO Decision, see S. Marks, The Complaint Procedure of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs 86 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1992).
185. The IESCR Covenant and the UN Convention contain no individual complaint
procedures. See Letter from Fiona Blyth-Kubota, Human Rights Officer, Centre for Hu-
man Rights, to Keith Henderson, Equality Party Leader (August 22, 1995).
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over its admission to the United Nations. 186
VII. MACRO-CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MINORITY LANGUAGE
RIGHTS
Quebec anglophones and their provincial government have not
limited their efforts to preserve or alter language policy to micro-
constitutional litigation. Interwoven into the analysis of micro-level liti-
gation, so far, has been Quebec's macro-constitutional response to the
Quebec Protestant School Boards Case, the Meech Lake Accord, and
following the passage of Bill 178 in response to the Ford commercial
signs case, the death of the Accord in 1990. Since then Quebec and the
Rest of Canada have been torn between two macro-constitutional
strategies: keeping Quebec in Canada or permitting the province to
separate. Still, the micro-constitutional question remains: What will ei-
ther path mean for Quebec anglophones and minority language rights
in business and education?
Anglophone Minority Language Rights in the Province of Quebec
While the UN Human Rights Committee had been involved with
the Ballantyne case, the Quebec Liberal government, angered from the
rejection of the Meech Lake Accord, committed the province to a sover-
eignty referendum in October 1992.187 The Rest of Canada responded
with the Canada Round, the second effort to "induce Quebec to acqui-
esce in the Constitution Act, 1982."188 The Canada Round produced the
Charlottetown Accord of 1992 which included a substantially broadened
distinct society clause intended to guide the courts in interpreting the
Canadian Charter in a manner consistent with "the vitality and devel-
opment of official language minorities throughout Canada."1 89 The Ac-
cord was, however, such a comprehensive response to so many matters
of constitutional discontent and created so many cross-cutting cleavages
that Quebecers and the Rest of Canada rejected it in a popular referen-
dum on October 26, 1992.190
186. BRIEF OF PARENTS SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 141, at 7.
187. For studies of post-Meech Lake Canada and the events leading to the
Charlottetown Accord, see, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT: CANADA AFTER THE
REFERENDUM OF 1992, supra note 5; JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 311-45; RUSSELL, supra
note 9, at 154-89.
188. For studies of post-Meech Lake Canada and the events leading to the Charlotte-
town Accord, see, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT: CANADA AFTER THE REFERENDUM
OF 1992, supra note 5; JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 311-45; RUSSELL, supra note 9, at 154-
89.
189. Charlottetown Accord, Consensus Report on the Constitution, §1.2(1)(d) (1992)
(Can.)(visited,June7,1999)<http://www.solon.orgtConstitutions/Canada/English/Proposals/
CharlottetownConsensus.html>.
190. For studies of the making of the Charlottetown Accord and its defeat, see, e.g.,
CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT: CANADA AFTER THE REFERENDUM OF 1992, supra note 5;
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The UN Committee's Ballantyne decision four months later led the
Quebec Liberal government to pass Bill 86 by the end of the year. Dur-
ing the 1994 provincial election campaign, Parti Quebecois candidates
avoided the language issue, although Jacques Parizeau, the PQ leader,
remarked that he would reactivate the provincial language police and
would "get rid of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that
condemned whole chapters of Bill 101."191 Parizeau's comment was con-
sistent with the PQ party platform which called for restoring Bill 101 to
its original form and tightening the francisation rules to business and
education, but he promised that there would be "no changes ... in lan-
guage laws before the sovereignty referendum" which the PQ promised
within a year.192
A Parti Quebecois victory ushered in a third round of constitutional
self-examination when the new government, fulfilling its election
promise, introduced legislation on sovereignty. 193 During the first ten
months of 1995, public discourse in Quebec focused on the issue of
whether the province should separate. On September 8, the Quebec Su-
perior Court's decided that Bill 1, the referendum law, violated the Ca-
nadian Constitution's amending provisions, but the PQ was not de-
terred from holding the referendum, because the court refused to issue
an injunction.194 On October 30, Quebecers went to the polls and said
No to sovereignty by the narrow margin of 50.6% to 49.4%.195 Minority
language rights were clearly a decisive factor. "Montrealers, ethnic,
and anglophone voters joined together to defeat Yes voters who were
overwhelmingly francophone native-born Quebecers from other re-
gions." 19
6
Since the Quebec referendum, Canada has been involved in another
BROOKE JEFFREY, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, TRYING TIMES: OCTOBER 1992 AND THE DEFEAT
OF THE POWER BROKERS (1993); C. Manfredi, On the Virtues of a Limited Constitution:
Why Canadians Were Right to Reject the Charlottetown Accord, in RETHINKING THE
CONSTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INTERPRETATION,
AND THEORY 40-60 (Anthony A. Peecock ed., 1996); RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 190-227.
191. I'll Reactivate the Language Watchdogs, Parizeau Says, MONTREAL GAZETTE,
September 9, 1994, at A8.
192. Id.
193. Bill 51, An Act Respecting Sovereignty, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., (1994) (Can.). After
the bill was tabled in the Quebec National Assembly on December 6, 1994, Premier
Parizeau announced that the bill would be considered at the next session in September
1995. On September 7, 1995, Bill 1, "An Act Respecting the Future of Quebec" was passed
and the referendum date (October 30, 1995) and question were announced. An Act Re-
specting the Future of Quebec, R.S.Q. (1995) (Can.).
194. Guy Bertrand, a Quebec City lawyer, former PQ separtist leader, and now a fed-
eralist, challenged the referendum in Bertrand v. Quebec (AG), see: GUY BERTRAND,
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: AN ATTORNEY'S STRUGGLE FOR QUEBEC 151-90 (1996).
195. Anthony Wilson-Smith, A House Divided [A Special Edition: The Quebec Referen-
dum], MACLEANS, November 6, 1995, at 14; see also H. Clarke and A. Kornberg, Choosing
Quebec? The 1995 Quebec Sovereignty Referendum, 29 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 676-82 (1996).
196. Wilson-Smith, supra.note 195.
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effort to gain the province's assent to patriation of the 1982 Constitu-
tion and to counter Quebec's campaign for an independent French-
speaking nation. The federal government, which had taken a low profile
until shortly before the referendum vote, became actively involved in
promoting national unity. Parliament responded to Quebec's interests
by enacting semi-constitutional resolutions in early 1996 which recog-
nized Quebec as a distinct society and gave the province a veto over
constitutional changes. 197 At the same time, the federal government
adopted two anglophone Quebecer arguments by submitting a reference
to the Canadian Supreme Court in 1996 which asked for a legal opinion
on whether the Canadian Constitution or international law allow seces-
sion;' 98 and by arguing that if Quebec separated, it would not maintain
its current boundaries. In other words, if Canada can be partitioned by
Quebec separation, so can a post-separation Quebec be partitioned to
keep anglophone Quebecers in Canada. 199
The provincial premiers from the rest of Canada also took the ini-
tiative to counter Quebec's separation impulse. At Calgary in Septem-
ber 1997, they issued a declaration which established a process for pub-
lic consultation on national unity based on seven principles which
affirm "the vitality of the English and French languages;" the equality
of all provinces; "the unique character of Quebec society, its French-
speaking majority, [and] its culture;" and the role of the Quebec gov-
ernment in protecting and developing "the unique character of Quebec
society within Canada."200 In sum, the Calgary Declaration, vaguely
197. S. Delacourt, Provinces Given Last Word on Veto, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Novem-
ber 29, 1995; T. Wills, Veto Over Constitutional Changes Now Law, MONTREAL GAZETTE,
February 3, 1996.
198. Anthony DePalma, Canada Seeks Legal Advice on the Status of Quebec N.Y.
TIMES, February 17, 1998, at A5. The federal government's reference began when Guy
Bertrand and Stephen Scott, a McGill law professor, challenged the constitutionality of a
future Quebec referendum. The federal government intervened on September 26, 1996
and referred the case to the Supreme Court of Canada which heard oral arguments on
February 16 to 19, 1998. See In the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.,
ch. S-26 (1995) (Can.). The text of the decision is online at
<http://www.droit.umontreal.ca.html>. See also In the Matter of a Reference by the Gov-
ernor in Council P.C. 1996-1497 (Reference re Secession of Quebec), File No. 25506, 37
I.L.M. 1340 (August 20, 1998). The decision's text is online at
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/Orientations/scess/indexen.html>. In a unanimous decision,
the Supreme Court held that the Canadian Constitution required Quebec to negotiate
with the federal government and the provinces if it wanted to secede and that interna-
tional law did not apply because Quebecers were not a suppressed or colonized people.
199. B. Cox, Partition After Separation OK" Dion, MONTREAL GAZETTE, January 27,
1996, at B1. Quebec Anglophones put partition on the national agenda by creating the
Special Community for Canadian Unity and arguing that if Canada were divisible, so was
Quebec. See DIANE FRANcIS, FIGHTING FOR CANADA (1996); and KEITH HENDERSON,
STAYING CANADIAN: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST UDI (1997).Calgary Declaration, 1997
(visited April 10, 1999)<http://www.uni.ca/calgary.html>.
200. Calgary Declaration, 1997 (visited April 10, 1999)<hup://www.uni.ca/calgary.html>
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reminiscent of the Charlottetown Accord, has no constitutional author-
ity, but it does provide a basis for future national unity discussions.
Anglophone Minority Language Rights in a Post-Separation Que-
bec: Canadian and International Legal Perspectives
Politicians, academics, and journalists continue to debate the great
"if." What will happen if Quebec votes for sovereignty in a forthcoming
referendum? Speculation ranges from a "velvet divorce" to civil strife
and U.S. military intervention. 20 1 The questions focus on how Canada,
outside Quebec, may be politically, economically, and culturally restruc-
tured, and what political and economic challenges Quebec will confront
as a new nation in an international political economy. 20 2 Speculation
also focuses on the nature of the new Quebec and Canadian constitu-
tional orders: the powers their governments will exercise and the rights
their citizens will possess. 20 3
In terms of this study, the question is what the character of minor-
ity language rights in a post-separation Quebec may be if the current
macro-constitutional discussions fail and Quebec votes for sovereignty.
One major macro-constitutional query is whether Quebec will separate
by constitutional means or issue a unilateral declaration of independ-
ence.20 4 A closely related issue is whether an independent Quebec will
be defined by its current provincial boundaries or be partitioned with
201. LANSING LAMONT, BREAKUP: THE COMING END OF CANADA AND THE STAKES FOR
AMERICA (1994); L. Gagnon, The Sorties by Bertrand and Bourgault Rocked the
Sovereignty Boat, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, January 21, 1995, n.p.
202. For studies of the political, economic, and cultural impacts of separation, see, e.g.,
MARCEL COTE & DAVID JOHNSTON, IF QUEBEC GOES: THE REAL COST OF SEPARATION
(1995); ALAN FREEMAN & PATRICK GRADY, DIVIDING THE HOUSE: PLANNING FOR A
CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC (1995); BEYOND THE IMPASSE: TOWARD RECONCILIATION (R.
Gibbins & G. LaForest eds.,1998); NEGOTIATING WITH A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC (Daniel Dra-
che & Roberto Perin eds., 1992); KIMON VALASKAKIS & ANGELINE FOURNIER, THE
DELUSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: WOULD INDEPENDENCE WEAKEN QUEBEC (1995); ROBERT A.
YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (1995).
203. For analyses of the constitutional and legal impacts of separation, see, e.g.,
BEYOND THE IMPASSE, supra note 202; JOHNSTON, supra note 202; DONALD G. LENIHAN,
GORDON ROBERTSON, et al., CANADA: RECLAIMING THE MIDDLE GROUND (1994); PATRICK
J. MONAHAN, COOLER HEADS SHALL PREVAIL: ASSESSING THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
QUEBEC SEPARATION (1995); YOUNG, supra note 202.
204. See, e.g., BERCUSON & COOPER, supra note 69; K. Banting, If Quebec Separates:
Resturcturing Northern North America, in The COLLAPSE of CANADA? (1992); ALAN C.
CAIRNS, LOOKING INTO THE ABYSS: THE NEED FOR A PLAN C (1997); GORDON GIBSON,
PLAN B: THE FUTURE OF THE REST OF CANADA, (1994); HENDERSON, supra note 201;
MONAHAN, supra note 205; PATRICK J. MONAHAN, MICHAEL J. BRYANT ET AL., COMING TO
TERMS WITH PLAN B: TEN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SECESSION (1996); P. RUSSELL & B.
RYDER, RATIFYING A POST-REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY (1997);
YOUNG, supra note 202; John E. Trent, Neither Integration Nor Disintegration: An
Agenda for Renewal of the Canadian Federation, DIALOGUE CANADA, March 1998,
<http://www.uni.ca/dialogue/trentdc3.html>.
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anglophones and aboriginals remaining in Canada. 20 5
Assuming Quebec could be linguistically partitioned, Quebec an-
glophones who remained in Canada as a new province would have no
need to rely on their Canadian Charter Section 23 minority language
rights, because they would be the linguistic majority. What about the
language rights of immigrant allophones who will live in the new prov-
ince? Whether they would be able to raise any international human
rights claims, now made on their behalf by Quebec anglophones, will
depend upon whether official bilingualism persists in a Canada where
the francophone minority will fall from 25% to 3% after separation, and
whether the new anglophone province adopts Section 23(1) (a), the
Mother Tongue Clause. 20 6 Assuming Quebec separates and maintains
its current boundaries, what might be the character of minority lan-
guage rights in a the new state? The Parti Quebecois in Quebec in a
New World, its plan for sovereignty, clearly envisions a Quebec in which
the French language will be "the cornerstone of Quebec's cultural iden-
tity[,] ... the official language of Quebec ... and the preferred instru-
ment for integrating newcomers into Quebec society."20 7 Still, the PQ
says it is committed to a pluralistic society and that sovereignty will lay
the foundation "for Francophone and Anglophone Quebecers to live to-
gether more harmoniously and fruitfully."20 8 In a sovereign Quebec, the
PQ affirms "[tihe individual rights of Quebec anglophones will be guar-
anteed and the community will be able to continue to count on a secure
network of educational, social, and cultural institutions that can main-
tain its vitality."2
09
The PQ government's 1995 draft legislation on sovereignty is, how-
ever, more cautious when it states that the new Quebec Constitution
"shall guarantee the English-speaking community that its identity and
institutions shall be preserved .... Such guarantee ... shall be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with the territorial integrity of Quebec."
210
Premier Parizeau's 1994 election remarks about his intention to "get rid
of' the Supreme Court's decisions in the Quebec School Board Case
(1984) and the Ford Case (1988) give even greater cause for concern.
211
His remarks drew upon other parts of the PQ program which call for
the restitution of the French-only commercial sign law, further restric-
tions on English language education, and extension of the requirement
205. For studies of partition, see, e.g., LIONEL ALBERT & WILLIAM F. SHAW, PARTITION:
THE PRICE OF QUEBEC'S INDEPENDENCE (1980); HENDERSON, supra note 199; SCOTT REID,
CANADA REMAPPED: HOW THE PARTITION OF QUEBEC WILL RESHAPE THE NATION (1992).
206. Kenneth McRoberts, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic Minorities, in
NEGOTIATING WITH A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC, supra note 202, at 173-88.
207. PARTI QUEBECOIS, supra note 18, at 37.
208. Id. at 39.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 193.
211. I'll Reactivate the Language Watchdogs, Parizeau Says, supra note 191.
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that businesses operate in French. Quebec anglophones who believe
that a post-separation government will bring out the "tongue troopers"
who will tighten down the "language screws" direct attention to the cur-
rent PQ government which has toughened its enforcement of its lan-
guage laws with the passage of Bill 40, instead of revising Bill 86.212
Still, it seems unlikely that Quebec would adopt a vengeful ap-
proach to anglophones. Bill 101's restriction on English language
schools are already an object of international attention. "Quebec will
[further] tarnish its image in international public opinion if, in acceding
to sovereignty, it decides to reduce or abolish the constitutional rights
that [linguistic] minorities have traditionally enjoyed." 13 Quebec will
also need to be sensitive to the views of other states and the UN,
UNESCO, and other international organizations. The PQ's government
has announced that Quebec would assume Canada's international legal
rights and obligations and apply for admission to the United Nations,
UNESCO, and other international organizations.
21 4
Granted, the ICPR Covenant, the IESCR Covenant, and the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child would not obligate Quebec to actively
support the freedom of anglophone businesses to advertise in English
and anglophone and allophone immigrant parents to send their children
to English schools, but merely to refrain from overtly discriminating
against them; and "their education clauses [would] only require covert
toleration of minority mother tongues."215 Still, a newly sovereign Que-
bec which moved to further restrict the commercial use of English
would violate the spirit of Ballantyne v. Canada, and further limits on
English language education would also raise questions about Quebec's
compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation Against Discrimina-
tion in Education. As Kenneth McRoberts observes, the readiness of the
international community "to recognize Quebec's sovereignty [and admit
it to membership] might well be influenced by how the Quebec govern-
ment treats its anglophone minority."216
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minority language rights have been a central feature of Canadian
legal and political life for the past thirty years. Quebec's vision of the
province as a distinctly French society has clashed with the freedom of
212. An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., Bill 40 (1996)
(Can.).
213. Freeman & Grady, supra note 202, at 189.
214. Supra note 193.
215. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas & Robert Phillipson, Linguistic Human Rights: Past and
Present, in LINGUISTIC HUMAN RIGHTS: OVERCOMING LINGUISTIC DISCRIMINATION 86
(1995).
216. McRoberts, supra note 206, at 183
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its anglophone minority to conduct its business in English and its right
to educate its children in English. Quebec anglophones have litigated
these issues before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Protes-
tant School Boards and Ford cases and before the UN Human Rights
Committee in the Ballantyne case. Quebec has been adept at resisting
changes in the Charter of the French Language, but Quebec anglo-
phones, buoyed by their successes in domestic and international litiga-
tion, have contemplated further litigation to challenge Bill 86 as a vio-
lation of the Canadian Charter and the international human rights
covenants and conventions. The outcome of future litigation will be in-
terwoven, as it already has been, with the macro-constitutional ques-
tion of whether Quebec shares enough in common with the Rest of Can-
ada to remain within the federation.

THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION SELF-
HELP PARADIGM: A LEGAL REGIME FOR
ENFORCING THE NORM PROHIBITING
THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
COLONEL GuY B. ROBERTS*
Neither the United States of American nor the world community of na-
tions can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the
part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where
only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a
nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so
destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially in-
creased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deploy-
ment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.
- John F. Kennedy, 19621
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION AND
THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIME
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 2 as well
* Colonel Roberts is currently the senior legal advisor for the United States
Southern Command in Miami, Florida. He is a graduate of Arizona State University
(B.A. 1972) and he received his J.D. from the University of Denver in 1975. He also
holds masters degrees in international and comparative law from Georgetown University
(1985), in international relations from the University of Southern California (1983), and
in strategic studies from the Naval War College (1995). He is admitted to practice in
Colorado, California, Arizona, the Tenth Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.
1. The Soviet Threat to the Americans, Address by President Kennedy, 47 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 716 (1962).
2. There is no universal and consistent use of this term to designate these weapons.
For purposes of this article the term "weapons of mass destruction" refers to nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. It will be abbreviated as
WMD. The implication is that these weapons have a common ability to inflict far greater
casualties than a comparable sized conventional explosive. Nonetheless considerable dif-
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as missile delivery systems, is one of the most significant and protracted
threats to international security and global stability ever faced by man-
kind. In a world where regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into
war and terroristic acts of violence have become commonplace, these
weapons have devastating consequences for world order. We continue to
witness a steady and deadly increase in those countries determined to
acquire a WMD capability. While the reasons are complex, and beyond
our scope here, the fact remains that despite the creation of interna-
tional nonproliferation norms and legally binding treaty commitments,
a minority of states continues to pursue these weapons. No nation can
absorb the devastating consequences of these weapons of terror. Yet,
although the international community has condemned the proliferation
of these weapons, the mechanisms for stopping or rolling back prolifera-
tion have been ineffective and the current legal regime authorizing na-
tions to use force in response to this threat is moribund.
The use of force, under the most commonly accepted view of the
current legal regime, may only be justified as an act in self-defense.
The criteria for self-defense include an actual attack or a threat of at-
tack so imminent that the perceived victim has no reasonable choice but
to attack. All other uses of force, absent specific UN Security Council
approval, are illegal and therefore prohibited. However, given the stra-
tegic realities created by proliferators armed with such weapons should
such responses be condemned as illegal in the absence of an "imminent"
threat?
Regrettably, the prevailing patterns of statecraft and the funda-
mental change of circumstances in the past fifty years have created a
radically different world from the one of the Cold War, so that the cur-
rent legal constructs so optimistically and idealistically enshrined in the
1945 UN Charter are unworkable. A new paradigm is essential if we are
to successfully meet the challenge of the WMD threat. The main reason
for a new juridical paradigm is that the old juridical paradigm of re-
straint as codified in the UN Charter simply no longer works. It is no
longer responsive to the threat facing nations. We already see evolving
events undermining the older paradigm's claim to deal adequately with
the problems within its domain. Consequently, new paradigms which
expand the permissible nature and role of the use of force are credibly
ferences exist between these weapons with respect to their effects, the potential military
impact of their use, the technical difficulties involved in acquiring them, and thus the
degree of proliferation concern that they engender. I will also use the abbreviation NBC
to refer to specific categories (nuclear, biological, chemical) of weapons and CBW to refer
only to chemical and biological weapons. Where necessary I will discuss them separately
in order to take into account the different issues (and the nature of the threat) that they
raise. Also, the term "nuclear weapons" is meant to include radiological weapons (i.e.
weapons that disperse radiological materials by whatever means) as well as the more
familiar large energy yield nuclear fission/fusion weapons.
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challenging the old order. A new legal regime or paradigm is necessary
to reflect the new political environment in which national survival, re-
gional security and world peace can, dictate the preventive or preemp-
tive3 use of force to eithek deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition
programs or destroy illicit WMD sites at any stage in the proliferator's
acquisition efforts.
This new counterproliferation self-help paradigm is not business-
as-usual power politics validated by a legal construct but rather a com-
mon sense recognition that the law is not a suicide pact and that it is a
process, more than just rules, that reflect and at the same time controls
state behavior. This new "counterproliferation self-help" paradigm is
fully consistent with the purposes of the Charter,4 since illicit WMD
programs threaten international peace and security. The current legal
paradigm is not responsive. So, if the law is to have any relevance, a
paradigm shift is both necessary and possible.
The term "paradigm" is appropriate since what is proposed is the
embodiment of a distinct and coherent explanation of a new legal norm
for the use of force that explains and validates the use of that force
which should guide future practitioners in responding to the extraordi-
nary threat posed by WIVD proliferators.5 The term is used as a concep-
tion of a specific legal regime, in this case a new legal regime to justify
and rationalize state (or states) responses to the new threat of WMTD
proliferation. New modes of thought, new orientations are needed if the
law is to adopt a dynamic, progressive-and therefore relevant-per-
spective. The old paradigm reflected a seemingly endless debate over
the limits and scope of the UN Charter's Article 2(4) use-of-force prohi-
bition and the right of self-defense enshrined in Article 51. As it cur-
rently stands we either provide tortuous and not-very-convincing legal
justifications for our actions or we end up hobbling ourselves with le-
galistic restrictions against carrying the war-and indeed that is ex-
actly what it is-to those that intend to do us and our way of life severe
3. A distinction should be drawn between the "preventive strike" and the "preemp-
tive strike." A preventive strike is taken to eliminate the potential capability of a known
enemy. A pre-emptive strike is one undertaken, based on clear and convincing evidence
in the hands of decision-makers, in anticipation of an immediate enemy aggression. See
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 370 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans. 1976). Until
the moment that WMD or its delivery system(s) is deployable and ready for use, any
counter-measure must be considered preventive. Once the weapon is deployable, the fo-
cus shifts to the prospective moment of its use, and self-defense becomes a preemptive
act.
4. That fundamental purpose is the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 1.
5. Dr. Thomas Kuhn first coined the term "paradigm." THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). A paradigm denotes "one sort of
element in [a constellation of beliefs], the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining
puzzles of normal science." Id. at 175.
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harm, either now or in the not-to-distant future.
To be relevant and useful international law must be adaptable. As
one legal scholar counseled: "International law, like all living law, is in
a process of continuous growth and adaptation to the new needs and
circumstances." 6 Responding to the weapons of mass destruction prolif-
eration threat necessitates examining the current legal regime in which
these potential responses will be made. The very nature of the threat
itself-WMD in the hands of unstable, despotic states that make no se-
cret of their hegemonic designs or desire to threaten regional peace and
security-is sufficient to justify the use of force, collectively or unilater-
ally if necessary. In cases involving the most fundamental of issues-
the survival of the nation, regional security, global peace and order-
the law should not be silent. A new paradigm will provide the world com-
munity with legally and politically supportable justifications for re-
sponding to and helping to eventually eliminate this ever-growing
threat to world peace and security.
After a brief review of the magnitude of the threat, the nonprolif-
eration and US counterproliferation efforts will be discussed, and the
current legal regime will be reviewed, to include the on-going debate on
the limits of self-defense. The criteria for the new paradigm will be set
forth and four case studies will be examined under these criteria to
demonstrate their efficacy and supportability without doing damage to
the norm requiring states to "refrain" from using force in international
relations. In the face of the demonstrably horrible threat of WMD, new
legal parameters need to be established that support and justify collec-
tive or unilateral actions in response to the threat.
Preemptive or preventive acts are and, it is submitted, always will
be controversial. In the current historical moment of world politics the
United States-the world's only superpower-with unparalleled mili-
tary power leads an international system in which most of the other
states participate as willing partners. If the United States fails to use
its power in ways that others will accept as just and legal, a terrible
backlash could result. The consequences could be weakened coopera-
tion, the de-legitimization of US leadership, and current international
nonproliferation regimes could collapse, resulting in the acceleration of
weapons of mass destruction proliferation both horizontally and verti-
cally. The new proposed paradigm recognizes that certain state actors
refuse to adopt the accepted practice of civilized nations and that stated
response policies, supported by a coherent legal regime, are the only
way to ensure national security, regional stability, and eventually a
world free of this scourge on mankind.
6. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (1980).
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II. THE WMD THREAT: AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE
TO CIVILIZATION AND WORLD ORDER
As the new millennium approaches, we face the very real and in-
creasing prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate armies, ter-
rorist groups and even religious cults will seek to wield dispropor-
tionate power by acquiring and using these weapons that can
produce mass casualties. These are neither far-fetched nor far-off
threats.
- Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
7
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have emerged
into the public consciousness whose behavior is in contravention of
agreed norms of state behavior; that have either used or threatened to
use force to coerce those that thwart their ambitions, and that seek to
acquire arsenals of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons to
achieve their aspirations. Former national security advisor Anthony
Lake identified these state actors as "rogue" or "backlash" states.8 At
least 25 countries already have or are in the process of developing nu-
clear, biological or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them.9 Of
these, many have ties to terrorists, to religious zealots or organized
crime groups who are also seeking to use these weapons. 10
Why are these weapons so unique? This is a threat qualitatively
different from conventional weapons because of its potential to do ex-
treme damage, physical and psychological, with a single strike." Due
to their availability, relative affordability, and easy use, weapons of
mass destruction allow conventionally weak states and non-state actors
to counter and possibly thwart the overwhelming conventional superi-
ority possessed by the United States and other Western nations. 12 Be-
cause of their potentially far greater lethality, any threats of use
against the civilian populations of regional allies or of Western inter-
7. TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL 42 (1997).
8. Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 45 (1994). The
term "rogue" or "pariah" states will be used here to characterize those states that are il-
licitly seeking these weapons of mass destruction in contravention of established interna-
tional normative behavior or in violation of solemn legal agreements.
9. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NONPROLIFERATION CENTER, THE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 1 (1995).
10. PROLIFERATION:THREAT AND RESPONSE, DEP'T OF DEF. REPORT 49-51 (1997).
11 Mark, Consequences of Nuclear War, in THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR: A
PUGWASH SYMPOSIUM 7, 7-16 (F. Griffiths & J. Polanyi eds. 1979); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1979).
12. See Eric Arnett & Thomas Wander, The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry:
Technology, Motivation and Responses (1992); Scott Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1996/97, at 56.
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vening powers will have a much greater impact than similar ones of a
conventional variety.
1 3
The threat of holding civilian populations hostage to WMD use has
a unique ability to deter regional allies from supporting a Western mili-
tary intervention, as well as to affect the calculus of Western govern-
ments regarding the wisdom of the intervention itself.14 In strictly mili-
tary terms, Western forces will hold conventional superiority over their
adversaries in most regional confrontations in which they become in-
volved.1 5 Regional powers that anticipate potential confrontation with
the West are likely to seek asymmetrical strategies able to exploit areas
of Western vulnerability. In this context, as former Secretary of De-
fense William Perry noted: "Rogue regimes may try to use these devas-
tating weapons as blackmail, or as a relatively inexpensive way to side-
step the U.S. military's overwhelming conventional military
superiority."s
The threat is well known and understood by our world leaders. In
January 1992, the UN Security Council, meeting for the first time at
the levels of Heads of State and Government, issued a declaration stat-
ing that "[t]he proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a
threat to international peace and security."17 In 1995, NATO responded
to the growing proliferation threat by declaring:
We attach the utmost importance to preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and, where this has occurred, to
reversing it through diplomatic means... As a defensive alliance,
NATO is addressing the range of capabilities needed to discourage
WMD proliferation and use. It must also be prepared, if necessary, to
counter this risk and thereby protect NATO's populations, territory,
and forces.18
President Clinton has declared weapons of mass destruction one of
the "most significant threats that all of our people will face in the next
whole generation.. ." 9 In 1994, President Clinton, by Executive Or-
der, declared that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction "con-
stitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
13. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION:ASSESSING THE RISK (1993).
14. Sagan, supra note 12, at 57-74; John Supko, The Changing Proliferation Threat,
FOR. POLICY, Winter 1996-97, at 5-6.
15. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, DEP'T OF DEFENSE 9 (1997).
16. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, DEP'T OF DEF. REPORT iii (1996).
17. Maintenance of International Security and Strengthening of the International
Security System, 46 U.N. Y.B. 33 (1993).
18. Final Communiqui, Communiqu6 M-DPC/NPG-1 (95) 57, NATO Press Service,
June 8, 1995.
19. THE PROLIFERATION PRIMER, A MAJORITY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES (1998).
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foreign policy, and economy of the United States," and declared a na-
tional emergency to deal with that threat. 20 Secretary of State Albright
called the proliferation of these weapons "the most overriding security
interest of our time."2 1 The 1997 Department of Defense annual report
on proliferation describes in graphic detail this wide-ranging and
growing threat-a threat that was to have diminished with the estab-
lishment of comprehensive treaties banning such weapons. 22 Unfortu-
nately, as Secretary of Defense William Cohen describes:
As the new millennium approaches, the United States faces a
heightened prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate armies, ter-
rorist cells, and even religious cults will wield disproportionate power
by using-or even threatening to use-nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons against our troops in the field and our people at home. 23
Notwithstanding extraordinary efforts by the United States and
others to create incentives to not acquire these weapons, the trend to-
ward further proliferation has accelerated, with a few notable excep-
tions.24 Dictators both impress and intimidate their populations by ac-
quiring WMD. In several regions, for example the Persian Gulf and
Northeast Asia, there appear to be few, if any, limits on the ambitions of
unstable actors to acquire the most advanced and deadly weapons
available, either through internal or external sources. 25 Increasingly,
the currency of power for these countries is a WMD capability.
Consequently, an increasing number of countries have or are seek-
ing the capability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons, heightening
security concerns and increasing tensions world-wide. 26 China, the
20. Exec. Order No. 12,938, 30 WKLY COMP. PREs. DOc. 2386 (Nov. 14, 1994). On
November 12, 1997, he continued the declaration of national emergency by finding that
the proliferation of these weapons continues "to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States .... 32
WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2384 (Nov. 12, 1997).
21. William Drozdiak, U.S. Pushes NATO on Arms Proliferation, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 1997, at Al.
22. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE
(1997).
23. Id. at iii.
24. Argentina and Brazil have resolved their security concerns and abandoned their
nuclear programs with Brazil ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1998. John Rodick, et. al, Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonprolif-
eration Regime, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 107. South Africa agreed to dismantle its nu-
clear weapons program (to include the six nuclear weapons it has assembled) and joined
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Roger Molander & Peter Wilson, On Dealing
with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 19, 30.
25. Attempts by rogue states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran to acquired WMD
is well known and voluminously documented. See e.g. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra, note 13; PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, DEP'T OF
DEF. (1997).
26. See DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY REPORT, GLOBAL PROLIFERATION: DYNAMICS,
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world's most proliferant proliferator of WMD materials and technolo-
gies, 27 now has intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting the United
States and others with nuclear annihilation. 28 India and Pakistan have
now officially joined the nuclear club with the underground testing of
nuclear weapons. 29 Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is particularly
worrisome. With the detonation of the "Islamic Bomb" the danger of
transferring weapons and technology to other states and potentially ter-
rorist groups has dramatically increased. As one Pakistan leader was
quoted: "We are going to sell our nuclear technology .... It will be up for
grabs to the highest bidder."30 The Iranian Foreign Minister, in con-
gratulating Pakistan on its successful nuclear detonation, reportedly
said that "all over the world, Muslims are happy that Pakistan has this
capability," claiming it would help counter Israel's presumed nuclear
weapons program. 31 The lack of effective civilian control over its nu-
clear capability and the increasing political turmoil brought on by a
shaky economy, turmoil in Afghanistan and extremist Islamic groups
further exacerbates the situation.32
Nuclear weapons have the greatest potential for catastrophic dev-
astation, the disruption of world peace, and the destruction of nonpro-
liferation norms. Small (weighing a few kilograms) nuclear devices
smuggled into population centers could produce thousands of casual-
ties.33 Those we most worry about as potential if not actual threats con-
ACQUISITION STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES (1994), ERIC STANTON MILLER, THIRD WORLD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AND NOTIONAL ACQUISITION PATHS, CENTER FOR
NAVAL ANALYSES (CRM 93-220, Mar. 1994).
27. See THE PROLIFERATION PRIMER, supra note 19.
28. Bill Gertz, China Targets Nukes at U.S., WASH. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at Al
(quoting a CIA report on China's strategic missile and nuclear capability); Bill Gertz,
China's Nukes Could Reach Most of U.S, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at Al (citing con-
cerns expressed by commander, U.S. Strategic Command, over China's growing capabil-
ity).
29. John F. Burns, India Sets 3 Nuclear Blasts, Defying a Worldwide Ban; Tests
Bring Sharp Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at Al; John F. Burns, India Detonates a
Hydrogen Bomb, Experts Confirm, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at Al; Steven Komarow,
Test Indicate Devices Big and Small, India's Arsenal Seen as Equal to U.S. in '60's, USA
TODAY, May 14, 1998, at A10; Molly Moore & Kamran Kahn, Pakistani A-Tests Seen as
'Triumph for Islam', WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at A19 [hereinafter Moore & Kahn).
Interestingly, prior to Pakistan's nuclear detonation, a former prime minister of Pakistan
called on the world community to launch a preemptive strike since "rogue nations that
defy world opinion ought to be taught a lesson." Benzair Bhutto, Punishment: Make it
Swift, Severe, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at M5.
30. Moore & Khan, supra note 29.
31. John Ward Anderson, Pakistan Claims It Has New Missile, WASH. POST, June 2,
1998, at A7.
32. Christopher Thomas, Tottering Pakistan Alarms Neighbors, LONDON TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1998, at 1.
33. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING THE
THREAT OF LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL chs. 1 & 2 (1996).
A quantity of plutonium the size of a soda can (about 2.2 pounds or one kilogram) is
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tinue along well-worn proliferation paths to acquire these weapons. For
example, despite Herculean efforts by the United States to stop and roll
back North Korea's nuclear weapons program, 34 U.S. intelligence offi-
cials have concluded that North Korea has resumed it's efforts to ac-
quire nuclear weapons, 35 and the recent firing of a long range missile
capable of hitting Japan and possibly US territories demonstrated that
it now has a delivery system to threaten the US and key US allies with
WM.36
One of the greatest proliferation dangers is the huge quantity of
fissile (nuclear) materials.37 The danger of fissile materials cannot be
overstated. Radioactive elements being removed from dismantled nu-
clear weapons and from nuclear power plant waste in the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) are being stored in a country where physical security is
compromised, where people in the military and scientific community are
not paid well, if at all, and where organized crime operates aggressively
and pays handsomely. 38 FBI Director, Louis Freeh, described the threat
of Russian criminal organizations stealing and selling nuclear material
to a rogue state or terrorist group as "extremely high."39 Thousands of
weapons and unknown quantities of weapons-quality nuclear materials
are being inadequately stored and secured in a still highly unstable
country. 40 Further, given the past and current economic crisis affecting
enough to create a nuclear explosion. See THOMAS COCHRAN & CHRISTOPHER PAINE, THE
AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM NEEDED FOR PURE FISSION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 9 (1995).
34. William E. Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administra-
tion's Response, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper #3 (Mar. 1995);
Walter B. Slocombe, Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, in FIGHTING
PROLIFERATION: NEW CONCERNS FOR THE NINETIES (Henry Sokolski ed., 1996).
35. J.F.O. McAllister, More Nukes, Is North Korea the Latest to Proliferate?, TIME,
Aug. 10, 1998, at. 24.
36. Bill Gertz, N. Korean Missile seen posing risk to U.S., WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1998, at Al; Jim Lea, NK Gives Japan Warning, PAC. STARS & STRIPES, Sept. 18, 1998, at
4.
37. Guy B. Roberts, Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of
Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials, INST.OR NAT'L SEC. STUDIES OCCASIONAL
PAPER#8, Feb. 1996.
38. See Barbara Slavin, Nuclear Weapons Threat Lurks in Russia Poorly Paid
Guards Are a Security Concern, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at A20 ("Recent U.S. visitors
to Moscow's elite Kurchatov Institute of Atomic energy found no one guarding a building
that holds 220 pounds of highly enriched uranium-enough for several bombs-because
the cash-strapped institute could not afford to hire a single guard."); Judith Matloff, In
Poorer Russia, Risk Rises for Nuclear Sites, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1998, at 1
("more than 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons... are at risk because no proper inventory
exists.').
39. Mark Johnson, Nukes and the Russian Mob, J. COM., Mar. 13, 1998, at 6. See
also Martin Sieff, Russian 'Kleptocracy' Risks Spread of Nuclear Weapons, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1997, at A3.
40. Since 1991 hundreds of incidents of theft and illicit trafficking of nuclear materi-
als have been reported, and, in a society rampant with social and economic hardship, po-
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Russia there is a great potential for the unauthorized export of danger-
ous WMD materials. 41 Troubling possibilities include the sale of mate-
rials or weapons and the recruitment of scientists, engineers or techni-
cians by rogue states seeking to acquire a WMD capability.
42 It is
virtually certain that one or more of these states will try to exploit per-
ceived opportunities in Russia or other states of the former Soviet Un-
ion to obtain a WMD capability at bargain-basement prices.
On December 1, 1997, the congressionally-mandated National De-
fense Panel warned that, "[t]he increasing capability to fabricate and
introduce biotoxins and chemical agents into the United States means
that rogue nations or transnational actors may be able to threaten our
homeland. 43 Despite signing and ratifying international agreements
banning the development, production and use of such weapons, many
nations are clandestinely attempting to acquire such weapons.
44
While the consequences of chemical or biological weapons appear
more uncertain, they nevertheless present the potential to inflict ex-
traordinarily large casualties on civilian population centers and disrupt
military operations. Iraq was able to use chemical weapons to good ef-
fect against poorly protected and trained Iranian forces as well as
against Iraqi Kurds, and Iraq had (and may still have) the potential to
launch Scud missiles with chemical agents against Israeli population
centers.45 Chemical and biological weapons, we know, are the poor
man's atomic bomb-cheaper to buy, easier to build and extremely
deadly, and it is extremely difficult to detect and eliminate such pro-
grams. 46 Witness for example, the seemingly never-ending efforts to
litical opportunism and highly organized criminal elements the risk of a catastrophic
rupture, if it has not already occurred, remains distressingly high. See Guy B. Roberts,
Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade
Fissile Materials, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper #8, Feb. 1996;
GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET L., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING THE THREAT OF
LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL (1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PROLIFERATION CONCERNS, ASSESSING U.S. EFFORTS TO HELP CONTAIN
NUCLEAR AND OTHER DANGEROUS MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION (1997).
41. See, e.g. Lee Hockstader, Rampages by Russian Troops Illustrate Army Erosian,
WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at 27; Douglas Farah, Freeh Says Russian Mafia Pose Grow-
ing Threat to U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1997, at 18; Oleg Bukharin & William Potter,
Potatoes Were Guarded Better, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 1995, at 48.
42. See, e.g. Bill Richardson, Russia's Recession:The Nuclear Fallout, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 1998, at 23.
43. TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21- CENTURY, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL 25 (1997).
44. See, e.g., Tim Weiner, Soviet Defector Warns of Biological Weapons, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1998, at Al.
45. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, DEP'T OF DEF.29-33 (1997).
46. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WEAPONS PROLIFERATION THREAT
(Brad Roberts ed, 1995); TERRORISM WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
CALIBRATING RISKS AND RESPONSE (1997).
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discover the depth and breadth of Iraqi's chemical and biological weap-
ons program eight years after the Persian Gulf War and the imposition
of the most intrusive inspection regime ever. Iraq's biological warfare
program was far more extensive than first believed, and much of the
program and the weapons and delivery systems are thought to still ex-
ist.47
So horrific and dangerous is the biological warfare threat it has
been called "the weapon too terrible for the parade of horribles. 48 Any
nation or non-state actor "that has even a rudimentary vaccine produc-
tion capability also has the equipment and expertise necessary to pro-
duce biological agents. .. ."49 For example, they could be readily intro-
duced into mass transportation systems and quickly spread to
thousands of people with devastating consequences. American cities are
dangerously vulnerable to the sneak release of biological agents in sub-
way systems or outside the unguarded vents of office buildings, and
troops "remain inadequately equipped, poorly trained and insufficiently
immunized to confront germ warfare." 50 Biological agents are a rela-
tively cheap force multiplier. One expert estimated that biological
weapons are the most cost effective for producing mass casualties.51
The continued progress of biotechnology could potentially lead to the
47. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal, WASH. POST,
Nov. 21, 1997, at Al. Iraq admitted to making enough botulinum toxin to, in theory,
wipe out the Earth's population several times over. During the 1980's, the Iraqis' pro-
duced many potential BW agents and studied ways to enhance the lethality and durabil-
ity of several potential BW agents.
48. Roger Cohen, The Weapon Too Terrible for the Parade of Horribles, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1998, at 4-1.
49. Randall Larsen & Robert P. Kadlec, Biological Warfare: A Silent Threat to Amer-
ica's Defense Transportation System, STRATEGIC REV., Spring 1998, at 7. For example,
ten grams of anthrax spores could kill as many people as a tone of sarin nerve agent.
The authors also cite the 1979 Sverdlovsk incident where less than one gram of anthrax
spores were released causing the deaths of 66 people in a relatively sparsely populated
area. See also Martin Arostegui, Fidel Castro's Deadly Secret, INSIGHT, July 20, 1998, at
1 (detailing Castro's biological and chemical warfare program and the possibility of pro-
viding terrorists with such weapons); Bill Gertz, China has Biological Arsenal, Congress
Told, WASH. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at 2 (U.S. annual arms control report to Congress de-
tails China's noncompliance with it's treaty obligations to not develop biological weap-
ons).
50. Bradley Graham, U.S. Gearing Up Against Germ War Threat, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 1997, at Al. A recent Pentagon Inspector General report found that the military is
not adequately training forces to fight in the face of the likely chemical and/or biological
attack. See John Donnelly, IG:Chem/Bio Battle Training Falls Short, DEF. WK., Aug. 3,
1998, at 1.
51. Estimated costs for producing mass casualties per square kilometer are:
$1 for biological
$600 for chemical (nerve agent)
$800 for nuclear
$2,000 for conventional
See RICHARD DANZIG, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A NATION AT RISK-A TIME TO ACT (1996).
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development of new agents that are more lethal, easier to store, and
have an even greater lethality against unprotected civilian populations
than nuclear weapons.
5 2
Reports abound about various radical and fundamentalist groups
attempting to acquire these weapons. For example, a group calling it-
self the "Jihad Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders," founded in
February 1998 by the infamous and elusive Osama Bin Ladin, has
threatened to unleash a terrorist offensive using chemical and biological
weapons. 53 With money no object, fanatics are supposedly being trained
to use these agents on Western populations.
5 4
Finally, the methods of delivering these weapons of terror increase
the likelihood of deployment and use of such weapons after their acqui-
sition. Many of the states in the process of acquiring a WMD capability
are also developing a ballistic missile capability. 55 In July 1998, the
Congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States released its report whose unanimous con-
clusions bear repeating here:
a. Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile na-
tions to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads
pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its
friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea,
Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballis-
tic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are
not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions. The
newer ballistic missile nations ... would be able to inflict major de-
struction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire
such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those
years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been
made.
b. The threat to the U.S. posed by these merging capabilities is
broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been re-
52. For an overview of this evolving BW threat see The Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, Biological Weapons: New Threats or Old News?, STRATEGIC SURV. 31-41 (1996).
53. Guido Olimpio, Islamic Cell Preparing Chemical Warfare, Toxins, Gases Against
West, MILAN CORRIERE DELLA SERA, July 8, 1998, at 9 (trans. by Foreign Broadcast and
Information Service).
54. Recently, news reporters "posing as middlemen for a medical laboratory in North
Africa, were offered samples of anthrax, plague and brucella by a laboratory in the Far
East" for around $1000 a sample. See Need a Biological War? Labs Sell Anthrax Germs
by Mail Order, LONDON TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, at 1.
55. See Barbara Slavin, Nations See Missiles as Ticket to Power, USA TODAY, Sept.
16, 1998, at 15; Walter Pincus, Iran May Soon Gain Missile Capability, WASH. POST,
July 24, 1998, at 28.
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ported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community.
5 6
c. The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballis-
tic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some plausible sce-
narios-including rebasing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and
air-launch options, shortened development programs that might in-
clude testing in a third country, or some combination of these-the
U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational de-
ployment.57 (Emphasis added)
The post Cold War era has elevated WMD proliferation into one of
the most important international security issues facing the world today.
In the hands of states unwilling to adhere to the established norms of
civilized nations, the likelihood of devastation and instability is great.
As will be discussed, the international community has erected impor-
tant legal and normative barriers to the proliferation of these types of
weapons, and yet it has not been enough to stop proliferation. Those
threatened with the potential of these weapons have recognized this
and instituted a series of defensive and offensive measures designed to
limit damage in case of attack and raise the costs in order to deter those
who acquire such weapons from using them.
III. CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS AND THE US
COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill,
that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hard-
ship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival
and success of liberty. We will not waver in the face of aggres-
sion and tyranny."
- John F. Kennedy 58
A. Non-Proliferation and the Establishment of Legal Norms
"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the
56. After the embarrassing nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, U.S. intelligence
Agencies publicly acknowledged serious intelligence shortfalls in its ability to detect
WMD programs and ballistic missile development. Walter Pincus, Buried Missile Labs
Foil U.S. Satellites, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at 1. But see Pakistan, India Exagger-
ated Nuclear Tests, Study Finds, BALT. SUN, Sept. 16, 1998, at A20 (tests by India and
Pakistan were overstated both in terms of numbers and power).
57. NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, <http://
www.nyu.globalbeat/usdefense/nsc071598.html>.
58. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961 in PUB.
PAPERS (1961).
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acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of
skill."
- Sun Tzu 5
9
The United States, NATO and the world community at large have
recognized that these weapons pose a "grave danger and urgent threat"
to international peace and security, 60 and the United States has under-
taken a multi-faceted approach to stop would-be proliferators. US non-
proliferation policies are based on three main thrusts: buttress technical
constraints; reduce proliferation incentives and enhance disincentives;
and build nonproliferation institutions or norms. 61 Nonproliferation ef-
forts aim at preventing potential proliferators from gaining access to
the relevant capabilities and technologies necessary to develop, field
and maintain such weapons. Indeed, nonproliferation policy has
achieved noteworthy successes in preventing and helping to reverse
proliferation. Traditional instruments of nonproliferation policy have
included detecting weapons programs (verification measures); reducing
regional tensions through confidence building measures, security assur-
ances and assistance, and military cooperation; strengthening multilat-
eral export control regimes to curtail access to NBC technologies and
material; reinforcing the international nonproliferation regimes; and
bringing pressure to bear on proliferating nations through trade sanc-
tions and public diplomacy.
62
Over the past three decades, multilateral export controls and sup-
pliers restraints have been put in place to enhance technical constraints
and make it more difficult for countries to acquire WMD weaponry.
63
These controls have not been expected to block proliferation outright.
Instead their purpose has been to "buy time."64 In some cases, buying
time has allowed other diplomatic and political actions to be taken (for
example, the use of US influence in the mid-1970s to persuade both
59. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 77 (Samuel B. Griffith ed., 1963).
60. WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE, EXEC. ORDER No. 12938 (Nov. 12, 1997) (declaring
a national emergency over the extraordinary threat of WMD proliferation); THE
ALLIANCE'S STRAGIC CONCEPT paras. 12,50 (1991), (Recognition of the grave risks of
WMD Proliferation); President of the UN Security Council Statement, S/23500, Jan. 31,
1992 (Proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security).
61. The United States proliferation strategy is summarized in OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
ASSESSING THE RISKS (1993); PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 10.
62. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 10, at 53-77.
63. See PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS (Cathleen Bailey & Robert Rudney
eds., 1993).
64. "In the ninth century the King of France imposed the death sentence on anyone
who sold a sword to a Viking. This did not prevent the Vikings from taking Normandy
or, even worse, their children from conquering England." David Fisher, The London Club
and the Zangger Committee: How Effective? in PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS,
supra note 63.
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South Korea and Taiwan to shutdown questionable nuclear activities).
65
Buying time, however, is also valuable in its own right. Regional secu-
rity and domestic political changes can lead to unexpected decisions to
renounce or rollback WNID programs. This is perhaps best typified by
South Africa's decision in the early 1990s to dismantle its rudimentary
nuclear arsenal and join the NPT, a decision made possible by the with-
drawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Angola in the late 1980s and
made necessary in the eyes of the new government of President de
Klerk by the inevitability of black majority rule.
66
Equally important, traditional prevention policies have sought to
reduce proliferation incentives. Diplomatic persuasion and dissuasion,
use of conventional arms sales to help buttress defense capabilities of
US allies and friends, political support in crises, and efforts to encour-
age regional stability and confidence-building all have played a role.
The threat of economic and other sanctions, for example, has been used
to enhance disincentives to pursuing NBC weaponry.
In the past, deterrence of acquisition has also been a modest but
not very successful element of past non-proliferation efforts. Almost ex-
clusively, deterrent efforts have emphasized the threat of punishment.
They have frequently foundered, however, on the reluctance either of
the US or of other countries to carry out such threats.67 And if such
threats are carried out, most states are reluctant or unable to stay the
course for usually a long, indefinite period before any results can be
seen.
Nonetheless, the threat of preventive military action has proven a
useful adjunct to other proliferation prevention initiatives. An implicit
threat of recourse to military force could back-up political and diplo-
matic initiatives. Similarly, the risk that acquisition of NBC capabili-
ties would prove a lightning rod and not a deterrent of US military
strikes in the event of conflict could reinforce other ongoing efforts to
buttress deterrence of acquisition by a strategy of denial of gains.
During the Persian Gulf War, for example, it has been argued that
the threat of massive retribution by the United States deterred Iraq
65. Joseph Yager, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation Rollback, DEP'T OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF ARMs CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, July 6, 1992.
66. Frank Pabian, South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons for US Non-
proliferation Policy, NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW (Fall 1995).
67. Despite frequent statements by government officials that certain "rogue" states
were engaged in developing an illicit WMD capability the United States and its allies
have rarely used force or the threat of force to deter the continued development of these
programs. See, e.g. James Woolsey (Director of Central Intelligence), World Threat As-
sessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Hrg. 103-630; CIA
REPORT, supra note 46; and the discussion in footnotes 197-261 and accompanying text,
infra.
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from using its biological and chemical weapons.68 The threat or retalia-
tion apparently worked in this case. Ultimately, how, and how well, we
cope with WMD proliferation will come down to what we know, how
much we know, and when we know it. Despite the extraordinary threat
these weapons present, the indiscriminate use of force could have the
same devastating impact on the international norms we are defending.
In practical terms, it is very difficult to formulate an approach to
post-Cold War deterrence that would systematically seek to deter re-
gional powers, NBC armed or not, from initiating aggression that
threatens Western security interests. Unlike during the Cold War,
there is no clear consensus within or between Western states regarding
the regional interest that need to be protected through deterrence
threats. It may be impossible, for example, to provide a definition of
"regional Western security interests," other than in quite general terms.
Challenges to regional interests are very unlikely to be always identifi-
able prior to a crisis, as was the case for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990.
Consequently, it is quite likely that Cold War deterrence will have
a diminished affect against regional local powers that are likely to have
more at stake than Western powers, whose interests at risk may be the
object of domestic political controversy and vary considerably depending
on the specific case. Furthermore, undemocratic regional powers may
have much greater interest in challenging the status quo that the de-
funct Soviet Union did during the Cold War, thus making them even
more inclined to accept significant risks.6 9 There are also indications
that enhancing freedom of action vis-a-vis Western countries has be-
come another acquisition incentive. Former Indian Army Chief of Staff
General Sundarji has been widely quoted as stating that the primary
lesson of the 1991 Gulf War is "[d]on't fight the United States unless
you have nuclear weapons," and "the next conflict with the United
States would involve weapons of mass destruction."70 Shortly before the
Gulf War, Muammar Qaddafi called for "a deterrent-missiles that
could reach New York.... We should build this force so that they and
others will no longer think about an attack."71
68. During the Gulf War President George Bush informed Saddam Hussein that
"[t]he United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons.... The
American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country
will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." Terry N. Mayer,
The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction, in AIR WAR
COLLEGE, STUDIES IN NATIONAL SECURITY 3 206 (1995).
69. See KENNETH WATMAN & DEAN WILKENING, U.S. REGIONAL DETERRENCE
STRATEGIES (1995).
70. PATRICK GARRITY, WHY THE GULF WAR STILL MATTERS: FOREIGN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Rpt. 16, July 1993, at xiv.
71. BRAD ROBERTS, WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND WORLD ORDER AFTER THE COLD
WAR 235 (1996).
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Attempting to prevent acquisition, above all on the part of countries
likely to threaten Western interests and in violation of treaty or other
legal commitments, clearly constitutes a critical goal of post-Cold War
security and defense policies.7 2 However, this objective also does not
readily lend itself to the formulation of a deterrence doctrine and pos-
ture, since it is impossible systematically to threaten the use of military
force in order to prevent NBC acquisition. It totally fails with respect to
transnational terrorist groups.
Finally, there are important legal and normative barriers related to
all three types of weapons, barriers that are in the interests of the en-
tire international community. Beginning with the creation of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, institution building has been
the third major non-proliferation thrust.7 3 In an incremental process,
major institutional advances have been made over the ensuing decades.
This process of institution building has helped to create and extend an
overall norm of non-proliferation--one that is arguably jus cogens. That
is, a pre-emptory norm of international law from which states may not
abjure or contravene. The establishment of worldwide legal norms
against the continuing proliferation of such weapons includes the fol-
lowing:
1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),7 4 with its legally
binding obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons as well as its
provisions for international inspections and export controls,
represents an almost universal commitment by the interna-
tional community to stop, and condemn as illegal, the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. The NPT was indefinitely extended in
1995 and has over 185 parties (only Israel, Pakistan, India and
Cuba are non-signatories).
7 5
2. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),76entered
into force in 1972 and helped establish the norm, albeit unveri-
fiable, banning the use of biological weapons by prohibiting the
"development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention"
of biological weaponry for offensive purposes.7 7 The BWC cur-
72. Exec. Order No. 12938, supra note 60.
73. See SEC. OF DEF., REPORT ON NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS 3-4 (1994).
74. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
75. See Barbara Crossette, Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Ex-
tended, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at Al.
76. April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. 8062.
77. There is also a norm-creating 1925 Protocol banning the use of poisonous gases
and biological weapons in war. Although signed and ratified by few parties (the US rati-
fied in 1975) it does arguably create a legal norm against the first use of biological weap-
ons in wartime. See infra note 121.
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rently has 140 state parties and, with an additional 18 signato-
ries, it also represents universal opprobrium for the use of such
weapons.
78
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 79 signed by 169 na-
tions (ratified by 118 as of October 1998) and entered into force
in 1997 (the US ratified in 1997), contains one of the most in-
trusive verification regimes yet devised to ensure the destruc-
tion of CW stockpiles and limit diversion to illicit CW pro-
grams.8 0 It prohibits the development, production and use of
chemical weapons for any purpose and obligates the parties to
destroy all existing stocks. It too is approaching universal ad-
herence.
4. The creation of nuclear weapons free zones beginning with the
Treaty of Tlatelcolo, creating a nuclear free zone in Latin
America in 1967.81 Since then one other NWFZ (South Pacific)
has been created,8 2 another has been agreed to for Africa,8 3 and
several others are proposed.8 4  These initiatives further
strengthen the international norm that eschews the position
and development of these weapons.
5. The establishment of export control groups to limit and control
nuclear materials, equipment and technology. To help stem the
tide of nuclear weapon information and technology, the Zangger
Committee was established in 1974 and periodically updates
"trigger" lists of controlled exports that could support a clandes-
tine nuclear weapons program, and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (established in 1978) whose goal is to obtain the agree-
ment of all suppliers, including nations not members of the re-
78. NPT, BWC, and CWC treaties can be found at website
http://www.acda.gov/treaties.
79. The Convention on the Prohibition, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons, opened for signature, Jan. 13, 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N.
Doc. A/47/27/Appendix 1 (1992), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
80. See Statement of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Before The Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March
22, 1994. Current status of CWC ratifications can be found at website
http://www.opcw.org/.
81. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 6
I.L.M. 521.
82. See United States, France, and the United Kingdom to Sign Protocols of the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty [Treaty of Raratonga], 7 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 15,
Apr. 8, 1996 (White House Statement of Mar. 22, 1996).
83. See Fact Sheet: African Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, 7 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 16, Apr. 15, 1996; African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Text),
35 I.L.M. 698 (1996).
84. There already exist agreements prohibiting nuclear weapons in Antarctica, in
outer space and on the seabed. Proposals for NWFZs exist in every region of the world.
See UN website www.unog.ch/unidir/Rr-enwfz.htm.
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gime to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accor-
dance with established guidelines. A similar group was estab-
lished in 1986 (called the Australia Group) to control BW and
CW-related items and equipment.
6. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), created in
1987, restrains and limits the sales of missiles, missile compo-
nents, and related technologies by key industrial countries.8 5
The goal is to limit the spread of missile technologies to coun-
tries of proliferation concern.
These multi-lateral treaties and voluntary restraint regimes have been
the primary engines for creating the current non-proliferation norms
that serve as political and legal barriers to WMD development. The es-
tablishment of these norms has been effective in reversing WMD acqui-
sition programs or facilitating the decision not to acquire such weapons.
Many nations that currently have the wherewithal to develop and ac-
quire these weapons have chosen not to do so or abandoned nascent
programs based on their commitment to these norms.8 6
However, the lack of credible and effective response to non-
compliance with countries' obligations under the NPT, BWC and CWC
stands out in any assessment of non-proliferation traditionalism. Re-
cent experience has been decidedly mixed. The story of Iraqi resistance
to inspections and it's stonewalling in the UN's attempt to root out its
NBC programs are well known.8 7 North Korea's success in resisting in-
ternational pressures to honor its NPT obligations also risks sending a
signal that other aspiring proliferators may seek to emulate.8 8 More
generally, lack of effective international responses to non-compliance
can only encourage countries contemplating treaty violations. Over
time, if some countries are perceived to be able to violate with impunity
their non-proliferation obligations, the credibility of the overall legal re-
gime will erode. Still other countries are all but certain, as well, to re-
think their own decision not to seek NBC weaponry. The establishment
85. Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related
to Missiles, 26 I.L.M. 599 (1987) (revised Jan. 7, 1993; annex revised July 1, 1993) (revi-
sions reproduced at 32 I.L.M. 1298 (1993) and 32 I.L.M. 1300 (1993), respectively). The
MTCR is not a treaty but a voluntary set of guidelines.
86. See LEONARD SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS (1990); DAVID FISCHER, STOPPING
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE PAST AND THE PROSPECTS (1992). Some states
might be considered "virtual" nuclear weapons states since they have the fissile materi-
als, technology and infrastructure to relatively quickly develop nuclear weapons. Japan
and Germany are two examples. See Selig Harrison, A Yen for the Bomb? WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 1993, at C1; Michael Williams, Japan Urged to Keep Potential for Nuclear Arms,
WALL STREET J., Aug, 2, 1994, at 10.
87. Ruth Wedgewood, Truth Sleuth in Iraq, WASH. POST, June 19, 1996, at 19; Evi-
dence Lacking that Iraq Destroyed Arms, Report Says, BALTIMORE SUN, April 12, 1996, at
22.
88. William Berry, supra note 34.
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of international nonproliferation norms does not and has not stopped
the determined proliferator. Recognition of that fact has resulted in the
United States developing a program to roll back or eliminate a rogue
state's WMD capability, and defending against the illicit acquisition and
use of such weapons to complement nonproliferation efforts. This rela-
tively new program is known as the Counterproliferation Initiative.
B. The United States Counterproliferation Initiative
"Between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of
worlds, I see no remedy except force."
- Oliver Wendell Holmes 89
The United States and others continue to enhance current nonpro-
liferation norms and strive to establish others (the fissile material con-
trol regime currently being negotiated at the Conference on Disarma-
ment being but one example). Unfortunately, as former Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin noted "the policy of prevention through denial won't
be enough to cope with the potential of tomorrow's proliferators."90 The
United States Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Prolif-
eration, and Federal Services concluded that "even if U.S. nonprolifera-
tion efforts work reasonably well, they will only slow the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, ballistic missile tech-
nology. America must be prepared for failure--of diplomacy, of arms
control, of export controls, and of deterrence-with something more
than threats of retaliation."91
Recognizing that despite all our nonproliferation efforts and insti-
tutional and legal norm building there continues to be determined state
and transnational actors pursuing these deadly weapons, the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DoD) in 1993 declared that the U.S. strategy for
addressing the new dangers of proliferation should involve a mult-
pronged approach, consisting firstly of "nonproliferation efforts to pre-
vent the spread of weapons of mass destruction," and secondly of coop-
erative threat reduction with the former Soviet Union. 92 It then stated
that "[wihile these first two efforts involve primarily diplomatic meas-
ures, DoD must also focus on counterproliferation efforts to deter, pre-
vent, or defend against the use of WID if our nonproliferation efforts
89. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollack, quoted in Living-
stone, Proactive Responses to Terrorism, in FIGHTING BACK: WINNING THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM 130 (Livingstone & Arnold, eds. 1986).
90. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, "The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
Created," 8 DEF. ISSUES 68, Dec. 7, 1993.
91. THE PROLIFERATION PRIMER, supra note 19, Summary.
92. Secretary of Defense, The Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative Created, DEF.
ISSUES, Vol 8, No. 68 (1993).
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fail .93
Consequently, in late 1993, the DoD unveiled its counterprolifera-
tion initiative designed to help embed these defense counterprolifera-
tion objectives as an integral feature of the planning, doctrine, training
and equipment procurement decisions of the military services. 94 Coun-
terproliferation involves preparing U.S. forces to fight and survive in a
WMD environment.95 It also includes, however, "maintaining a robust
capability to find and destroy NBC weapon delivery forces and their
supporting infrastructure elements with minimal collateral effects."
96
Another key element is developing the ability "to detect, characterize,
and defeat NBC/M facilities with minimal effects."97 U.S. forces must
be able to interdict an adversary's biological and chemical capability
during each stage of the agent's employment. 98 Counterforce operations
include (but are not limited to) attacking agent production facilities,
storage complexes, and deployed mobile weapon platforms."99
So, on a multifaceted front, engaging all political, diplomatic and
military tools, the U.S. strategy is to prevent further proliferation, roll
back proliferation where it has occurred, and adapt U.S. forces and
planning to conduct military operations despite or against proliferation
threats. If proliferators cannot be stopped from obtaining these weap-
ons, however, then the U.S. will consider whatever means necessary to
eliminate that capability. However, while preventing the spread of
WMD remains an objective that is shared by the overwhelming majority
of states in the world,a goal that unites both North and South, the uni-
lateral intentions of the U.S. to strike at all who would violate the
"norms" prohibiting proliferation raises serious legal and policy issues.
Counterproliferation became, in the eyes of its critics, nothing more
than a way of punishing those states that successfully defied the status
quo by eluding the spider's web of controls imposed by a world under
93. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, supra note 90.
94. The U.S. Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) is summarized in the annual edi-
tions of several unclassified Defense Department publications: PROLIFERATION: THREAT
AND RESPONSE; SEC. OF DEF. ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS;
COUNTERPROLIFERATION REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS FOR
COUNTERING PROLIFERATION; AND DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER,
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICALICHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.
95. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 7.
96. Department of Defense Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report
on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism (May 1998),
at 1-3.
97. Id. The purpose of the CPI is to contribute to government-wide efforts to prevent
parties from obtaining, manufacturing, or retaining these weapons by "equipping, train-
ing, and preparing U.S. forces, in coalition with the forces of friends and allies, to prevail
over an adversary who threatens or uses these weapons and their associated delivery
systems." PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 16, at iii.
98. Id. at 71.
99. Id.
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U.S. leadership. 10 0 On the contrary, the intent of the Counterprolifera-
tion Initiative was to ensure that potential adversaries recognize and
legitimately fear that the United States is not only capable of striking
them from outside their WMD range, but that it was also capable of op-
erating within a contaminated environment. If weapons of mass de-
struction are employed against the territory of the United States or
against our forward-deployed forces, this is a clear and unambiguous
signal that the United States is prepared to respond decisively.
In sum, if prevention efforts fail, at a minimum, the United States
will contemplate responding, as appropriate, to any proliferation sce-
nario. This includes attacking designated WMD facilities before they
pose a present threat to the United States, its forces or allied forces.
However, absent an actual attack or threat to use these weapons would
such a response be legitimate under the currently understood interna-
tional legal regime regulating the use of force among nations?
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME: THE
SELF-HELP PARADIGM
A. Traditional Responses to Threat: The Customary International Law
of Self-Help
"It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the law is behind
the times."
- Oliver Wendell Holmes'01
The employment of coercive self-help measures by states is an
anomaly since for the most part disputes are resolved peaceably. How-
ever, in an anarchical world where no central authority exists to assist
states and other international actors in obtaining justice or a satisfac-
tion of legitimate claims, states have historically resorted to self-help
measures short of war to remedy the injustice or satisfy the claim. As
discussed, infra, although the UN Charter condemns methods of self-
help based on the use of force short of war, the fact remains that such
methods are still in use, precisely because there is no Hobbesian "Levia-
than" to render final justice in disputes. A former U.S. State Depart-
ment legal advisor once noted that "the policeman is apt protection
against individual criminals; but national self-defense is the only pro-
tection against the criminal state."'102 In situations where force was
deemed necessary it is an act of self-help, usually described as either a
100. See Harald Muller and Mitchel Reiss, Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in
Old Bottles, WASH. Q., Spring 1995, at 143.
101. SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 101 (1934),.
102. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 922 (1986).
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reprisal or self-defense.
The right of self-defense is generally limited, confined to respond-
ing to breaches of legal duty or wrongs committed against it by other
nations.1 03 But historically, the traditional right of self-defense never
contemplated that one must wait until the first blow is struck. The fa-
ther of international law, Hugo Grotius, in The Law of War and
Peace,104 recognized that a nation could legitimately respond to "present
danger." Self-defense is permitted not only after an attack but also in
anticipation of such an attack, or, in his words: "It be lawful to kill him
who is preparing to kill...."105 Grotius' position was adopted and en-
dorsed by later legal scholars such as Emmerich de Vattel, who posited
in 1758 that:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation
has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to
use force... against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's
design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful
suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggres-
sor.1
06
American legal scholar Elihu Root argued in 1914 that interna-
tional law did not require the aggrieved state to wait before using force
in self-defense "until it is too late to protect itself."107 His reasoning was
posited on the self-defense criteria enunciated by Secretary of State
Daniel Webster in his diplomatic note to the British in the context of
the Caroline Case of 1842.108 He stated, in a widely accepted dictum,
that "anticipatory" self-defense must be restricted to those cases where
the necessity "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation." He further argued that the act should
involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept
103. DerekW. Bowett, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-9 (1958).
104. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vol. 3, 1625 (James Brown Scott ed., 1925).
105. Id. at ch. 1. Elsewhere he wrote that "the first just cause of war.., is an injury,
which even though not actually committed, threatens our persons or our property." Bk 2,
ch. 1, § 2.
106. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations IV, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 3
(James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
107. Elihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 427 (1914).
108. The Caroline was an American steamboat, accused of running arms to Canadian
rebels. A Canadian military force crossed over into the United States and set the ship
ablaze, killing an American citizen in the process. A Canadian was arrested in New York
for the murder, and the British government protested. While never admitting culpability,
The British apologized to the United States for the Incident. See Jennings, The Caroline
and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 85-89 (1938); John Moore, 2 DIG. INT'L L. 409-
14 (1906).
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clearly within it."109
Webster's Caroline criteria continue to this day to form the basis for
analysis of the right of self-defense focusing on the "necessity" of the re-
sponse and the "proportional" use of force in response. 110 "Necessity" is
the most important precondition to the legitimate use of military force
in self-defense (or, one could argue, under any other condition requiring
the use of force). The initial determination of necessity is made by the
target state based on a number of facts. These include, but are not lim-
ited to, the nature of the coercion being applied, the relative size and
power of the aggressor state, the nature of the aggressor's objectives,
and the consequences if those objectives are achieved."1' "Proportional-
ity" is the "requirement that the use of force or coercion be limited in in-
tensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to se-
cure the permissible objectives of self-defense."'1 12 Because the purpose
of self-defense is to preserve the status quo, proportionality requires
that military action cease once the danger has been eliminated. 113 The
requirements of necessity and proportionality "can ultimately be sub-
jected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law,
reasonableness in particular context."' 1 4
While this right of self defense is widely acknowledged as custom-
ary international law, it is not absolute. 1 5 It must be balanced against
similar rights enjoyed by other states and the maintenance of peace in
the international community.' 1 6 However, when in the judgment of the
injured state the necessity of acting in self-defense outweighs any harm
such act imposes, it may lawfully resort to the use of force. 1 7
Another form of self-help commonly resorted to in the pre-UN
Charter era was reprisals. Reprisals are considered to be illegal acts
undertaken by a state in retaliation or retribution to compel a state to
agree to a satisfactory settlement of a dispute originating as a result of
a prior illegal act done by the state or to compel the state to cease activi-
109. See also DANIEL PATRICK. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1965).
110. DEREK BOWETT, supra note 90, at 188; Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Limits to the
Use of Force by Sovereign States, 37 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L., 229-302 (1961).
111. Oscar Schachter, Self-Help in International Law: U.S. Action in the Iranian Hos-
tage Crisis, 37 J. INT'L L. 242 (1984).
112. MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 242 (1961).
113. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 496-97 (3d ed. 1976); J.E.S. Faw-
cett, Intervention in International Law: A Study of Some Recent Cases, RECUEIL DES
COURS 404-8 (1961); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of the International Rules on the Use of
Force, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 120 (1986).
114. Id. at 218. See also DEREK BOWETT, supra note 90, at 269-70.
115. DEREK BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1958).
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ties that violate it's legal obligations either to the state or the interna-
tional community at large.11 8 As laid down by the Naulilaa Incident
Arbitration'1 9 Tribunal legitimate reprisals must fulfill three conditions:
1. The act of the offending state must have been illegal;
2. Retaliatory "illegal" action must have been preceded by a "request
for redress which has been unavailing"; and
3. A reasonable degree of proportionality must be shown to exist be-
tween initial offense and retaliatory action.
120
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States fur-
ther states that in response to violations of international obligations the
victim state "may resort to countermeasures that might otherwise be
unlawful, if such measures
(a) are necessary to terminate the violation or prevent further violation,
or to remedy the violation; and
(b) are not out of proportion to the violation and the injury suffered."'
21
In defining the "necessity" of such actions the Restatement con-
cludes that:
[C]ountermeasures in response to a violation of an international obli-
gation are ordinarily justified only when the accused state wholly de-
nies the violation or its responsibility for the violation; rejects or ig-
nores requests to terminate the violation or pay compensation; or
rejects or ignores proposals for negotiation or third-party resolution.
Countermeasures are to be avoided as long as genuine negotiation or
third-party settlement is available and offers some promise of resolv-
ing the matter. A showing of necessity is particularly important before
any drastic self-help measures are taken.
122
118. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, ED., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 136-37 (1952).
119. Concerning the Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese
Colonies of South Africa, (Port.-F.R.G.), Arbitral Decision of July 31, 1928, 2 R.I.A.A.
1011 (1949).
120. See A.V. W. THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS
IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 136-38 (1956).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 905 (1987). ('The threat or use of force in response to violation of international
law is subject to prohibitions on the threat or use of force in the United Nations Char-
ter... ).
122. Id. at 381. Regarding retaliation the Restatement states that "[t]he principle of
necessity ordinarily precludes measures designed only as retribution for a violation and
not as an incentive to terminate a violation or to remedy it." And, in response to a viola-
tion of international law: "[t]he use or threat of force in response to a violation of interna-
tional law is subject both to the requirements of necessity and proportionality and to the
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The prohibition of reprisals is deducible from the broad regulation
of force in UN Charter Article 2(4), the obligation to settle disputes
peacefully in Article 2(3), and the general limiting of permissible force
by states to "self-defense" as delimited by Article 51. A total ban on re-
prisals, however, presupposes a degree of global cohesion that simply
does not exist, and the circumstances may clearly arise wherein the re-
sort to reprisal as a form of self-help would be distinctly law enforcing.
This is especially the case in matters where reprisals are undertaken
for prior acts of terrorism.
123
It is often difficult to distinguish between reprisals and acts of self-
defense. Although reprisal and self-defense are both forms of the same
generic remedy of self-help, an essential difference lies in their respec-
tive aim or purpose. Since they come after the harm has already been
absorbed, reprisals are punitive in character and cannot be undertaken
for protection. 124 Self-defense, on the other hand, is by its very nature
intended to mitigate harm.
125
Often the rationale for use of force is based on a combination of
facts and circumstances that justify it under either definition. In fact,
notwithstanding the apparent prohibition, there have been numerous
cases where states have claimed a right to reprisals or retribution,
1 26
and many publicists take a similar view.127 As with most cases in which
force is used in response to acts or threats of terrorism, the distinction
between self-defense and retribution or reprisal for illegal acts is
blurred. As the author has argued elsewhere, 128 slavish devotion to
"self-defense" as the sole justification for the use of force to stop delic-
tual activities by another state blurs the distinction between self-
defense and reprisals. This is primarily because states are reluctant to
recognize a right to reprisal under the Charter paradigm eschewing the
prohibitions of the United Nations Charter." Id. at 382.
123. See, e.g. R. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1969). See also JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-8
(1958) (arguing that a permissible role for reprisals continues to exist under interna-
tional law).
124. See Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 394-410 (1985) (discusses the dis-
tinction between reprisals and self-defense).
125. Id.
126. Id.; William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421 (1990). On the legal status of reprisals, Professor
Bowett noted that "there is a discrepancy between the formal principle and the actual
practice." D. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
22 (1972).
127. See, e.g. Alberto R. Coll, The Limits of Global Consciousness and Legal Absolut-
ism: Protecting International Law from Some of Its Best Friends, 27 HARV. INT'L L. J. 599
(1986); O'Brien, supra note 142.
128. Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-
Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243 (1987).
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use of force even though, in practice, many of the uses of force charac-
terized as "self-defense" are, in fact, reprisals under the Naulilaa defini-
tion.129 Obviously, there is a danger that accepting reprisals would be
destabilizing and contrary to the internationally agreed preference of
solving disputes by peaceful means. But, as Professor Arend succinctly
observes:
[Wihile states are formally unwilling to depart from the Charter
paradigm, in justifying their actions they have expanded the notion of
self-defense to include deterrence and even punishment. Such a
broadened notion of self-defense, while perhaps politically and even
morally commendable, seems to be clearly at variance with the Char-
ter's ideal of peace over justice.
130
Nevertheless, each use of force is currently judged by the international
community on whether it meets minimally acceptable standards of self-
help within the extended parameters of "self-defense."
'131
B. The UN Charter Paradigm: Article 2(4) and Article 51
The point is that international law is not higher law or better law; it is
existing law. It is not a law that eschews force; such a view is alien to
the very idea of law. Often as not it is the law of the victor; but it is
law withal and does evolve.
- Daniel Patrick Moynihan1
32
After the adoption of the UN Charter, particularly Article 2(4) pro-
hibiting states from using force as an instrument of statecraft, and Arti-
cle 51, giving back to the state the right of self-defense (discussed infra),
the debate on use of force centered on whether the right to use force ab-
sent an "armed attack" continued to exist. 133 Despite widespread refer-
ence to the Caroline case, some contend that Article 2(4) limits its appli-
cability to traditional threats of aggression where an enemy was
massing on the border in preparation of an attack. 3 4 As I argue here,
and as have others urged earlier, such a prerequisite today is unrealis-
tic and conceivably fatal to state survival. 135
129. Id.
130. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1990).
131. See James McHugh, Forcible Self-help in International Law, 62U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE INT'L STUDIES 143 (1980).
132. DANIEL MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 19 (1990).
133. Josef Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, AM. J. INT'L L. 41 (1947); Schachter, supra note 116.
134. DEP'T OF ST., OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, 12 DIG. OF INT'L L. 49-50 (1971).
135. Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 597 (1963). One author commented that 'The formulation was probably unrealisti-
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The original United Nations Charter paradigm for the use of force
has essentially three components: 1) a legal obligation to refrain from
the use of force and to resolve disputes by peaceful means; 2) institu-
tions to enforce the obligation, primarily the Security Council; and 3) a
value hierarchy that formed the philosophical basis of this obligation;
specifically, a preference for change by peaceful processes rather than
coercion. 136 The legal obligation was enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter that obliges nations to "refrain" from the use of force in their
relations with each other.1 37 Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
Security Council is empowered to investigate international conflicts and
determine if there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an
act of aggression.' 38 If it so determines, the Council is authorized to
take collective action against the miscreant state. The final element is
the preeminent goal of maintaining international peace and security.
The goal of peace was to take priority over the other goal of justice; jus-
tice could be sought but not at the expense of peace.
Unfortunately, state practice since the adoption of the Charter has
challenged the validity of this Charter paradigm.1 39 States frequently
assert self-defense as a justification for the use of force, often in circum-
stances where the assertion is palpably false.' 40 The term "self-defense"
has thus become so distorted that it now represents a rather curious
category of the use of force. These distortions are representative of the
failure of international institutions and the emergence of new values
concerning the recourse to force. While almost all international legal
scholars would agree that these post-WW II developments represent se-
rious threats to the Charter paradigm, Professors Arend and Beck ar-
gue that, in fact, a new legal paradigm has emerged: a "post-Charter
cally restrictive when stated in 1841. In the contemporary era of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons and rapid missile delivery techniques, Secretary Webster's formulation
could result in national suicide if it [was] actually applied instead of merely repeated."
W.T Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collec-
tive Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335, 348
(1962).
136. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 177. See also JOHN NORTON MOORE,
LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 170-71 (1972).
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 2., para. 4, stating that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations."
138. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
139. A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR
11 (1997) (Weisburd details hundreds of cases of the use of force that demonstrates the
utility of such uses in pursuit of vital interests).
140. Id.; Kathryn S. Elliott, The New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in the
United Nations Charter, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67 (1991); Note, Self-Defense
or Presidential Pretext? The Constitutionality of Unilateral Preemptive Military Action,
78 GEORGETOWN L. J. 415 (1989).
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self-help" paradigm.1 41 That is, in the face of the current UN Charter
paradigm being unresponsive to the needs of the community of nations,
that paradigm has been ignored and is in the process of being replaced
with a new "self-help" paradigm more attune to the legitimate needs of
the world community and more in line with previous customary inter-
national law which recognized multiple justifications for using force in
the face of articulable threats.' 42 The philosophical underpinning of the
Charter, that peace was more important than justice, has been under-
mined since members of the international community have time and
again demonstrated their belief that, at certain times and places, it is
better to pursue justice than to accept an inequitable peace.
43
While several scholars have argued that the legal proscription of
Article 2(4) is still good law,' 44 that view is clearly inconsistent with the
overwhelming realities of state practice and the international system; a
system in which the norm eschewing the use of force is violated fre-
quently and with impunity in some of the most important cases of state
interaction.
A putative norm, however, is a rule of international law only if it is
authoritative and controlling.' 45 In numerous instances there are pro-
found violations of the Article 2(4) norm; specifically, when a state
judges foreign policy goals to be at stake, it will generally not allow it-
self to be circumscribed by the prohibition of Article 2(4).146 In a decen-
tralized system that exists today, international law can only be consti-
tuted through state practice followed as a matter of legal obligation.' 47
141. AREND & BECK, supra, note 136, at 178.
142. Bowett, supra note 124, at 20.
143. The view that the sovereignty and integrity of the state, as enshrined by Article
2 of the UN Charter, is no longer sancrosant is succinctly stated in the International
Court of Justice's recent Appeal's Chamber opinion in Prosecutor v. Tadic:
"It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice,
should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against hu-
man rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the reach of law and as
a protection for those who trample underfood the most elementary rights of humanity."
Further, "a [s]tate-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a
human-being-oreinted approach ......
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 32, 54 (1966). See also, Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the
Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 238 (1996); Bowett,
supra note 124, at 50.
144. Ian Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183-268
(1961).
145. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 60-61 (5th ed. 1955).
146. See generally Myres McDougal & F. Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 93-96 (1961). The propensity to obey international rules disappears when
to do so could be tantamount to self-destruction.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
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If state practice does not coincide with a putative norm, even one en-
shrined in a treaty such as the UN Charter, then the practice, rather
than the putative Charter rule becomes the norm. To again quote
Arend and Beck:
In 1945, fifty-one states chose to enunciate a particular rule relat-
ing to the use of force by ratifying the United Nations Charter. Since
then, these states and over one hundred additional ones have, through
their actions, chosen to change the rule. Even though there have been
no formal acts that have attempted to change the written words of Ar-
ticle 2(4), the behavior of these states has been sufficient to effect a
change.
148
Indeed, some have argued that Article 2(4) is "dead." Professor
Franck argued in 1970 that the practice of states "has so severely shat-
tered the mutual confidence which would have been the sine qua non of
an operative rule of law embodying the precepts of Article 2(4) that, as
with Ozymandias, only the words remain.149 Twenty years later, in his
The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Franck, in acknowledging the
egregious lack of control of putative rules dealing with the use of force,
commented:
The extensive body of international 'law,' oft restated in solemn
texts, which forbids direct or indirect intervention by one state in the
domestic affairs of another, precludes the aggressive use of force by
one state against another, and requires adherence to human rights
standards simply, if sadly, is not predictive of the ways of the world. 150
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes a state's "inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs .... "151
Many legal scholars have argued that the customary law of self-defense,
as developed from the Caroline case did not survive the language of Ar-
ticle 51 since states parties to the Charter waived their rights to those
aspects of self-defense not specifically permitted. 15 2 A larger number
have argued that the customary international law right of self-defense
remains unimpaired and includes the right to act in anticipatory self-
§102(1)(c)(3) cmt. C (1987).
148. Id. at 182.
149. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
150. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 32 (1990).
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
152. Representative views are included in PHILLIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS, vol. 1166 (1948). Qincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 560
(1963); American Bar Association, Section on International Law and practice, Committee
on Grenada, International Law and the United States Action in Grenada, 18 INT'L L. 266-
67 (1984); Kathryn S. Elliott, The New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in the
United Nations Charter, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67 (1991).
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defense.
5 3
Professor Myres McDougal argues that Article 51 can not be taken
so literally as to preclude a victim from using force in self-defense until
it has actually been attacked. 54 He argues that Article 51 should be in-
terpreted to mean that a state might use military force when it "regards
itself as intolerably threatened by the activities of another."'155 Earlier,
Sir Humphrey Waldock stated that "[i]t would be a travesty of the pur-
poses of the Charter to compel a defending state to allow its assailant to
deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow.... To read Article 51 other-
wise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first strike."1 56 Whatever
interpretation one may take, it is undisputed that the practice of most
member states since the Charter was adopted has been to recognize acts
of anticipatory self-defense as legitimate.
157
Former US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick,
explained it this way: "The prohibitions against the use of force in the
Charter are contextual, not absolute... The Charter does not require
that people submit supinely to terror, nor that their neighbors be indif-
ferent to their terrorization."'5 8 One should note that the language of
self-defense is being invoked to cover military responses that really bear
the characteristics of reprisals or retaliation. 15 9 Nevertheless, because
the language of the Charter essentially prohibits all other acts of uni-
lateral self-help, 60 all uses of force are characterized as legitimate acts
of "self-defense." As one legal scholar lamented:
What the provisions of the Charter have done, in effect, is to deprive
states of valuable tools of self-help and of enforcement of international
rights without substituting a really workable method for achieving the
same ends. It remains to be seen whether states will stand by the
prohibition if and when interests or rights considered to be vital are af-
fected and peaceful methods of settlement or sanction fail.'
6 1
153. See, e.g. BowETT, supra note 124, at 188; Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Limits to
the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, in 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
299-302 (1961); W. Michael Reismann, Coercion and Self-determination: Construing
Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642-45 (1984); Oscar Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620-26 (1984).
154. Proceedings, 57 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 165 (1963).
155. Id.
156. Sir Claud Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 45, 498 (1952).
157. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 146, at 190; Bowett, supra note 130, at 188;
Higgens, supra note 110.
158. Ved Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada-Impact on World
Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 395, 418 (1984).
159. See Oscar Schachter, Self Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259
(1989) (discussion of expanded claims of self-defense).
160. Arts. 2(4), 51. See Brownlie, supra note 144.
161. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 512 (3d ed. 1976).
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Based on an analysis of state practice since the inception of the
Charter, 162 that practice simply does not support the proposition that
the limits of use of force enshrined in the Charter are rules of custom-
ary international law. Indeed, this is hardly a novel observation; Pro-
fessor Reisman has argued for some time that the Charter standard
cannot be said to state the law when measured against the practice of
states. 63 Professor Arend has taken a similar position 164 as have oth-
ers. 1
65
It must be remembered that the Charter does indeed have its own
procedures for dealing with international threats to peace. If the threat
is one that could reasonably be contained or turned aside through call-
ing an emergency meeting of the Security Council, then a unilateral an-
ticipatory self-defense response probably will not be met. At the same
time, in a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret a
provision in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its
fate before it can defend itself. Even in the face of conventional war-
fare, this would also seem the only realistic interpretation of the con-
temporary right of self-defense. 166 Of course, abusive claims may al-
ways be made by states claiming to act in anticipatory self-defense. But
in a decentralized legal order that is always possible; there is no avoid-
ing the judgment that third parties will have to make on claims of self-
defense in the light of all the available facts.
V. A NEW COUNTERPROLIFERATION SELF-HELP PARADIGM:
THE USE OF FORCE IN RESPONSE TO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high du-
ties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of
self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher
obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written
law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all
those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end
to the means.
162. See MARK WEISBURD, supra note 156. Oscar Schacter, The Lawful Resort to Uni-
lateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 291-94 (1985).
163. W. Michael Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 75 (1986).
164. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
165. See VON GLAHN, supra note 161, at 512.
166. But see Louis Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary In-
ternational Law, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 147
(1963).
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- Thomas Jefferson1
67
Those that view international law as rule-based are apt to see those
rules as immutable and static rather than dynamic. Repeated viola-
tions of these rules are to them a reflection of the reality that at the end
of the day international law is dependent upon power: and, if there is a
divergence between the two, it is power politics that will prevail.' 68 The
perception that international law is rules-based-rules impartially ap-
plied and frequently ignored because of the absence of effective cen-
tralized compliance mechanisms-is, I believe, off the mark. True,
there is no world government to enforce the law of nations and the rule
of law, but, as Professor McDougal has described, international law as:
Not a mere static body of rules but. .. rather a whole decision-
making process.... It is, in other words, a process of continuous in-
teraction, of continuous demand and response, in which the decision-
makers of particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims of
the most diverse and conflicting character.. .and in which other deci-
sion-makers, external to the demanding state.. .weight and appraise
these competing claims in terms of the interests of the world commu-
nity and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them.
As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices
and sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and changing as
their demands and expectations are changed by the exigencies of new
interests and technology and by other continually evolving conditions
in the world arena.
1 69
Rules play a part in law, but not the only and by no means pre-
dominant part. Rather, international law should be viewed as process
delineated by established practices and norms. As Judge Rossyln Hig-
gins explained "international law is a continuing process of authorita-
tive decisions. This view rejects the notion of law merely as the impar-
tial application of rules. International law is the entire decision-making
process, and not just the reference to the trend of past decisions, which
are, termed 'rules'."1 70
167. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 279 (Paul Ford ed.,
1898).
168. See generally GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE MISERY AND GRANDEUR OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1963). Professor Schwarzenberger argues that if particular rules of
international law are constantly breached, we cannot continue to call them law.
169. Myres McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the
Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 356-57 (1955).
170. Rosalyn Higgens, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process,
17 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 58, 58-59 (1968). The contrary view is best expressed in Judges
Fitzmaurice and Spender's opinion in the South West Africa Cases in 1962, when the
wrote:
We are not unmindful or, nor are we insensible to, the various considera-
tions of a non-judicial character, social, humanitarian and other... but these
are matters for the political rather than for the legal arena. They cannot be
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Consequently, if international law is to have any relevance in the
eyes of the public and guide the practices of states it cannot distance it-
self from that practice or the social policies it reflects. Judge Higgins is
persuasive on this point:
Policy considerations, although they differ from 'rules', are an inte-
gral part of that decision making process which we call international
law; the assessment of so-called extralegal considerations is part of the
legal process, just as is reference to the accumulation of past decisions
and current norms. A refusal to acknowledge political and social fac-
tors cannot keep law 'neutral', for even such a refusal is not without
political and social consequence. There is no avoiding the essential
relationship between law and politics.
171
We must face the reality that we live in a decentralized interna-
tional legal order, where claims may be made either in good faith or
abusively. We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is to
remove the possibility of abusive claims ever being made. The role of
norms should be the achievement of values for the common good.
Whether a claim invoking any given norm is made in good faith or abu-
sively will always require contextual analysis by appropriate decision
makers-by the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, by
various international bodies and public opinion.
Recently we have seen the emergence of new paradigms beyond the
paradigm of self-defense. These include intervention to remove an "ille-
gitimate regime" or one that denies the "right" to democratic self-
determination. 172 Another, is the growing consensus that states may
act for humanitarian reasons to intervene in the affairs of another coun-
try. 173 Intervention is based on the principle that sovereignty is limited
and that there are certain obligations states owe each other, and which
allowed to deflect us from our duty of reaching a conclusion strictly on the
basis of what we believe to be the correct legal view.
South West Africa Cases, 1962 I.C.J. 466 (Joint diss. op.).
171. Rosalyn Higgens, Integration of Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature
of International Law and Relations, in TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY
(Burns Weston & Michael Reisman eds., 1976).
172. AREND & BECK, supra, note 153, at 192.
173. See, e.g., Glen T. Ware, The Emerging Norm of Humanitarian Intervention and
Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (1997); EMERGING NORMS OF
JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION (Reed & Kaysen eds., 1993). However, many legal scholars ar-
gue against the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g. Ian Brownlie, Hu-
manitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John.
Moore ed., 1974); Richard Falk, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 339 (1968); Louis
Henkin, General Course, in RECUEIL DES COURS 154 (1989). See also Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess.,
Annex 3, Agenda Item 107, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965).
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no state is at liberty to violate. 174 The practice of intervention is, argua-
bly, an admissible means for enforcing these higher claims. The inter-
vention paradigm has been roundly criticized by advocates of the nar-
row interpretation of Article 2(4) and Article 51. For example, one
publicist flatly denied any flexibility in the Charter language of Article
2(4):
Article 2(4) prohibits entirely any threat or use of armed force be-
tween independent States except in individual or collective self-defense
under Article 51 or in execution of collective measures under the Char-
ter for maintaining and restoring peace.
175
Such an interpretation, of course, would deny the right to use force
even in the face of a threat to regional or global peace and security de-
spite the failure of peaceful efforts or measures to reverse the WMD
proliferation decision of the threatening state. So, when the traditional
methods of securing compliance with the law of nations (that is, nego-
tiations, mediation, countermeasures or, in rare cases, recourse to su-
pranational judicial bodies such as the International Court of Justice)
fail, there is no legal basis for responding to the threat. The state must
wait figuratively and literally for the first blow to strike. The funda-
mental change of circumstance brought on by an aggressor's known
possession of WMD can wreck more havoc on regional security than the
actual use of such weapons but it certainly increases greatly the likeli-
hood of a full-blown armed conflict. The proliferant state will directly or
indirectly attempt to achieve its goals by the manipulation of other
states based on the implied threat inherent in WMD possession. Ag-
gression does not usually begin, and injury is not usually incurred when
the first weapons are fired. The uses of force are usually but one phase
of a competition of interest and power.176 As Clauswitz observed, the
aggressor is often peace-loving, and it is his resistant victim who causes
war to erupt: "[a] conqueror is always a lover of peace (as Bonaparte al-
ways asserted of himself); he would like to make his entry into our state
unopposed; in order to prevent this, we must choose war."'177
As the foregoing analysis has amply demonstrated, such a view of
the law is impracticable and far off the mark as a reflection of state
practice. Self-defense, expanded to include pre-emptive acts to elimi-
nate "imminent" threats, is legally supportable, and most scholars make
174. EMERGING NORMs, supra.
175. Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States
in International Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS 544 (1952). See also Richard B. Lillich,
Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, in U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 129-30 (1980): pp. 129-30.
176. War is merely the continuation of Policy by other means." CLAUSEWITZ, supra
note 3, at 87.
177. Id. at 376.
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a plausible case for pre-emption based on the concept of anticipatory
self-defense.17 8 However, in an age of uniquely destructive weaponry
that has the potential to put a population at risk of annihilation, pre-
emptive or anticipatory self-defense responses are also inadequate. The
current self-defense paradigm does not go far enough in providing the
legal justification for using whatever force is necessary to eliminate a
rogue state's illicit WMD program. The new counterproliferation self-
help paradigm proposed here will fill that lacunae and will relieve
states of the burden of continually contorting the round peg of military
response into the square hole of self-defense as interpreted under Arti-
cle 51.
A. The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: Use of Force Criteria
"When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait
until he has struck before you crush him."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt 179
Based on the clear and present danger to international peace and
security, in any case where it has been determined that nonprolifera-
tion efforts have failed and a state has embarked on a program to ac-
quire a WMD capability, any nation, unilaterally or preferably in con-
junction with others, has the right to use force, as a legitimate form of
self-help, to prevent WVMD acquisition or to pre-empt the development
and use of such weapons. International law is always subject to the cri-
teria that it is essentially political by nature and lacking in legal stan-
dards. Since it derives from political events and is often result-oriented,
as this proposal is, care must be taken to formulate a framework and to
derive generally accepted principles or criteria before analyzing actual
events. Otherwise every statement of law will justify or condemn a par-
ticular incident, but no principle will ever emerge or acquire preceden-
tial value.
Recognizing that the use of force should always be limited to situa-
tions that detrimentally affect the international community and the na-
tions that are a part of it, this new paradigm of self-help should only be
applied under carefully crafted criteria upon which the application of
force should be judged. It is proposed here that, in order to be legally
supportable, the following six criteria should be the standard for the use
of force in responding to the threat of WMD proliferation.
178. See footnotes 139-166 and accompanying text supra.
179. Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat of Sept. 11, 1941, quoted in DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 247 (1966).
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1. Notice. A declaratory statement by a regional se-
curity organization or an individual state that WMD ac-
quisition programs or the possession of such weapons, in
violation of treaty obligations or international nonpro-
liferation norms, is a threat to the vital national security
interests of the state, regional security, and international
peace and security.
As already discussed supra, the United Nations, NATO and the
United States have already declared the proliferation of such weapons a
threat to international peace and security. The United States in both
it's National Military Strategy180 and A National Security Strategy for a
New Century8'1 have put rogue nations on notice that illicit acquisition
of WMD is a threat to the vital national security interests of the United
States.
President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, iden-
tified seven categories in which the United States would use force, uni-
laterally if necessary, in furtherance of national interests. One of those
categories included preventing "the dangerous proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."18 2
The United States' willingness to act unilaterally was made clear
when then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,
stated to Congress:
When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of ac-
tion that best serves our interests. We may act through the UN, we
may act through NATO, we may act through a coalition, we may
sometimes mix these tools or we may act alone. But we will do
what ever is necessary to defend the vital interests of the
United States. 183 (Emphasis added)
Unilateral U.S. action firmly rests within a framework of vital national
interests. If interests to the United States are vital and the UN is not
capable of ensuring those interests, then the United States will look to
other means of ensuring the protection and preservation of those inter-
ests. As the target of an anticipated illegal use of force, a state need not
wait before defending itself until it is too late to do so.
Further, a rogue state's failure to conform to the legal norms of the
180. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA i (1997).
181. WILLIAM CLINTON, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEw CENTURY 6
(1997).
182. Anthony Lake, American Power and American Diplomacy, 5 U.S. DEP'T OF
DISPATCH 46 (1994).
183. Warren Christopher, A New Consensus of the Americas, 5 U.S. DEP'T OF
DISPATCH 20 (1994).
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world community or their solemn treaty commitments clearly threaten
global order, peace and security. If an NBC-armed rogue were able to
challenge a major commitment or interest of one of the established nu-
clear powers, and thereby cause that power to back down and appease,
others could draw the conclusion that the security guarantees of the
great powers-especially the United States-and the already limited
promise of collective security are paper tigers. Similarly, the acquisi-
tion of these weapons in contravention of existing legal undertakings,
such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could lead to an unrav-
eling of the international effort to control the proliferation of such
weapons, particularly since other measures such as sanctions have
proven so ineffective. This could prove highly damaging to interna-
tional security. Many states have the capability to build WMD weapons
but for the moment are uninterested in doing so. The actions of an
WMD-armed rogue could lead to the fire-like building of arsenals of
mass destruction in regions in conflict and in regions now free of such
weapons. Such far-reaching changes in the distribution of power and in
the credibility of the major powers would likely erode sharply the inter-
national processes and institutions that are the current foundation of
international order. These changes would eviscerate the norms and
principles of the UN Charter, if not lead to their eclipse by new norms
antithetical to the interests of justice and peace.
In the international system today, many small and medium-sized
states depend upon international norms and collective mechanisms to
compensate for their own modest capabilities to provide for their own
security.18 4 Therefore, defending the stability of the system is in the na-
tional interest of overwhelming majority of states. The world order ar-
gument thus creates an additional justification for preventive or pre-
emptive action. Protecting the world from a WMD catastrophe is long-
term self-defense.
2. Threat. The threat must be a concrete, persuasive
threat rather than a speculative or unsubstantiated one.
Attack with WMD need not be imminent but, by objective
evidence, a state must reasonably determine (1) the exis-
tence of an illicit WMD program, and (2) that past behav-
ior or declaratory statements indicate that acquired
WMD will be used as an aggressive force against it's vital
national security interests, or regional peace and secu-
rity.
Whether or not the WMD threat is "imminent" as required under
184. Literature about international regimes abounds. See e.g., Stephen Krasner, ed.,
International Regimes, special issue of INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, vol. 36, no. 2,
(1982); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY (1984); VOLKER RITTBERGERIPETER MAYER,
REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1993).
VOL. 27:3
1999 THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION SELF-HELP PARADIGM 521
the current self-defense paradigm is irrelevant, and requiring such cal-
culations prior to using force potentially has the affect of forcing a state
or states to wait until it's too late. The rogue proliferator will have al-
ready deployed the weapon or, worse, used it. When the threat to a
state's vital interests is predicted as the logical conclusion of a course of
events, that state, in cases of WMD proliferation, must have the legal
right to take preventive action rather than waiting until the threat be-
comes more immediate. While there is latitude for national decision
makers to make independent determinations concerning what are a
state's vital national interests, inevitably, once a decision is made and
acted upon, it will be the community of nations that ultimately decide
the correctness of the decision based on whether the nation's percep-
tions were reasonable, given the actual circumstances under which it
acted and whether a reasonable nation with such perceptions would
have acted the same way.
A nation's decision makers, under this condition, need to make it
emphatically clear that illicit WMD acquisition is a threat of such mag-
nitude that the perpetrator is on notice that if the traditional tools of
statecraft or diplomacy fail, all other means, to include the use of force,
are available. A nation that uses those "other means" will be legally
justified. So, in addition to the political declaration the world commu-
nity has made against WMD proliferation, states need to develop not
only the military capability to act, but also provide the requisite domes-
tic legal authority. For example, in 1966, Congress authorized the
President to "use all necessary means, including covert action and mili-
tary force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastruc-
ture used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist
training facilities and safe havens."'8 5 A similar authorization to target
WMD "infrastructure" developed by rogue states would accomplish the
dual purpose of raising the costs to a potential proliferator and re-
enforcing the legal basis for responding to the threat.
In determining intent, the relationship between the parties is criti-
cal. Past aggressive acts, disregard for sovereign integrity, support for
terrorism and terroristic acts against the state or its allies, violations of
the laws of war, and repetitive threats of future action may support a
reasonable apprehension of attack. On the other hand, prior peaceful
relationships would raise the standard to one requiring a direct and
specific threat of the use of force to provide justification for the use of
force; i.e. meeting the anticipatory self-defense standard. In sum,
evaluation of the facts must lead a reasonable person to believe that a
state, which historically has not complied with international norms or
made declarations of its intent not to abide, has embarked on the path
185. U.S. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1255, § 324
(1996).
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of WMD proliferation, and the threat is sufficiently concrete to require
contemplation of the extraordinary application of the use of force.
3. Force Imperative. A finding that further delay in
undertaking the preventive strike will compromise secu-
rity and will unreasonably increase the possibility of
harm to its civilian population or will exacerbate the
threat to the region or international peace and security.
The threatened state must determine, in terms of time and degree,
whether a use-of-force response is necessary. If so, this standard de-
fines a clear course of action, and critically, provides the international
community with a means with which to judge any action taken. Once a
state has chosen to use force, the legality of the act is not determined by
the depth of the state's explanation, but by how closely the act corre-
sponds to the pattern of practice sanctioned by the international com-
munity. In how to determine the legitimacy of the response to the
threat I would offer Professor Walzer's useful commentary:
The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not going
to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at the point of suffi-
cient threat. That phrase is necessarily vague. I mean it to cover
three things: a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation
that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in
which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magni-
fies the risk.... Instead of previous signs of rapacity and ambition,
current and particular signs are required; instead of an "augmentation
of power," actual preparation for war; instead of the refusal of future
securities, the intensification of present dangers. 186
So, expanding on Professor Walzer's commentary, states that dem-
onstrate hostile intentions, act in such a way as to abrogate specific le-
gal undertakings or contravene accepted norms of international behav-
ior and otherwise act in a way to adversely affect the peace and security
of a region or neighboring state become a legitimate target for a mili-
tary response to those illicit acts-a response that is legally justifiable
and therefore legally appropriate. The acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction fits nicely under this criterion. Such actions can confirm an
intent to injure, create a positive danger, and raise the risks of waiting.
Their dispersal in time of crisis would certainly signal preparation for
war. Acquiring such weapons and a viable delivery system and pre-
paring for their use would qualify as a "sufficient threat," particularly if
done so by a "rogue" regime since such regimes have already demon-
strated their propensity to act outside the bounds of normative behav-
ior.
Obviously, there are risks in preventive/preemptive responses to
186. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 81 (2d ed. 1992).
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WMD threats as posited here. It has the potential for nuclear confron-
tation. If the strike is not successful in eliminating an aggressor's NBC
weapons and he opts to use them in reply, the use of force would have
unleashed a terrible chain of events. Wars such as this may or may not
prove to be massively destructive, depending on the choices made by the
aggressor and the character of the arsenals and delivery systems avail-
able to him. No rogue has the nuclear capacity to annihilate a major
power, although each major power has the capacity to annihilate a
rogue. The nuclear powers would have to consider whether or how to
use nuclear weapons in meeting the aggression of such states, not sim-
ply in deterrence or for national survival, but for larger purposes of in-
ternational order. Arguing here that it would be legal to do so does not
make for an easy answer since any use of force will always have moral,
geo-political and domestic ramifications to a state's decision-makers.
As the world's only superpower, the United States faces a real di-
lemma in cases where it might undertake preventive/preemptive strikes
against rogue states that have not first made military attacks on it. If it
arrogates to itself the right to determine when and how to strike at na-
tions it considers outside the law, it may be judged as having put itself
above the law. In this particular historical moment, the United States,
as the world's dominant military, economic, and political power, has
been cast in the role of primary defender of the global status quo--of the
existing balance of global power and of the institutions it has labored to
put in place to promote global stability, prosperity, and liberty. 187 As
the defender of the status quo, it has a special stake in turning back the
aggressions and deterring the potential aggressions of rogue nations.
The concern that the United States not put itself above the law is par-
ticularly evident among its closest allies, for their partnership with the
United States is based on a belief in its benign use of power and on the
legitimacy it enjoys within their societies as a steward of common inter-
ests. 88 Both of these qualifications would be eroded by acts outside the
law.
The United States, therefore, should always encourage, where pos-
sible, collective action against WMD proliferation as it has done with
the NATO Alliance, and use the standards set forth here in these crite-
ria to explain why the use of force was necessary, justifiable and legally
supportable. Today, the vast majority of states side with the United
States in its commitment to the preservation of hard fought nonprolif-
eration norms, so long as this permits them the opportunity to make
evolutionary changes in the ways that promote justice, peace and pros-
187. See WILLIAM CLINTON, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 5-
6 (1998).
188. For example, NATO members have leveled criticism at the potential unilateral
use of American military force to destroy WMD. See Natalie J. Goldring, Skittish on
Counterproliferation, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 12 (1994).
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perity. The world community must declare that any state that embarks
on an illicit WMD acquisition program or allows transnational terrorist
groups to do so on their territory forfeits any of the protections and pro-
cedural guarantees currently in place and enshrined in the UN Charter.
It is vitally important, therefore, for the United States, as currently the
only power capable of responding worldwide to the proliferation threat,
establish the concrete legal basis for the use of force in order that the
world community will accept and embrace the standard supporting
nonproliferation.
4. Discriminate Response. The use of force to elimi-
nate the threat is proportional. That is, the least amount
of force should be applied to resolve the threat. If de-
struction or elimination of the WMD program is re-
quired, the use of force will be limited to the facilities
that relate directly to the threat.
Another essential requirement must be that only the minimum
force necessary be used to eliminate the threat. Specifically, this prin-
ciple of proportionality is enshrined in traditional jus ad bellum (when
it is legally justified to use force) and jus in bello (the appropriateness of
the type and use of weapon, and the duration and magnitude of weapon
use in comparison to the object of attack and the potential for collateral
damage) concepts of conducting war or using force in international rela-
tions. 8
9
With regard to jus ad bellum, the proportionality of preven-
tion/preemption is clouded by a number of factors. Even if the use of
force successfully prevents the aggressor's use of those weapons, the
cost of that thwarted aggression cannot be known-certainly not pub-
licly proven. Most WMD arsenals have been used not militarily but po-
litically, to coerce a potential adversary to make an important conces-
sion (either to do or to refrain from doing something). 90 The costs of
this "use" cannot readily be compared with the costs of the military at-
tack upon them. However, the potential coercive use of WMD arsenals
does provide a legitimate basis for a prevention/preemption response.
As history as demonstrated dramatically and with regularity, appease-
ment or untimely inaction typically emboldens aggression and those
acts of aggression are usually only reversed at an enormous cost.191
189. See, e.g. FRITS KALSHOVE, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 29-32 (1987);
ESBJORN ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 12-14
(1979); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (FM27-10) 3 (1956).
190. During the Cold War nuclear protagonists deterred each other through the
threat of mutual annihilation. Likewise, non-nuclear states were coerced through
threats, overt or implied, of the possibility of nuclear attack. See LAWRENCE FREEDMAN,
THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 87-8, 192-3, 318-19 (1983).
191. Id. at 95; HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 310-12, 531 (1994).
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5. Positive Outcome. There is a reasonable chance
that the proposed use of force will be successful. That is,
it will eliminate the WMD program or site, or signifi-
cantly, in terms of cost, time, and resource allocation,
degrade the ability of the proliferator to resurrect the il-
licit program.
The military and technical risks of any use of force have to be care-
fully weighed and evaluated in terms of objective national criteria de-
fining the "success" of the use of force. Usually military forces will be
tailored to the target, backed by timely and accurate intelligence and
with the right on-call technical experts. 192 Depending on the specific
situation, the political costs-both at home and overseas-also are
likely to vary. They could range from intensely critical in the case of in-
terception of questionable but legal dual-use transfers to widely wel-
coming in the event of use of military forces to block transfer of or re-
cover stolen NBC weaponry or critical materials.
Whatever the scenario, it is vital that an appropriate assessment be
made to determine if the attack will either eliminate the WMD program
or so degrade its capabilities or resources that the proliferator can no
longer carry on the program, at least for the near term. If information
is insufficient to give the responding state high confidence that the pro-
gram can be eliminated, then the use of force should be shelved in favor
of using the other tools of statecraft or until sufficiently identifiable tar-
gets present themselves. So, for example, once a program has been un-
derway for some time, the military requirements of successful military
preventive action-from accurate intelligence on all facilities and sites
to target destruction with a politically acceptable risk of collateral or
environmental damage-are likely to be very high.
6. Last Resort. The potential victim state should
continuously seek to resolve the threat by other means
unless it would, based on the actions of the aggressor,
reasonably be seen as futile.
To the extent practicable, a state must affirmatively pursue alter-
native modalities of resolution and remained engaged in the diplomatic
process until the ultimate moment of action. Military action shall not
be undertaken unless all other reasonable means have been tried and
have failed. This does not mean all conceivable means, rather those
that policy makers within a particular country have determined to be
sufficiently exhausted as to reasonably leave the recourse to force as the
192. See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1997); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 100-5 OPERATIONS (1993).
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reasonable course of action. 193 These decisions are never easy and there
is no commonly acceptable standard of proof by which states make these
decisions. While the evidence must be more than "some" it does not
have to rise to a level beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence sufficient to
convince any prudent person that a threat to the national security or
vital national interests of the state will warrant a military response.
What that evidence is depends on the circumstances. Obviously, when
a state is confronted with a rogue regime bent on acquiring WMD the
last resort criterion will be subject to a quite narrow interpretation.
Of course, if the political climate supports it, a state should always
attempt to secure UN Security Council action or, minimally, an en-
dorsement for the use of force in response to WMD proliferation. There
already exists a presumption of Security Council support given its con-
demnation of proliferation. This could help not only to fill non-
compliance gaps, but also to build norms and lessen insecurities that
could shape other countries' proliferation decisions. While a state could
always seek endorsement by the Security Council for a decision to strike
preemptively, there are, however, many practical reasons not to con-
sider such a move, not least the warning likely to be given to the target
state proliferator by such an action, which might induce it to disperse
its weapons or to perhaps use them before losing them.
Also, preemptive use of force is a exceedingly unpopular measure
usually generating strong negative reactions in key regions of the
world.' 94 In fact, even the characterization of certain states as "rogue"
for violating established international norms by the United States, and
its subsequent policies to isolate them and undertake counterprolifera-
tion preparations for possible military action against their WMD pro-
grams and facilities have been much criticized, not least by U.S. friends
and allies who see such actions as an effort to put the United States
above or outside the law. 195 In any case, it is extremely difficult to sepa-
rate defense of national interests that one state but not others see as
common, or to justify an attack as a defense of norms that it asserts but
others do not support.
In sum, in order for use of force to be justified under this new para-
digm all six interrelated conditions or criteria must be satisfied if the
193. "[T]aken literally... 'last resort' would make war morally impossible. For we can
never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it." Id. at xiv.
194. See, for example, responses to Israeli attack on Iraqi's nuclear reactor in 1981
and the United States raid on Libya in 1986 drew criticism from around the world. See
United Nations, Security Council, Official Records: Resolutions and Decisions of the Se-
curity Council, 1981, Resolution 487 (1981) S/IUF/37 (1981); Frederick Zilian, Jr., The
U.S. Raid on Libya-and NATO," ORBIS, Fall 1986, at 499-524; CLYDE MARK, LIBYA: U.S.
RELATIONS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (1987).
195. See generally MICHAEL KLARE, ROGUE STATES AND NUCLEAR OUTLAWS:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY (1995).
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use-of-force response is to be legitimate and legally supportable. Obvi-
ously, in determining the propriety of the use of force in these cases cer-
tain ambiguities, problems of interpretation, difficulties of factual appli-
cation, and standards of proof problems will arise. There will always be
those that require more certainty and specificity than is factually or po-
litically possible. However, as Professor Brownlie observed: "Those who
demand the perfect definition present an attitude of mind more suited
perhaps to the design of precision instruments than the making or for-
mulation of legal rules." 196
Inevitably, the nature of the threat to peace and stability, the evi-
dence presented establishing an illicit WMD program, the degree of
limitation on the use of force in response to the threat, the achievement
of the desired goal by the use of that force, and the degree of subsequent
reaction to that action by the world community at large will determine
the legal appropriateness of each instance in which force was the chosen
in response. Four previous cases in which the acts in response to the
threat were characterized as self-defense (or likely would have been so
described in one case) have been chosen to apply the criteria to demon-
strate how this new legal paradigm supports and validates the applica-
tion of force in response to proliferation threats with clear, easy-to-
understand guidelines for both decision makers and their publics.
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense in Responding to the WMD Threat: Four
Case Studies
Neither the United States of American nor the world community of na-
tions can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the
part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where
only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a
nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so
destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially in-
creased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deploy-
ment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.
-John F. Kennedy
97
1. The Cuban Missile Crisis
One of the most useful examples for the application of these criteria
is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President Kennedy, in response to
photographic evidence that the Soviets were installing medium range
ballistic missiles capable of hitting large portions of the United States,
196. Ian Brownie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. 183 (1961).
197. 47 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 715, 716 (1962) (address by President Kennedy, The Soviet
Threat to the Americas).
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declared that United States military forces would interdict the delivery
of offensive weapons and associated material going to Cuba.19 8 Cuba
was to be "quarantined" from receiving any "offensive" weapons. 199 This
involved putting naval forces around the island and boarding and
searching all vessels bound for Cuba, in effect a blockade.200 Further, it
was announced that any continuation of "offensive" military prepara-
tions would justify "further action" on the part of the United States.
20 1
The State Department primarily defended the "quarantine" as a collec-
tive action against a threat to the region as a result of authorization of
the Organization of American States and thus appropriate under the
UN Charter.20 2 Most commentators on the legality of the United States'
activities sought to justify the naval "quarantine" used to stop missile
parts from reaching Cuba as a legal exercise of self-defense. 20 3 Other-
wise, it would be a violation of the Article 2(4) prohibition against the
use of force. 20 4 However, under the counterproliferation self-help para-
digm the quarantine would have been legally supportable as a legiti-
mate response to a WMD proliferation threat.
The nonproliferation norms that exist today did not exist in 1962.205
If it had, this clearly would have been a violation of the NPT. Certainly,
the United States was unambiguous in its response and made it em-
phatically clear that this deployment of nuclear-armed missiles was a
grave threat to potentially the survival of the nation and to regional
peace and security.206 Arguably, the presence of missile sites or nuclear
weapons in Cuba did not per se constitute a threat against the United
States and the Western Hemisphere. Their presence, only when con-
sidered together with other factors, created a real threat. The most im-
portant factor to consider is the purpose behind the introduction of the
missiles and the intention for subsequent use.20 7 The aggressive inten-
198. See James S. Campbell, The Cuban Crisis and the U.N. Charter: An Analysis of
the United States Position, 16 STAN. L. REV. 160 (1963); C. G. Fenwick, The Quarantine
Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 588 (1963). Note that this volume has
several articles on this issue debating the legal validity of the quarantine.
199. President John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10401 (1962),
47 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., supra note 197, at 717.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Abe Chayes, The Legal Case for US Action on Cuba, 46 DEP'T ST. BULL. 763
(1962).
203. Myres McDougal, "The Soveit-Cuban Quarantine and Self Defense, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 597 (1963); Carl Christol and Charles Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval
Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated material to Cuba, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L 525; Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
204. Leonard Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515
(1963).
205. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was not signed until 1968. See footnotes
75-78 and accompanying text, supra.
206. 47 DEP'T OF ST. BULL., supra note 197.
207. McDougal, supra note 208.
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tions, based on past acts, of Cuba and the Soviet Union were clear.
208
The record of the Soviet Union in Hungary and East Berlin, and Cas-
tro's well known support for terrorism and "revolutionary" armies
throughout central and South America demonstrated their aggressive
intentions, and previous attempts at attacking or undermining regional
peace and stability.20 9 The mere presence of these missiles in Cuba
would have given Castro the opportunity for blackmail and other mis-
chief in the region.
In customary self-defense terms, the question must also be asked as
to whether or not the danger to the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence or vital national interest of the United States was immi-
nent?21 0 The answer would be affirmative if the mere deployment of
nuclear missiles in Cuba was considered as the danger. If there was
enough evidence to show that the other side was planing an attack us-
ing weapons of mass destruction, the right of self-defense may be in-
voked, even though the exact date of the expected attack is unknown.
211
We can avoid this quandary under the new paradigm by the fact of
WMD proliferation, and that the weapon of choice is a WMD in the
hands of one whose intentions could easily be read from his past con-
duct.
The United States response was proportional and reasonable to the
threat. Indeed, given the Cold War climate of the times, the response
was constrained by the real concern that the overt use of military force
could result in a nuclear Armageddon. 21 2 Assessing Soviet and Cuban
intentions, U.S. decision-makers felt that this limited measure had a
reasonable chance of success in persuading the Soviets to remove the
missiles without recourse to more violent measures. 21 3 Obviously, if
this had not achieved the removal of the threat, other measures would
have been required. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union
continuously sought to resolve the crisis through measures other than
force.21 4 Ultimately, it was a combination of force, threat of nuclear
war, and willingness to compromise that led to a solution that avoided
further uses of force. But, the quarantine and the ultimate resolution of
the crisis met all the criteria of the new counterproliferation self-help
paradigm.
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209. Fenwick, supra, note 198, at 589-90.
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opment of International Law, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 493 (1990).
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2. The Israeli Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor at Osirik
In 1981 Israeli jets bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik. The
international community roundly condemned Israel, and the UN Secu-
rity Council passed a resolution strongly condemning "the military at-
tack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and the norms of international conduct."2 15 Few legal scholars argued
in support of the Israeli attack.216 Of course, subsequent events demon-
strated the perspicacity of the Israelis, and some scholars have re-
visited that attack arguing that it was justified under anticipatory self-
defense.
217
In 1981, as it continues today, there exists a state of war between
Israel and Iraq.2 18 Israel's actions and statements prior to the attack
made it clear to the international community that it would not tolerate
any threats to its national security. 21 9 Iraq was certainly on notice that
any threat, whether it be WMD or conventional, would result in a re-
sponse by Israel.220 Iraq is, by all accounts, a "rogue" state, flouting in-
ternational norms, the will of the international community, as reflected
in the numerous Security Council resolutions, and its acts of aggression
against Kuwait and Iran.221 It has never recognized Israel as a state
and considers itself at war with Israel.222 Iraq is also known for its sup-
port of terrorism, and has been implicated in terroristic acts such as the
215. U.N. SC Res. 487, 36 UN SCOR, 2288th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981). See
also W.T. Mallison & Sally Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self Defense?, 75 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982).
216. See Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 584 (1983).
217. See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's De-
struction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 437 (1995); Uri
Shoham, The Grenada Intervention: The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reac-
tor and the Right of Self-Defense, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191 (1985).
218. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Israeli Air Strike,
Hearings, atl, 4 (1981) (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting United States Secre-
tary of State).
219. For a detailed account of Israeli decision making and subsequent justifications
see DAN MCKINNON, BULLSEYE IRAQ 1988 (especially chapters 13 and 18).
220. Given the state of hostilities between Israel and Iraq, as well as Israel's overt
military actions against perceived threats it is reasonable to assume Iraq would have
known that Israel would attack if evidence persuaded them it was a site for nuclear
weapons programs. See Steve Levenfeld, Israeli Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon:
Self-Defense and Reprisals under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1 (1983). Also, the Iranians had tried to destroy the facility during its war with Iraq. See
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attempted assassination of former President Bush.
223
There is compelling evidence that the nuclear reactor bombed by
Israel would have been used to produce plutonium for weapons pur-
poses even though Iraq had repeatedly denied it had a nuclear weapons
program. 224 Subsequent events have definitively established what Is-
rael through its intelligence sources discovered; Iraq's intent to make
nuclear weapons and to use them against Israel. 225 Iraq continued to
deny any attempts at manufacturing nuclear weapons and it is reason-
able to assume that resorts to peaceful attempts at redress had little
likelihood of success. 226 International inspections continued to give the
Iraqi program a clean bill of health. 227 The proportionality requirement
was met since the attack occurred prior to the reactor's activation, lim-
iting any radioactive fallout, and attacking the facility on a weekend
when there would be few workers about. There was certainly a good
chance of success in terms of severely degrading Iraq's nuclear capabil-
ity since this was the only known facility and the physical destruction of
it would destroy years of effort.228 It would be exceedingly costly and
time consuming to reconstitute the program.
Most legal scholars originally condemned the attack because it was
argued that the danger was not so "imminent" as to require this use of
force. 229 If the threat is not imminent, it does not meet the anticipatory
self-defense requirements and therefore "dangerous as they are, cus-
tomary international law [does] not consider such displays of force ille-
gal so long as they remained on ... the state's own territory, unless
there was evidence of an immediate intention to use them for attack."'230
Under the counterproliferation self-help paradigm, however, given the
horrific nature and potential for destruction and disruption of peace and
international security, the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons (or any
other weapon of mass destruction for that matter) by this state would be
a threat to regional security. Any illicit acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction and their attendant catastrophic consequences should logi-
223. PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON, ADDRESS TO THE NATION, June 26, 1993, reprinted
in 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 21-D (1993).
224. Marc Dean Millot, Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,
WASH. Q 41, 48 (1994).
225. Shoham, supra note 217, at 208.
226. Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1986, at Al.
227. See W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7,
1981, upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense? 15 VANDERBILT J.
TRANSN'L L. 420 (1982).
228. Beth Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Stan-
dard for a Nuclear Age, 59 NEW YORK U. L. REV. 203, 226 (1984).
229. Mallison & Mallison, supra note 227, at 429; MARIAN NASH LEICH, U.S. DEP'T OF
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2933-35 (1995).
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cally give a threatened state the right to respond. Illicit WMD acquisi-
tion is a clear and present danger requiring a response. The new para-
digm accepts that shared values implicit in the current international le-
gal order require the international community or member states to
respond to threats to its survival and a unilateral response is appropri-
ate when the international community cannot or will not respond.
3. The U.S. Secretary of Defense's threat to destroy Libya's
Chemical Weapons Facility
In the 1980s, Libya produced over 100 tons of chemical weapons
agents, and it is one of the few nations to have employed chemical
weapons.231 In 1987 it dropped chemical agents from a transport air-
craft against Chadian troops.232 Libya is not a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, but it is a party to the 1925 Gas Protocol which
bans the use, but not the possession, of chemical weapons in warfare.
233
In response to intense media scrutiny, Libya supposedly shut down its
facility in 1990 but re-opened it in 1995 as a "pharmaceutical" facility,
and began constructing a large underground chemical facility near
Tarhunah, a mountainous region southeast of Tripoli.234 The United
States has accused Libya of continuing its chemical weapons program,
which Libya denies. 235 Libya has also embarked on a ballistic missile
acquisition program.236 It is attempting to acquire the No Dong missile
from North Korea with a reported range of up to 1000 kilometers.
237
This would allow Libya to threaten all of Egypt, Israel, NATO countries
in southern Europe and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. 238
Secretary of Defense William Perry condemned the Libyan chemi-
cal weapons program, in announcing it to the world, and when asked
whether the United States was contemplating the use of force to destroy
the plant, he replied, "I wouldn't rule anything out and I wouldn't rule
anything in."239 He also stated that the United States would not allow
231. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 35.
232. OFFICE OF THE SEC. OF DEF., PROLIFERATION:THREAT AND RESPONSE 26 (1996);
Duel over Rabta, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1989, at 34. Also, in January 1989, a Sudenese re-
bel group alleged that Libya had used chemical weapons against it during the previous
six months. John Pear, Suddenese Rebels Say They are Victims of Poison Gas, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
233. Multilateral Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, 26 U.S.T. 583,
T.I.A.S. 8062, available in 1975 WL 39791.
234. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 232, at 27.
235. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 35.
236. Id. at 37.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 36.
239. John Lancaster, Perry Presses U.S. Charge Against Libya, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
1996, at 1.
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Libya to open the plant.240 He later warned Libya and other nations
that any use of chemical weapons against it would result in a "devas-
tating response. In every situation that I have seen so far, nuclear
weapons would not be required for response, that is, we could make a
devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would
not forswear that possibility."24' Under anticipatory self-defense analy-
sis a use of force against Libya's chemical warfare capability and its
means of delivery without a demonstration of "imminent" use would fail
and therefore be subject to condemnation as an illegal use of force. Un-
der the counterproliferation self-help paradigm the use of force would,
however, be legally supportable.
First, United States pronouncements were clear and unambiguous
that it would view acquisition of this capability as an international
threat to regional peace and security. 242 The acquisition efforts contin-
ued despite overwhelming world condemnation for chemical weapons.
Libya has already demonstrated its contempt for its treaty obligations
by using chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Gas Protocol. It is a
well-known sponsor of terrorism, and it is currently harboring at least
two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988, in violation of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 731.243 It is a state under UN sanctions, im-
posed by UN Security Council Resolution 748, for its refusal to comply
with its international legal obligations. 244 It is a rogue state.
Second, Libya has already demonstrated its willingness to use
chemical weapons and its attempts at acquiring a long-range ballistic
missile capability is further evidence of its offensive intentions. 245
Libya's well-documented terrorist affiliations and a report that it was
training its air forces in mid-aid refueling, a technique that could con-
ceivably enable Libyan aircraft to reach Israel, increased the concern
that Libya would use its chemical weapons.246 Third, based on past acts
and future intentions, the United States could reasonably conclude that
the best time to strike would be before the weapons are deployed. 247 On
240. Secretary Perry declared that Libya "will not be allowed to begin production" and
strongly intimated that the United States would use military force to enforce this prom-
ise. Philip Shenon, Perry, in Egypt, Warns Libya to Halt Chemical Weapons Plant, N.Y
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996, at 4. No attempt was made to ground this declaration on any legal
rationale for justifying the use of force against the site in Libya. Libya is not a party to
the Chemical Weapons Convention and there does not exist any legal prohibition against
possessing chemical weapons. Interviews, Office of Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the
Joint Staff, Aug. 27 1998.
241. William J. Perry, Statement on Libyan Chemical Warfare Facility at Tarhunah
Air War College Conference on Nuclear Proliferation Issues (Apr. 26, 1996).
242. Id.
243. See U.S. DEP'T OF ST., PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 24 (1997).
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the other hand, as far as the facts are currently and publicly known, the
United States could just as easily conclude that this is not the right
time to respond. As already discussed, an evaluation of state use of
force under this criterion will be heavily situational and fact dependent,
subject to the responding or threatened state's evaluation of evidence.
248
Fourth, an attack on the identified facilities will in all likelihood meet
the proportionality test. They are located in an isolated area so damage
and injury to civilians and civilian infrastructure would be minimal. 24
9
Finally, Libya has already demonstrated its disregard for peaceful
resolution of this issue and has denied that it has a chemical weapons
program. By any reasonable standard further dialogue or Security
Council resolution would have no effect on Libya's CW program. Under
the counterproliferation self-help paradigm the use of force to eliminate
this threat is legally supportable.
4. The United States Attack on the Sudan "Chemical Weapons"
Facility
On August 20, 1998, the United States attacked with cruise mis-
siles and destroyed a pharmaceutical plant near Khartoum, Sudan that
U.S. intelligence sources had identified as a chemical weapons facil-
ity. 25 0 This attack was part of a U.S. response to the bombings of two
American embassies in East Africa two weeks earlier by a terrorist
group led by Osama bin Laden, an exiled Saudi who had "declared war"
on the United States and the West. The United States also attacked bin
Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan. The legal justification for the
U.S. attack was "as an act of self-defense." More specifically, because
the bin Laden terrorist group was behind these and other terrorists at-
tacks, he had declared his intention to conduct more attacks, and be-
cause "key terrorist leaders" were gathered at the headquarters com-
pound the continuing threat was sufficient "imminent" to justify the
attack. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that this
was an act of "prevention," stating, "[t]his is not simply a response to
some specific act, but a concerted effort to defend U.S. citizens and our
interests around the globe against a very real and very deadly terrorist
ties because of their small size and a proliferator's ability to hide such weapons in popu-
lated areas. See Robert Chandler, Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of
Mass Destruction, INSTIT. NAT'L SEC. STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPER #21, August 1998.
248. See footnotes 147-196 and accompanying text, supra.
249. The Tarhunah facility is 60 kilometers southeast of Tripoli in an unpopulated
mountainous region. PROLIFERATION:THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 218, at 26.
250. The facts as discussed here are derived from the Washington Post and New York
Times reports of the U.S. attack. See James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan
and Afghan Targets Tied to Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al; Barton
Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan, Factory in
Sudan, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at 1.
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threat."
251
As discussed earlier, the use of force in response to these attacks
contained elements of both self-defense and reprisals. 2 2 And, as is al-
ways the case, such acts are always controversial even if popular. As
one law professor complained: "The U.S. and Israel are the prime sup-
porters of the notion of retaliation in the world, and they tend to make
legal justifications that other people are uncomfortable with. I'm not
convinced that punishment is useful as a deterrent."2 3 Assuming the
attack on bin Laden's headquarters was a legally sustainable act of self-
defense, the attack on the "chemical weapons" factory is more problem-
atic. So far, the only evidence available supporting the attack is the
U.S. claim it was a chemical weapons facility, that bin Laden was
known to have made financial contributions for its construction, and
that bin Laden was known to be seeking to acquire chemical weapons
for use in terrorist attacks. 254 Assuming for the moment that the facil-
ity was in fact a chemical weapons factory, 255 the United States has not
made a valid argument for use of force under anticipatory self-defense
unless it can convincingly explain that acquisition and use by bin Laden
was imminent. To date, no such claims have been made.
The United States response fairs better under the counterprolifera-
tion self-help paradigm. First, as previously noted, a number of state-
ments and pronouncements have condemned the proliferation of chemi-
cal weapons. 25 6 The United States has made it clear that it would not
tolerate the acquisition of such weapons and it would respond if it con-
sidered it a threat to its vital national security interests. 257 Since the
most recent use of chemical weapons involved a terrorist attack (i.e. the
March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway with cyanide),
there was heightened concern for terrorist use of such weapons. 25 8
Since at least 1996, Sudan has continued to serve as a refuge and
training hub for a number of terrorist organizations. Sudan has failed
to comply with the Security Council's demand to cease supporting ter-
rorists and turn over at least three terrorists wanted in the 1995 assas-
251. Bennet, supra note 250.
252. See footnotes 102-131 and accompanying text, supra.
253. Serge Schmemann, In the War Against Terrorism, Any Attack Has Pros and
Cons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al, quoting Professor Roger Clark, Rutgers Univer-
sity Law School. Another professor from Wharton Business School is quoted as calling
the attacks "a violation of international law." Id.
254. Supra note 250.
255. See Steve Chapman, Doubts Continue to Grow About Sudan Raid, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 1, 1998, at 1.
256. See footnotes 73-78 and accompanying text, supra. See also ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS READER, Jan. 21, 1994.
257. Shenon, supra note 240.
258. PROLIFERATION THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 50.
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sination attempt of President Mubarak. 259 Assuming the facility was
actually a chemical weapons facility, possession of such a clandestine
facility violates the universal ban on such weapons. Currently 169
states have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and there
are 125 state parties.260 Although Sudan has not signed the CWC, ar-
guably the CWC is reflective of the will of the international community
as a whole that states will not possess or use chemical weapons. There-
fore, the prohibition against chemical weapons is arguably a preemp-
tory norm of general international law from "which no derogation is
permitted."
261
Second, while there is little evidence bin Laden was about to use
chemical weapons against the United States, there is more than suffi-
cient evidence for any reasonable observer to conclude he was well on
the road to acquiring such a capability, and that once so obtained he
would find a way to use it. The existence of chemical weapons and an
expressed or implied intent to use it against vital national security in-
terests would be sufficient. The use of force was discriminate and pro-
portional. Precision weapons were used to attack the facility, and it was
done in a manner to limit destruction. Given the use of these precision
guided munitions there was a great probability of success. The facility
was completely destroyed and, although the Sudanese have vowed to
rebuild it, it is unlikely that it will be rebuilt for some time to come. Fi-
nally, it is quite obvious that there would have been little chance of re-
solving the threat peaceably given bin Laden's stated intentions and the
Sudan's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions by con-
tinuing to harbor terrorists.
As all of these examples demonstrate, the new counterproliferation
self-help paradigm is clear, predictable, credible and effective in estab-
lishing a new norm for the use of force. It is constraining in that it is
only applicable in response to violations of the nonproliferation norms
and the rogue state has already, by its actions, demonstrated it is not
amenable to peaceably stopping and rolling back its WMD acquisition
program. It augments but does not supplant the self-defense paradigm
by authorizing states, unilaterally or collectively, to prevent WMD pro-
liferation as well as pre-empting a WMD capability before it becomes an
imminent threat. And finally, it allows states to respond to one of the
greatest threats to the survival of civilization and international peace
and security even though, at the moment, a particular state or region
may not be in imminent danger of attack.
259. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra, note 243, at 25.
260 See Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website
http://www.opcw.org/.
261. Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) in, BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 233 (1972).
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VI. CONCLUSION
"[A]ny startling developments in international law cannot be the
work of international lawyers... [but] must be the outcome of a
changed attitude of Governments prompted and supported in this mat-
ter by an enlightened public opinion."
-Hersch Lauterpacht
262
Since the Charter's inception there has been numerous instances of
armed intervention justified under the rubric of self-defense.263 They
have been controversial due in large part to the expansive-oftentimes
tortured and unconvincing-definition of self-defense offered by the in-
tervening state.264 Many legal scholars have been reluctant to counte-
nance an expansive self-defense rationale because there is "a wide-
spread perception that widening the scope of self-defense will erode the
basic rule against unilateral recourse to force." 265 Yet leaving the law
behind while states respond to the new dangers to civilized peoples is
wholly unsatisfying. I reject the proposition that we should conclude
that the law stops short of these problems, and leave it at that. Fur-
ther, if the strict application of the rules on the use of force leads to re-
sults that seem absurd, as it certainly can, then those rules lose their
credibility. In the face of these threats we need to facilitate the contin-
ued development of legal rules that enable states to deal effectively with
new forms of aggression, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. These new dangers represent offenses against the interna-
tional order itself and undermine the very fabric of international rela-
tions in an insidious way.
The law cannot be seen as irrelevant in situations where a nation's
vital interests or survival is at stake. The United States has made it
clear, particularly with it's recent response to terrorist acts in Kenya
and Tanzania, that it will use whatever means at its disposal to defend
and respond to such threat, and it is ready to act unilaterally when cir-
cumstances require. 266 As Secretary Cohen cautioned:
Any individual or group that seeks to deprive us of [the] ability to
move about as members of the international community is an enemy of
freedom-loving people everywhere, and will be treated as such. The
262. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTED PAPERS, Vol. 2 42
(1975).
263. See e.g. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS
1899-1990, Committee on Armed Services Rpt. No. 13, 1990 (detailing numerous in-
stances of the use of force for self-defense and other purposes).
264. See Roberts, supra note 128.
265. Oscar Schacter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 272
(1989).
266. See footnote 183 and accompanying text.
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American people cannot retreat and hide behind concrete bunkers and
barriers and expect to be a force for good in the world-or even be se-
cure in or own homes.... No government can permit others to attack
its citizens with impunity if it hopes to retain the loyalty and confi-
dence of those it is charged to protect. We can remain free only as long
as we remain strong and brave. Those states that sponsor or support
[such] acts... are not beyond the reach of American's military
might.2
67
Like all law, international law is (or certainly ought to be) a living
institution in a living world society. It is a reflection of the political will
of the community it purports to govern.268 Consequently, it must be re-
sponsive to the needs of that society or it will be ignored. Customary
international law represents the commingling of legal principle and
policy. 269 The breadth of this law is defined by the generally accepted
and sanctioned practices of states, delimited first by policy. When legal
"norms" present an unworkable solution, or mandate an illogical result,
an imbalance in the law exists. In the face of a belligerent state that
has acquired a WMD capability and a credible delivery system, the po-
tential for mass destruction must be the critical factor in the justifica-
tion and timing of the potential victim's response. The destructive na-
ture of these weapons requires that the point of unacceptable danger
move further in time from the actual moment of aggressive use. Policy,
practice, and the law must move to resolve the imbalance.
In responding to the threats to international peace and security and
national sovereignty in the modern age, we have seen states respond to
the challenges while the law vainly tries to keep apace. As new legal
obligations emerge in the areas of humanitarian intervention, pro-
democracy self-determination, and self-help to correct injustices, the le-
gal boundaries proscribing the use of force must change. Numerous
categories of action (e.g. imminent attack and indirect aggression) give
rise to the right of self-defense even if not explicitly accommodated in
the original Charter language. 270 So too then must the legal regime
change to adapt to the new threat of weapons of mass destruction pro-
liferation.
If, as seems obvious, sovereign states are involved in clandestinely
developing and acquiring weapons of mass destruction and delivery sys-
tems (or using surrogates to deliver these weapons of terror), then the
267. William S. Cohen, About Last Week... The Policy: We Are Ready to Act Again,
WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at Cl.'
268. Horace Robertson, Jr., Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's
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(1995).
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law must adapt and a new legal paradigm adopted to allow sovereign
states to effectively respond without themselves being labeled interna-
tional rogues. The response should not be judged on the basis of a
popularity contest but on its legitimacy as a tool of statecraft in the war
against chaos. Fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons with
the potential to destroy us all is, unfortunately, the war of the future. If
the law is to have any relevance in maintaining world order in the face
of this threat it must either adapt or become an anachronistic curiosity.
The highest national interest of all nations is a stable peace based on
respect for the rule of law. Adoption of a legal paradigm that governs
responses to the greatest threat to the new world order is the only way
to return nonproliferation norms to their rightful place of respect and to
prevent the world from sliding into anarchy.
Results in this continuing process will remain as incomplete and
imperfect as nearly everything else in legal development. It will always
remain difficult to make convincing assessments except in retrospect.
Long-term effects often remain obscure, and anticipating objections
which may arise at a later stage is risky by any standard. The law can
not nor should it be discerned in a vacuum or cold sterile void. The law
is but one factor in the human decision-making process; a process that
requires an interdisciplinary approach, one that includes ethical, cul-
tural, technological, economic, and operational considerations. It is not
a fixed set of bright line rules that can be applied irrespective of the fac-
tual context. None of the problems that the use of force is supposed to
solve can be satisfactorily resolved by confident invocation of a "correct
rule."
The United Nations Charter enshrines principles of peace, order
and prosperity and admonishes us to use force only as a last resort in
the face of threats to that peace and order that are unlikely to be per-
suaded to use peaceful means. International law can and must set
strict limitations on the use of force. But to interpret that law to flatly
prohibit such uses in all cases that do not meet the classic paradigm-to
tell a government confronted with the specter of weapons of mass de-
struction that it cannot under any circumstances respond with force be-
cause possession of such weapons, albeit illicitly, is not really an "armed
attack"-is to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the legal re-
straints on the use of force themselves. New challenges demand new
responses. The manner in which those responses are framed can help
determine whether the international legal restraints on the use of force
will be perceived as a meaningful basis for efforts to uphold interna-
tional law, or as merely an anachronistic and irrelevant obstacle. In-
stead of waiting for an unsatisfactory legal regime to respond to a world
order threat, states should agree on a legal paradigm that is responsive
to that threat. The proposed counterproliferation self-help paradigm
will help to clarify the when and how of using force in response to this
extraordinary threat, and when not to.
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access to public
service
Article 19(1) & (2) Article 19(1)(a) Freedom of
Speech
Article 21 Article 19(1)(b) The right of
peaceful assembly
Article 22(1) Article 19(1)(c) Freedom of as-
sociation




Article 15(1) Article 20(1) Freedom from
ex-post facto legis-
lation
Article 14(7) Article 20(2) Freedom from
double jeopardy
Article 14(3)(g) Article 20(3) Freedom from
self incrimination




Article 6(1) & Ar- Article 21 Right to life,
ticle 9(1) liberty & security &
freedom from arbi-
trary arrest & de-
tention
Article 9(2), (3) & Article 22 & 32 Right to be in-
(4) formed of charges
of arrest; right to
legal remedies
Article 18(1) Article 25 Freedom of
thought, conscience
& religion
Article 27 Article 29(1) & Rights of mi-





Page 99 second paragraph second sentence should read:
It secures to every individual, citizens and aliens alike, the right to
invoke the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction for enforcing any of the
fundamental rights.
Page 99, footnote 57 should read:
It submitted the Draft Constitution for the approval of the Con-
stituent Assembly in February 1948.
Page 101, first full paragraph, second sentence, should read:
The express declaration of fundamental rights coupled with the in-
troduction of judicial review in the Indian Constitution marks a radical
departure from the pivotal British Constitutional doctrine of parliamen-
tary supremacy.
Page 102, footnotes 75 and 76:
The phrase [hereinafter Universal Declaration] should be included
in footnote 76, not footnote 75.
Page 104, section F, the subheading should read:
Judicial Interpretation In The First Three Decades of Independence
- Pre-emergency Era (1950-77).
Page 105, footnote 96:
The case L.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab 1967 S.C. 1643, should
read I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
Page 107, second full paragraph, first sentence, should read:
In the aftermath of emergency, the Supreme Court carved a role for
itself in Indian politics quite different from that which it had played
since independence.
Page 113, footnote 151 should not contain the phrase "in the world
is unnecessary".
Page 124, first paragraph, last sentence should read:
In the words of a former Additional Solicitor-general:
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Page 124, last paragraph, first sentence should read:
While these matters are legitimate concerns, nonetheless, they
ought not to be taken very seriously indeed.
Page 125, part III, first paragraph should read:
Jack Greenberg, an American jurist, made a prescient observation
fifteen years ago: "it may be time for United States Courts to begin
looking to international criteria as sources of domestic law on human
rights issues". This observation makes sense even for the Indian judici-
ary.
Page 129, the following paragraph is missing:
Let noble thoughts come to us from all sides goes an ancient Vedic
saying. One hopes that in keeping with this noble invocation and the
Harare Declaration, the Indian judiciary will continue to enrich its ju-
risprudence with international learning.
Page 134, second paragraph, Article 38-A of the Indian Constitu-
tion should be Article 39-A of Part IV of the Indian Constitution, which
deals with the provision of free legal services.
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